Turinys

Foreword

What is at the core of the ethnic processes in contemporary society, and what are the adequate ways to research them? What fruitful ways could be employed to understand the situation and choices of ethnic group members in what is commonly generalised with the cliché "post-communist societies"? This publication explores the possibility of developing ethnicity research via the analysis of adaptation.

The discourse that established itself in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the socialist bloc concentrated on political changes and legal frameworks of ethnic relations. Civil status, voting peculiarities, and human rights have largely dominated the analysis. Another paradigm that has received greater popularity because of the political relevance of the grave events in former Yugoslavia has been that of ethnic conflict. The dominance of those paradigms may be among the reasons explaining the limited conceptual advancement in ethnicity research in most of Eastern Europe. The relatively peaceful societies in the region have not ceased to have ethnic groups, and ethnicity has not disappeared from social life despite the fact that the foundations of a democratic legal system and political rights have been more or less successfully established in a number of countries.

The articles in this volume take a closer look at what occurs on the level of ethnic groups themselves, and the idea of adaptation to the surrounding contexts as well as social changes is present in the perspectives that the authors develop. Most of the papers were presented at the seminar "Social Adaptation of Ethnic Minorities" organised on 12-14 October, 2001 by the Centre for Social and Political Analysis at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. The seminar papers were further developed and complemented by a few later contributions to provide additional highlights on how the context of adaptation can be explored. Most of the authors have rich research experience; the considerations of N. Kasatkina, S. Lallukka, and N. Lebedeva come from or accumulate the knowledge of long-term work in various settings. I believe this to be a valuable circumstance nowadays when there is a clear need both to renew research methodologies and advance comparative studies.

N. Kasatkina presents a specific research project devoted to adaptation and based on a survey of five ethnic groups in Lithuania. She introduces some empirical findings and highlights a number of ideas of how adaptation could be perceived and how ethnicity could be explored accordingly. Her paper stimulates one to transgress the apparent self-evidence of the usual terms such as 'ethnic minority', and to fill them with analytical contents. Before turning to the variety of empirical indicators possible to obtain, she urges for conceptual precision and distinction between the descriptive term "ethnic group" and the particular type of ethnic groups such as minority or diaspora. The peculiarities of the phenomenon of diaspora are brilliantly explored by S. Lallukka, who presents a fragment of his extensive research of Finno-Ugric groups and identifies the social mechanisms that enable one to see that internal diasporas are also a part of reality. N. Lebedeva reviews a great number of empirical indicators that provide a rich background for comparison between Estonia and Lithuania. The material presented is a good basis for considering the extent to which adaptation processes are shaped by their contexts and the extent to which they are universal. M. Vašečka, in his analysis of Slovakia, presents a broad context of recent historical circumstances and social practices that have resulted in extreme challenges of adaptation for both Roma and the dominant ethnic groups. The double marginalisation thesis advanced by the author clearly demonstrates that an analysis of the exclusion of the Roma has to address problems of social structure and cannot be reduced to the more conventional understanding of individual problems of adaptation.

V. Beresnevičiūtė reviews a spectrum of concepts that are quite often used by researchers in a rather haphazard way, without great concern for theoretical coherence. Beresnevičiūtė examines the trends in usage of the concepts of social integration, social participation, social exclusion, and social capital and their relevance to the study of ethnic groups. It is a good introduction for those who search for the links between practice oriented empirical research and broader concepts of social science.

The three essays that close the volume present specific fields of politics and highlight how dominant and minority ethnic groups act in different circumstances. E. Rindzevičiūtė reveals how strongly the ideas of traditional nationalism are present in the current cultural policy discourse in Lithuania. The paper by A. Jansons documents the details of various actors trying to influence public policy in Latvia. And D. Borowska presents the self-organisation of Lithuanians in Poland from a minority perspective.

Hopefully, this volume will be useful both for those interested in general issues in ethnic studies and for those who follow the changes in eastern European societies.

T A D A S   L E O N Č I K A S

I Conceptualising and measuring adaptation

The Adaptation of Ethnic Minority Groups: Defining the Problem (Case of Lithuania)[1]

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ABSTRACT. This paper reviews the adaptation strategies among various ethnic groups in Lithuania. The four variants – assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalisation – are seen as the specific outcome of status, social relationships, and ethnic identity. The context of the four strategies is conceptualised through discussion of the relevant notions of ethnic studies, the importance of status groups, and adaptation challenges. The specific contents of the four are analysed on the basis of survey and interview materials that cover the topics of identification, social distance, closure of social networks, and civic activity. The specific sampling approach was worked out in order to achieve a reliable cross-group comparison of five ethnic samples (Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Tatar). This study aims to overcome the tendency to see minority integration as an issue that can be fully solved politically, and to reveal the contents of ethnic relations and remaining social challenges through sociological analysis.

Ethnicity in contemporary society

Ethnic group, ethnic minority, diaspora: theoretical view

The concept of ethnicity that entered the discourses of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist block quickly established itself as an essential part of social science. However, does it represent any specific methodological view or has it merely replaced the older terms of the languages in the region such as 'nationality'? In fact, ethnicity indeed corresponds to the Lithuanian word '*tautybė*' that was formerly translated as 'nationality' – yet this meaning of the term is only valid in a limited number of fields such as applied studies or statistics. In analytical studies, ethnicity is given preference due to its background in social science. At the same time, this preference for the term 'ethnicity' is strengthened by the fact that the original words related

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[1] This text is related to a research project carried out in 2001-2002 (supported by grants from the State Foundation for Science and Studies (No.398; No.A-564) and the Open Society Fund-Lithuania) and reviews many points of the monograph based on that study: Kasatkina N., Leončikas T. (2003) *Lietuvos etninių grupių adaptacija: kontekstas ir eiga*. Vilnius: Eugrimas (forthcoming).

to the term 'nationality' in the languages of the region are ideologically loaded and belong to everyday usage rather than to terminology theorised in a scientific way. Whatever the loose usage of the notion of ethnicity in social science is, it refers to identity based on common descent and solidarity and takes the issue of social constructing into account. In this paradoxical way, the looseness of the concept of ethnicity becomes its strength: It allows one to refer to a wide range of social groups and identities that have an ethnic dimension – in contrast to the rather strict meaning of 'nationality', which reminds one of the institutions and boundaries in which it is embedded. Further on, we can turn to what specific social characteristics ethnic groups may have; ethnic group, minority, and diaspora can be viewed as the terms that characterize the specificity of the social groups based on ethnicity. Who are the groups based on ethnicity that live in Lithuania: just ethnic groups of the same kind, minorities, or diasporas? It is a question to be considered if we wish to understand where the prevailing modes of adaptation lead to. Like the term 'ethnicity,' ethnic group remains a rather loose notion without precise definition – which, again, may be among the reasons for the term's popularity. A short look at the usage of the term nevertheless enables one to see that it is probably the best and most flexible term to name the varying components of the ethnic composition of society.

Ethnic minority is a term that is widely used in legal and political discourse where it is rather descriptive even though it often goes without a definition[2] (sometimes intentionally). In sociology, however, the term minority is more an analytical category and refers to social stratification and inequality rather than group size[3]. An ethnic group that gets situated in an unequal position or becomes an object of discrimination without being able to counteract it becomes a minority. Regardless of formal conditions for equality, the subjective perception of the situation by the group members is a crucial factor. This perception is shaped not merely by the legal acts establishing equality but also, or even more, by collective experience, symbolic interaction with the majority, and the attitudes of the majority. When minority members perceive their subordinate position as common and join in their wish to preserve their cultural identity, there is a basis for a diaspora to emerge.

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[2] Moreover, there are parallel functioning terms such as ethnic or national origin or 'national minorities' that is more usual in European documents of international law. E.g. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe), etc. See *Human Rights in International Law* (1991) Strasbourg.

[3] See Smelser, N. (1988) *Sociology*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Simpson, G.E., Yinger, J.M. (1985) *Racial and Cultural Minorities. An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*. N.Y.; Feagin, J.R. (1984) *Ethnic and Racial Relations* (2d edition). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, etc.

Besides cultural features such as idealisation of homeland, diaspora communities have often developed specific social organisation[4]. The historical task of minority group adaptation used to be finding a niche in a host society, finding a place in a system of social roles and labour distribution – often in a hostile environment. The cultural features of diasporas both helped them to be assigned to those niches and contained their social mobility. That is why diasporas have often developed corporatism, strong communal solidarity, and professionalism as features enabling survival. At the turn of the 21st century, the problem of diasporas has not lost its importance regardless of the apparent spread of individualism and decreasing group competition on an ethnic basis. The collapse of the USSR or Yugoslavia and migration in the developing countries or to the West result in millions of people that happen to be in the position of minorities – challenged to adapt to the changes. In this respect, diasporas are not at all a phenomenon of the past.

It seems reasonable to assume that the processes and results of adaptation have to do with the model of social organisation that prevails in the ethnic group. For contemporary Lithuania, three types of ethnic relationships (and their outcome: minority, diaspora, or citizenry) seem relevant. Minorities can be created by real or perceived inequality. The minority groups can find a solution in organising themselves as diasporas, but this may occur at the cost of fully-fledged relations with the majority. And thirdly, there could be a community of equal and participating citizens, where non-dominant groups would appear as "integrated minorities".

The ethnic composition of Lithuania

Population structure and migratory processes are objective elements in the context of adaptation. In comparison to the census of 1989, which was carried out in the eve of the great transformations related to the collapse of the Soviet block and the reemergence of the independent state of Lithuania, the 2001 census registered the highest rate of ethnic Lithuanians in the territory of contemporary Lithuania ever. In that sense, there is a small move towards ethnic homogenisation. The numbers and often the rates of other groups, most notably Russians, have decreased. Poles have replaced Russians as the second biggest ethnic group in the country (see Table 2 at the end). The reasons behind the ethnic changes have not yet been studied systematically, yet emigration and decreasing fertility are considered to be among the main factors; we also assume that some assimilation may have taken place too.

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[4] For how the social developments of a diaspora are related to the broader evolution of nationalism, see Gellner, E. (1993) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Ethnic diversity has a regional dimension. While most counties have 90 percent or more Lithuanians, some are different. A few areas have a significant Polish population; this prevails in the Šalčininkai area (89.5 percent non-Lithuanians), the Vilnius area (77.6 percent non-Lithuanians) and some other areas. The most diverse city is Vilnius, while the second most diverse is Klaipėda; Visaginas, the town next to the atomic power plant, is 85 percent non-Lithuanian (Russians make up 52.4 percent of its population). Ethnic diversity was a criterion in choosing the locations for our survey.

A short look through the typology of ethnic groups enables one to realize that there are indeed differing ethnic segments in Lithuania. The flows of migration during the Soviet period are important factors that account not only for ethnic diversity, but also for diversity within ethnic groups. Russians consist of people who came to the country at different times and because of various circumstances, with differing flows, to different places – yet often related to labour migration. Although processes of migration in Lithuania were part of flows throughout the entire Soviet Union, the position of the Russians in this country had some specific features. In comparison to the other Soviet republics, Lithuanian Russians had almost the smallest rate of intelligentsia (Остапенко 1997). Broadly speaking, Lithuanian nationalism in Soviet times was in a way successful in keeping the dominant social roles for ethnic Lithuanians. Russians, on the other hand, appear as less likely to be expected to have good preconditions for adaptation and self-organisation at a time of transformations than could be inferred from their generally dominant role in the Soviet system.

Ethnic groups included in the survey have some specific typological peculiarities that become apparent when considering ethnic composition and classification schemes. Russians and Russian-speakers are mainly postcolonial and labour migrants. The Polish community has a clear regional dimension, they have the legacy of being the border minority and they are challenged by the processes of elite formation. Tatars are an old territorial minority that have integrated many varying elements in their identity (the dominant language has changed several times over the years). An interesting relationship is connected with the so called 'Kazan' Tatars that are largely Soviet migrants and are usually considered to be 'another type' of Tatars than 'Lithuanian Tatars'. Jews are the group that has undergone various aspects of diaspora existence. However, the Holocaust destroyed the evolution and the existence of Lithuanian Jewry; a large part of contemporary Lithuanian Jews are migrants from the territory of the former USSR (Goldstein & Goldstein 1997). The Roma (not included in the survey) exhibit one of the most typical characteristics of a diaspora: due to deep social exclusion, the social mobility of an individual depends on the mobility of the entire group.

Although one ethnic group may often fall into several categories, may consist of differing parts, etc., even a schematic account of social or migratory

segments allows one to better grasp the preconditions and context of adaptation. The adaptation challenges intensively emerged in the milieu of the changing political regime and social structure in the early 1990s.

Ethnicity in everyday life

The consideration of ethnicity is concluded with notes on how it appears in everyday life in Lithuanian society. For many people today, "ethnic relations" do not seem to be an important issue. There are no evident ethnic clashes or massive tensions. Ethnicity is, metaphorically speaking, mollified and calm. Does this mean it has lost all social impact? A closer look reveals that ethnicity remains quietly present in everyday life, influences interpersonal relations, and is reflected in opinions about various groups in society. The answers to the question "how do you recognise a person of another ethnicity?," as a rule, referred to physical appearance. The classification of people by appearance seems clear, simple, and a matter of common sense, although the outcomes of such classification may not be that simple for those classified. Anyway, it comes as a surprise that the criteria of ethnic recognition that are common in everyday life are not consciously perceived by the respondents. Most inhabitants of Lithuania do not have very specific racial features, yet in everyday life we make guesses about their ethnic belonging. The most common criteria are surname and accent. Language is an especially important, if not critical, criterion of Lithuanian identity. While the linguistic criterion as a marker of ethnicity remains, its function has radically changed. At the beginning of perestroika, the non-native speaker speaking Lithuanian was an object of admiration; nowadays, he/she is an object of derision due to accent. Hypertrophied linguistic sensitivity results in constant recognition and reminding of ethnic boundaries and, at the very least, does not encourage the public participation of non-Lithuanians. Accent, surname, or appearance are banal and often misleading criteria, but their importance is in their presence. Obvious or less visible, ethnicity remains in everyday life. Ironically, often it does so without any efforts from cultural activists.

Minorities and status groups

The chapters on status and adaptation introduce the basic assumptions on which the research project was based.

Understanding status. Status group and its relevance

Apart from traditional status distinctions such as the differences between prescribed and achieved, ethnicity may become a status element in more subtle ways. The outcomes of adaptation are complicated when the statuses in minority and

majority groups do not correspond or contradict each other; the mismatching statuses may result in the marginalisation of such an individual. However, keeping both statuses can be a conscious decision by an individual, e.g. local ethnic community leader who otherwise is known as an average schoolteacher. The contradiction of statuses becomes a problem if an individual wishes to overcome it, but cannot do so. The social environment may strengthen certain status contradictions, e.g. when an ethnic party leader (say, charismatic leader of the minority community) is not allowed to take certain public roles (that are considered important by the majority). A minority can also punish a coethnic individual for a perceived venality or lack of support. Can statuses within minority and majority correspond? The exemplary case of status match are Lithuanian Karaits. Leaders of their tiny community are well known and respected by the majority. An example is H. Kobeckaitė, who has led the Minority Department, has been a representative to the Council of Europe, and who currently works as an ambassador.

A further issue is the relationship between status and social mobility. In a society in transformation, such as Lithuania, the formal criteria of stratification seem to say little about individual status. An office secretary in an auditing firm such as Delloite & Touche and an owner of a few kiosks in an ordinary city district may both have the same level of education and income. Yet their status repertoire can be mutually exclusive: the respectable shiny townswoman and employee working in the city centre, and a small owner and employer, having no office and rarely reading a leading newspaper. The cultural aura of the status group rather than income or education alone seems to better express the social success or failure of a person. Therefore, we constructed a nine-item scheme of status groups that in one way or another symbolize status change during the last decade. This scheme was a tool to choose those individuals for the survey that have particular experience of changing status (adaptation), challenged either by pressures or opportunities of the great changes.

Minority groups

When society treats a certain characteristic as a special feature, it creates the preconditions for a minority identity to emerge. Depending on context, any feature can become to be seen as atypical. Yet, a specific criterion is inequality – minority members often experience injustice or feel like an object of collective discrimination. When discussing discrimination, sociology stresses the distinction between attitudes and behaviour, yet this distinction creates confusion when we try to assess the situation of minorities. One of the puzzling questions, often asked by journalists as well as our colleagues, was whether Lithuanians in Visaginas or Šalčininkai are an ethnic minority or not? A woman in Visaginas complained that her children were being sneered at for speaking Lithuanian. She also thinks that her career was limited since authorities of the atomic power

plant give preference to "their own kind" (i.e. non-Lithuanians). Formally, this person belongs to the country's majority, but in her environment she feels isolated and constrained – that is why she is almost a classical example of minority consciousness. This example is important to grasp the significance of the subjective feeling that minority members have. Even when the conformity of a minority is successful, i.e. the majority is "satisfied" by the performance of a minority, we should consider the price that the minority members pay for this adaptation. Conformity has its psychological cost for an individual, and adaptation success depends not merely on the willingness and ability to adapt, but also on the degree of pressure from the majority, on the social space that is provided, and barriers that are confronted.

Links between status and ethnicity

It is largely in the informal sphere where the links between ethnicity and status exist in contemporary society (given that civil rights are recognised). Yet how could they be conceived? Let us consider what obstacles would matter for a non-Lithuanian seeking a higher social status. Clearly, it depends on the position sought (its place in the social hierarchy) and on the status boundaries (whether it is a common or exclusive status). However, social ties, social norms, and linguistic competence are specific factors that also have an ethnic dimension. According to our observations and the responses of the respondents, most groups of acquaintances are based on ties formed during one's period of education. As a rule, education groups in Soviet times were monoethnic, and remain so to a considerable extent. The groups of political and social interests are also largely monoethnic. The very character of such groups reduces the chance for a non-coethnic to enter them. Social norms refer to acceptable ways of behaviour. In a society with a wide-spread practice of ethnic recognition (conscious or unconscious prescription of a person to a certain ethnicity), social differences in behaviour are often perceived as ethnic even though they do not necessarily preclude communication. Linguistic competence becomes increasingly important in a contemporary social climate where communication skills are among the crucial means of self-presentation. The language barrier can be encountered by very different people: a taxi driver may have difficulties with the spoken language, a sales agent may lack the proper terminology, and a university professor may be observed to make even small mistakes as she/he communicates to the educated audience. That is, the apparently individual problem can become a factor for ethnic mobilisation. But first of all, it creates isolation. Consideration of the preconditions for status achievement in the background of ethnicity suggests that adaptation may be a good indicator to analyse how the ethnic processes flow in contemporary society.

Adaptation: conception and methodological assumptions

Conception of adaptation

We understand social adaptation as a process of the combination of an individual's aspirations and expectations with his/her possibilities and expectations and the requirements of society. Why is adaptation so central for researching ethnic processes? It has to be noted that it used to be very popular to discuss so-called ethnic relations in post-communist countries and especially the Baltic States in terms of citizenship and minority rights. Understanding adaptation in broader terms is important because an individual may have not only more, but also quite different aims than acquiring a particular civil or national identity. The expectations of most traditional and liberal nationalists that minorities should follow the majority and learn its culture prevents them from seeing what really matters to minorities themselves. A non-dominant population may have wishes other than the majority wants to see: For instance, instead of active loyalty to the state, a minority may only wish to have social security. Civil virtues may be of secondary importance. That's why debate concerning civil society does not help to understand what the goals and perceptions of the adapting minority members are. Legal formalities related to civil status, place of residence, or property can be handled *as* formalities – without greater effect on identity, attitudes, or loyalties. Formally granted rights and orderly civil status does not tell much about civic virtues or the civic skills to use the rights and fulfil the duties. To extend the frame in which ethnic group adaptation can be better grasped, we shall present a theoretical scheme.

We are mostly interested in socio-cultural adaptation, which encompasses both "external" social conditions and individual skills to participate in the surrounding society. For representing the links between cultural identity and social adaptation we turn to the typology of J.W. Berry (Berry 1997; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, Dasen 1992), who worked in the field of cross-cultural psychology and has distinguished four variants of acculturation. His scheme concentrates on individual attitudes along two lines: whether an individual wishes to sustain his/her cultural identity and whether contacts with groups of another culture are free and regular. According to the specific combination of the above two, assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalisation emerge as specific strategies. Our study builds on the former typology but extends it to the social sphere rather than merely discussing personal attitudes.

What matters for adaptation is not merely acculturation attitudes, but also how the surrounding social environment reacts. When there are informal obstacles to an individual's advancement, acculturation does not necessarily guarantee successful adaptation. The opposite is also true. If there are large groups that do not acquire the necessary skills (i.e. acculturation is limited) for main-

taining their welfare and participating in the larger society, their adaptation cannot be considered entirely successful. Both on an individual and a group level, the success of adaptation depends on expectations and aims and on whether a person finds a way to realize them in his/her society. If an individual has any particular ethnic features, implementation of his/her aims in social life has an extra dimension. There is the encounter with majority attitudes, and there is the question of maintaining (or not) the background identity – via family traditions, via choosing a school for children, via choosing friends, etc.

Types of adaptation

Berry's scheme concentrates on individual attitudes and assumes that they are consciously chosen – therefore it is quite legitimate for psychological research to consider the acculturation variants as strategies. In this study we emphasise the social context: Not everything is up to an individual; type of adaptation is therefore more than a strategy of individual behaviour. What can be considered a strategy is a bid for status: Everyone seeks success according to one's understanding. But the results of this attempt can vary: the desired status is either achieved or not, it gives satisfaction or not, ethnic identity either changes or not. The result of adaptation is the complex outcome of the pursuit of status and the social environment. In other words, when an individual strives for status and society reacts to his behaviour, the outcome is a result, or a type, of adaptation. And this result can be aptly grasped with Berry's concepts: integration, assimilation, marginalisation, and separation, as long as their contents include the social dimension. The adjusted scheme of adaptation types:

Adaptation type	Satisfaction with the achieved status	Ethnic identity maintained
Integration	+	+
Assimilation	+	–
Marginalisation	–	–
Separation	– / +	+

Guidelines for researching adaptation: survey themes and sampling peculiarities

Having the above considerations on status and adaptation in mind, we come to designing the methodology for adaptation research. The assessment of adaptation is based on a comparative analysis of responses given by five samples, each of which was drawn from a particular ethnic group. The main topics of the survey cover questions on identity, social ties, and self-assessment of one's social position. Identification tendencies were registered via a suggested list of catego-

ries and via the Twenty Statements Test. The character of social ties was analysed by comparing the ethnic composition of one's circle of friends, relatives, and job colleagues. Besides that, the degree of civic activity was assessed by answers about membership in organisations, participation in public events, interest in politics, and trust in public institutions. The attitudes of tolerance were measured with the help of the Bogardus scale. The perception of how one's social position has changed during the last 10 years was distinguished as one of the central indicators of adaptation success. The aforementioned theoretical scheme of adaptation types is a means to see what all those differences on a number of dimensions actually mean.

Sampling was one of the major challenges for the empirical part of this project, and we hope to have found a successful model for this research that enabled a valid comparison of the ethnic groups. A model of disproportional stratified sample was applied (non-probability sampling); the stratification criterion was ethnicity (as self-declared). A few non-titular ethnic groups were preselected, and approximately the same number of respondents was chosen for each of them. This model allowed the assessment of how the same variables (adaptation aspects) differed in different samples (in our case, in different ethnic groups). Sampling took sex, age, and concentration in particular towns of a given community into account, but the central emphasis in the logical model of this research was on the status groups. Expert groups were used for foreseeing and assigning particular individuals to a particular status group; in some cases, locations rather than individuals were specified (e.g. for finding the unemployed). Sample composition is presented in Table 1 (below).

Sampling phases. For territorial sampling, sites of different ethnic composition were selected (Vilnius as the centre and a case of ethnic variety; Visaginas, Alytus, Šalčininkai, and Klaipėda as locations with a higher concentration of Russians, Tatars, Poles, and Jews; Kaunas as a case where the ethnic majority prevails. Next there was a selection of individuals from the *status groups*. As was formerly discussed, we concentrate on the social positions which have a cultural-symbolic meaning in society and are considered to mean different social success (or success of adaptation) in the current social situation. We constructed the following status categories that bear 'coded' names:

1) "Tuxedos": extraordinary social advancement and income level; the establishment;
2) "Mobile phones": middle range managers mainly in the private sector;
3) "Conference participants": people of science and culture (as a likely case of clear and strong cultural-ethnic identity);
4) "Uniforms": policemen and military;
5) "Hairdressers": personnel of small enterprises (up to 10-15) that often tend to be monoethnic; the case of adaptation in the local social environment – hairdressing saloon, car-repair, kiosk, etc.

6) "Marketplace": self-employed, relying on active individual effort, non-adapted to the institutionalised labour market;
7) "Unemployed": socially critical layer, especially in a time of transition;
8) "Dormitory": residents of the dormitories that used to be built next to the great industrial plants for the migrant labour force; these building settings still remain ethnic and social enclaves;
9) "Pensioners": pensioners as a category of people who are at the end of their trajectory of social mobility and do not have another (stronger) social identity.

Each of the five samples consists of the respondents of the same nine status categories. The samples are not representative of the entire ethnic groups they come from. Instead, everything possible was done to make all the five samples similar in terms of social characteristics such as status, income, and education. This model permits the assessment of how the same variables (various indicators of adaptation) contrast in different samples (in our case, in different ethnic groups). In other words, when social differences are controlled, it is more likely that the differences between the samples are due to the ethnicity factor (i.e. the effect of ethnicity is maximised). Whether and how the ethnic groups differ in their adaptation has been the main issue of this research project.

TABLE 1. Actual distribution of respondents by town.

| | Place of residence | | | | | | | |
	Vilnius	Kaunas	Visaginas	Šalčininkai	Alytus	Klaipėda	Other	Total
Lithuanians	38	35	36	19			1	129
Russians	32	36	36	1				105
Poles	39	8		34			1	82
Jews	34	34	1			31		100
Tatars	31	1	33		32			97
Others	11		34				1	46
Total	185	114	140	54	32	31	3	559

Features of Lithuania's ethnic groups (survey results)

The empirical findings of the research project are covered by a discussion of identification, social ties, and evaluation of one's social status. The data come from survey and interview materials collected in 2001-2002 from Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, Jews, and Tatars.

Identification tendencies

The strongest identification in all the surveyed groups is with the social categories such as coworkers or people of the same profession. Yet differences appear when the respondents evaluate the ethnic categories. When asked to mention the single most important category from the suggested list, Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians indicated one of the social categories while the Jews and Tatars more often mentioned an ethnic one (such as coethnics in Lithuania, diaspora members, or people who speak the same language). The historical diasporas have also declared a more intensive activity in NGOs.

Two largest non-dominant ethnic groups, Poles and Russians, exhibit quite different tendencies of territorial identification. Poles, as well as Tatars, are more strongly attached to various dimensions of Lithuanian territory, and in this way are quite similar to the majority ethnic group. In contrast, Russians and Jews have lesser attachments to the territory of the country. However, as far as Russians are concerned, the low importance of territory cannot be immediately thought to mean the diasporisation of the Russians since identification with coethnics living abroad is quite low (a little higher in Visaginas).

Additional data on how ethnicity is currently verbalised comes from interview materials. Often ethnicity is perceived in banal and schematic terms, which proves that it is a clear and usual part of everyday life. In some cases it is verbalised clearly and extensively, and we call it 'a mobilised ethnicity,' and in some cases it is verbalised vaguely and rather unwillingly, and we call it a declining ethnicity.

Ethnic toleration and social distance

Lithuanians proved to be more "selective" in their relationships with others than Russians or Poles did. There is a higher rate of Lithuanians who say that they can always recognise a person of different ethnicity, while a large portion of Russians and Poles declare they do not notice a person's ethnicity (see Table 3 at the end). Other surveys such as the European Value Survey (EVS) have also revealed that Lithuanians exhibit higher ethnic closure by declaring (43 percent) that ethnicity of spouses matters for the luck of marital life (51 percent think it is not important), while 70-74 percent of Russians and Poles think it does not matter (Leončikas 2000). On the one hand, we notice certain differences in the levels of closure or tolerance, but the hierarchy of disliked groups is very similar for all of the ethnic groups. Selective intolerance "unifies" all the groups against the most disliked categories such as Gypsies, Muslims, and Jews.

According to the EVS, the categories of identity that were disliked have remained stable during the last decade (data from 1990 and 1999). The negative reaction to other disliked categories such as drug-addicts or former criminals has changed, but the items of disliked identity remained on the same level and

in the same order. We link the high level of intolerance for the identity categories to the high prevalence of ethnic recognising that exists on a regular basis. For that matter we refer to Sartre's essay on anti-Semitism where he aptly grasped the consequences of ethnic recognizing. Sartre (Сартр 1991) described the situation during the Nazi-period, when strangers would encounter Jews who were already marked with a yellow star. Willingly or not, with compassion or with despise, the passers-by were looking at the victims and their looks were inevitably reminding the others that they were Jews – without any choice.

Ethnic insularity or exclusion?

A look at the data on social ties reveals the ethnic isolation of certain social segments. In spite of the present preconditions for structural assimilation (i.e. equal rights), there are groups in the sphere of employment that are ethnically isolated (separated). Although this is primarily a feature of small-scale business that is organised along family ties, almost a half of the surveyed Poles and Russians work in a monoethnic environment. A certain portion of respondents (13 percent of Poles and Russians, 17 percent of Tatars, and 21 percent of Jews) also indicated that they do not have Lithuanians among their personal friends.

Social participation is one of the key factors in adaptation of minority groups on a broad scale. Russians exhibit a striking indifference with regard to participation in public life and are the most passive group (see Table 4 at the end). Lack of participation may result in marginalisation of a considerable portion of the population. The satisfactory economic situation of a number of individuals does not tell everything about their perception of social life: Their perception may be greatly influenced by symbolic interaction and by lack of recognition, which results in withdrawal from public life.

It is interesting to note that one-fifth of the respondents indicate that it is important to be Lithuanian if one wishes to get a good job. Moreover, those who mentioned that they have encountered some kind of violation of their rights as minority members, tend to indicate that it happened in the sphere of employment. It all raises concerns about unequal chances for minorities during the process of adaptation.

Perceptions of changes in social status

The central piece of data in this study is a clear difference in the perception of how one's social status has changed. The largest share of Lithuanians think their personal situation has improved. Russians have the opposite opinion (see Graph 1 at the end). This opinion among Russians is noticeable in all of the towns and allows us to conclude that social status and the issue of recognition rather than formal political rights is a barrier to the successful adaptation of the Russians.

Moreover, there is a noticeable opinion among Russians and Poles that there is a constant danger for some of their family members to lose their jobs. The prevailing sense of social insecurity may be one of the basic indicators of the stumbling integration of minorities.

The data on identification, perceptions of social distance and change of social status reveal that ethnicity has different contents in different groups (see Graph 1, Graph 2 at the end). We combine various pieces of data to produce the brief sketches of what could be a 'portrait' of each of the surveyed groups.

Lithuanians. Given the various data that reflect the results of adaptation directly or indirectly, the higher rate of Lithuanians (in comparison to non-dominant ethnic groups) who acknowledge an improvement in their social status seems understandable. Also, there is a higher share of Lithuanians (and, by the way, Poles) that ascribe positive personal characteristics to themselves. As a majority, Lithuanians do not encounter ethnic obstacles in the process of adaptation to the social environment.

When comparing the data on self-evaluation and perceived change in status between Lithuanians and other ethnic groups (where the samples have similar social characteristics) we can make initial assumptions about the ethnic dimension of adaptation problems. These assumptions are strengthened by data that show the higher ethnic closeness of Lithuanians both in the field of primary relationships and in the groups of higher social status. Moreover, Lithuanians are more aware of ethnic stratification (admit that they recognise persons of another ethnicity).

Russians. Russians exhibit the conventional features of an ethnic group less than others: They identify less strongly with categories such as territory, co-ethnics in the country, and co-believers. Confessional or religious identity barely appears among the self-declared identities and is rarely given any importance on the list of suggested identity categories. At the beginning of the last decade there was a wave of religious revival, and it was anticipated that the Orthodoxy could become the unifying factor for the Russian community. However, this expectation didn't come true, unlike in pre-war Lithuania.

The opinion about worsened social status and the overall civic passivity among Russians suggest that there are more general problems of adaptation rather than a mere identity crisis. More specifically, there are great differences of opinion in the segments of differing social status. The greatest contrasts (of all the surveyed groups) in comparison to the majority opinions are noticeable in the Russian groups of low status and low education. This means that the integration of the Russians (social similarity to the majority) in Lithuania is related to their social status.

Poles. Poles experience smaller obstacles in their adaptation or/and feel certain about the backing of their ethnic group. Strong identification with one's

town or region testifies to the firm consolidation of this ethnic group. In some of the answers of the Poles, one can even see the signs of a traditional community. Apart from the relatively strong religious identity, Poles give a smaller significance to education and rather emphasise social background and ties with co-ethnics (in finding a good job). It was among the Poles that we saw the highest rate of ethnic Lithuanians among the relatives. This clearly contradicts a popular opinion about the prevailing separation of the Poles. On the other hand, the Poles who considered themselves typical did express an attitude of separation, yet their share in the overall sample is negligible.

Tatars. Tatars have the highest rate of individuals who are certain that they are typical representatives of their ethnic group. Generally Tatars (as well as Jews) are relatively more active in ethnic organisations, however, their attitudes are not always the same: For instance, there is a difference between respondents from Visaginas and those from Alytus and Vilnius. Respondents from the latter towns, who are more often the descendants of a historical diaspora, exhibit a higher rate of accommodation (assimilation) attitude to Lithuanians.

Jews. Among the major categories of self-identification, the Jews surveyed did not mention religious identity. Also, identification with the territorial aspects of the country is relatively weak. These features, at least at first glance, make the answers of the Jews and the Russians similar. It is possible that the similarity relates to the experience of both Russians and Jews as migrants of the Soviet period (which is common trait with a share of Russians and great portion of contemporary Lithuanian Jews). There is also a high prevalence of professional identity among the Jews that may have to do with a higher level of education in their sample.

To sum up, the major differences among larger ethnic groups such as Lithuanians, Russians and Poles versus historical diasporas are noticeable mainly in the strength of ethnic ties with other group members. Apart from that, data confirm that Russians still experience identity crisis and are likely to become a minority in a sociological sense. Among the surprising findings is that on many issues Poles tend to have the most similar opinions to those of Lithuanians. In the background of our study, we are led to conclude that Poles are likely to become the most successfully integrated group (in contrast to popular opinions).

Successes and failures of social adaptation

The interview materials explain how the specific processes of adaptation – integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalisation – appear in the social life of an individual. Obviously, processes of integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalisation are multidimensional. The qualitative analysis focused on

extracting the real content of those processes that is present and recognizable in individual lives. Empirical research (the answers of respondents) confirms that distinguishing the four types of adaptation makes sense. Sometimes surprisingly, sometimes not, all of them exist next to each other – sometimes in one family. In case of a particular individual, it may be complicated to unambiguously 'assign' a person to one type of adaptation. It confirms, though, that the choice of one or another type of adaptation is very conditional. It is dependent on the peculiarities of an individual's status and social ties. To reiterate, the type of adaptation is less a well-planned strategy of behaviour than it is an outcome of how an individual combines his/her social status and ethnic identity.

An analysis of the content of types of adaptation leads one to a critical assessment of the stereotypical evaluations attached to notions of "integration", "assimilation", "separation", or "marginalisation". Integration is not always an expression of social success or free choice. Of course, integration, when an individual can achieve a desired status and still sustain his/her identity, is an optimal social scenario for a democratic society. Yet what also has to be taken into account is the price paid for integration, i.e. the efforts. As a rule, the majority expects loyalty and active performance of civic duties by members of the minority. Also, the majority often controls how minorities internalise its culture. In this context, it is important to see that minorities are not always able to easily comply with the expectations of the majority. Therefore, there should be means by which the majority recognises, appreciates, or supports the efforts of minorities to adapt.

Assimilation is not always as dramatic as minority members often imagine it. On an individual level it may go smoothly and unnoticed – as long as both groups recognise the conversion and recognise the right for an individual to change groups and decide one's identity individually. Thus, the right to assimilate can also be considered an expression of democracy. In theoretical discussion though, we should be aware of the difference between cultural and ethnic assimilation. Cultural approximation does not necessarily have to result in the loss of ethnic identity. But again, it has to be seen whether identity is preserved because one wishes to do so or because one is forced to.

Marginality is apparently widely spread in times of intensive social change. Fragmented identity, dissatisfaction with lowered social status, and limited social networks may happen to be characteristic not only to particular social layers, but to entire ethnic groups. In such a case, we encounter not only many personal problems of various individuals, but also a social entity whose behaviour is hard to predict. Marginality creates preconditions for deviant behaviour; marginal groups can be not only vulnerable but also manipulated.

Ethnic separation may sometimes appear as a regrettable state of affairs because it limits the social choices of an individual to a minority group. However, research has revealed that separation can be a well-calculated strategy for

a social career. Moreover, separation can provide an individual with full satisfaction with himself and his social environment. An ethnically mixed circle of clients was considered by some service-providers as proof that 'things are going right' without assuming for a moment that people of differing ethnicities can be partners rather than clients to each other. Separation provides comfort; that is why it remains a challenge for society that wishes to have its ethnic groups interrelated on equal grounds. Low civic activism precludes counter-separatist mechanisms from emerging. Surprisingly, even NGOs sometimes have a dubious role: Rather than providing links with the state and among various citizens, they function as a shelter for minority members both from the state and from other citizens.

Assessments and alternatives

The focus on adaptation enables one to discuss ethnic processes in a contemporary society such as Lithuania nowadays. Although this society is relatively calm and free of ethnic conflicts, ethnicity has not disappeared and is effectively present when an individual solves problems regarding his/her status, social aspirations, and identity. The empirical data and considerations in this study lead to a conclusion about the importance of the social (rather than political and legal) dimension in the contemporary adaptation of differing ethnic groups. In the beginning of the 1990s, the majority had great uncertainty about the political loyalty of the minorities and was concerned about potential claims of separatism. Lithuania's decision to grant citizenship to all permanent residents of the country truly brought political revenues at an early stage of independence. The adaptation of ethnic groups however remains a social challenge for a democratic society.

Regardless of equal rights for all Lithuanian citizens, one's own perception of change in status is not the same in different ethnic groups. Russians and Tatars exhibit the most negative evaluations, which at the same time are the most different from the evaluations of the majority group (Lithuanians). However, the negative evaluations are not exhibited in the place where they might be mostly expected. People in Visaginas have not indicated that their situation has worsened more often than respondents elsewhere have. This means that Russians see their situation as problematic in broad contexts, not only in the area of forthcoming industrial restructuring due to the closure of the atomic power plant.

Another crucial finding regards the ethnic isolation of certain social segments. In spite of the present preconditions for structural assimilation (i.e. equal rights), there are groups in the sphere of employment that are ethnically isolated (separated). Although this is primarily a feature of small-scale businesses that are organised along family ties, almost a half of the surveyed Poles and Russians

work in a monoethnic environment. Apparently, partnerships across ethnic lines do not emerge easily.

Analysis of individual instances of various adaptation types reveals that adaptation is not always a pre-planned and consequential strategy and significantly depends on the social milieu. That is why there cannot be a simple recipe for adaptation – be it adaptation of an individual or a group. Neither is there a universal solution for minority-related policies. Even an option of integration has to be viewed critically and should not be fetishised. Integration includes individual efforts – that we called 'integration costs'. Moreover, integration is not necessarily an outcome of free choice and does not by itself help to escape the social niche prescribed for a diaspora. The historical diasporas of Lithuania, such as Tatars, are in a way deemed to 'integrate': Their members are often recognised and asked or reminded about their ethnicity; therefore they could not so easily opt, for instance, to assimilate.

For assessing the success of adaptation in minority groups on the broad scale, it is important not to overlook the problem of social participation. Lack of participation may result in the marginalisation of a considerable part of the population. Marginalisation has more expressions than merely social exclusion in its economic sense. The satisfactory economic situation of a number of individuals does not tell everything about their perception of social life: Their perception may be greatly influenced by symbolic interaction and lack of recognition, which can be a cause of withdrawal from public life. Those who do not take part in societal processes and who do not identify with the surrounding society can not be considered 'integrated'. Spreading marginality among minority members may strengthen the process of an ethnic group becoming a minority. Minorities that are passive, indifferent, and infantile in public life can also easily become an object of political manipulation.

Marginality can turn into assimilation or separation. Assimilation, however, is not an easy solution for a minority member even if it is sometimes assumed to be. Individuals who lose their identity and the support of one group do not always acquire recognition and identity in another group. Again, marginality is never far away. Therefore we emphasise that participation rather than assimilation should be a focus of the state's integrative policies. On the other hand, assimilation should always remain an open option for individuals, and all the ethnic communities should nurture toleration for individual choice.

When ethnic boundaries are emphasised, it may result in separatism. First, ethnic recognising reproduces ethnic boundaries in everyday life. The dividing line gets more problematic if it precludes social mobility. The measurement of both mobility and separation is always complicated, but it is reasonable to assume that intolerance, such as it is with regard to Roma, complicates the way out of the social margins. In such cases it is quite obvious that the efforts of one ethnic group may not be enough. On the other hand, we noticed that ethnic sepa-

ration, from an individual's point of view, could be a rational and satisfactory strategy of adaptation. That is probably why we see it present regardless of the fact that there is no tangible ghetto.

The successes and failures of adaptation is one of the ways to develop ethnicity studies. It is significant to realise that ethnic processes are part of contemporary life in a democratic society. In Lithuania, the challenge is to optimise ethnic relationships: Quite often minorities are not involved in the consideration of issues of common concern. They are not encouraged to take the role of active and responsible citizens. Unequal participation in civic life can result in marginality and separation, which in turn can lead to ethnic mobilisation. Moreover, ignoring passive citizens, such as minority members often are, raises the risk that they will not only lose civic participatory skills but also channels for inclusion. This could cause the old problems of ethnic mobilisation and undefined loyalty to reappear.

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TABLES AND GRAPHS

TABLE 2. Population of Lithuania by ethnicity. Census data (share of respective ethnicity in percentages)

Ethnicity / year	1923	1959	1969	1979	1989	2001	
						Perc.	Thousands
Lithuanians	69,2	79,3	80,1	80,0	79,6	83,45	2907,3
Poles	15,3	8,5	7,7	7,3	7,0	6,74	235,0
Russians	2,5	8,5	8,6	8,9	9,4	6,31	219,8
Belorussians	0,4	1,1	1,5	1,7	1,7	1,23	42,9
Ukrainians	0,0	0,7	0,8	0,9	1,2	0,65	22,5
Jews	8,3	0,9	0,8	0,4	0,3	0,12	4,0
Latvians	0,6	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,08	3,0
Tatars	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,09	3,2
Roma/Gypsies	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,07	2,6
Germans	3,4	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,09	3,2
Armenians	-	-	-	-	-	0,04	1,5
Others	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,4	0,4	0,18	6,1
Not indicated	-	-	-	-	-	0,94	32,9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	3484,0

Sources: Lietuvos statistikos departamentas (1992) *Lietuvos gyventojai 1991.* Vilnius: Lietuvos statistikos departamentas.

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TABLE 3. Ethnic recognition. Row percentages

	Can you recognise people of another ethnicity?					
	I can always recognise people of another ethnicity	I can recognise some ethnicities	It's difficult for me to recognise ethnicity	I don't pay attention to someone's ethnicity	No answer	Total
Lithuanians	27	28	11	33	1	100
Russians	12	17	11	60		100
Poles	11	13	11	63	1	100
Jews	25	20	11	42	2	100
Tatars	28	29	5	38		100

TABLE 4. Public activity. Row percentages
Question: Have you personally ever participated in the public events or decisions of your region or country and in what ways?

	Public events, decisions					
	Have signed political petition	Have donated money to movement or organisation	Personally have collected signatures	Participated in demonstration, public meeting	Participated in strike	Wrote my opinion to a newspaper
Lithuanians	35	29	15	33	2	15
Russians	18	11	7	8	1	10
Poles	23	24	11	24	6	13
Jews	20	24	3	20	2	23
Tatars	21	21	10	26	5	7

GRAPH 1. Evaluation of the change in social status
Question: Have you personally gone up or gone down on the ladder of social hierarchy during the last 10 years?

Perceived Change in Social Status (perc.)

Legend: Gone up — No change from where I was 10 y. ago — Gone down

Values:
Lithuanians: 40,3; 31,8; 27,1
Russians: 29,5; 23,8; 43,8
Poles: 36,6; 26,8; 34,1
Jews: 36; 26; 32
Tatars: 21,6; 26,8; 47,4

GRAPH 2. Identification: ethnic dimensions

Identification: ethnic dimensions (mean)
0 – "don't feel any attachment" 1 – "feel somewhat attached"; 2 – "strongly attached"

Legend: Lithuanians · Russians · Poles · Jews · Tatars

Categories: People speaking the same language · People of the same faith · People of my ethnicity · People of my ethnicity in Lithuania · Non-governmental organisation

The Phenomenon of Internal Diasporas in Russia: The Case of the Mari[1]

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ABSTRACT. By examining theoretical definitions as well as empirical observations, the argument is developed that the phenomenon of diaspora does not necessarily involve an international dimension. In the Russian Federation an example of this is provided by those members of non-Russian nationalities who have within the federation a titular autonomous unit but who live outside it. In this paper, I attempt to typologize possible trajectories of identity development in major Mari diaspora communities. Evidently, variations of integration and assimilation constitute the most widespread identity options facing them.

Diaspora: international and intra-state dimensions

Among nationality issues of the post-Soviet space, the problems of diasporas have become an object of overriding concern. Moreover, it is quite natural that by virtue of their large size and political weight, Russian diaspora groups have captured the most attention devoted to the issue in public. Indeed, the change in the status of those Russians who happened to be residents of the non-Russian republics during the collapse of the Soviet Union has been drastic: A group of over twenty million people representing the empire-bearing nationality, formerly privileged by their political and cultural dominance, were transformed overnight into minorities of uncertain status, scattered over a number of newly independent states. However, for a large number of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union, including those autochthonous to Russia, the issue of diaspora is also an important one. Besides this one can argue that the question also existed before the demise of the Soviet system.

The notion of diaspora is by no means a clear-cut one. Not infrequently, it is difficult to discern a diaspora from a group of migrants, an ethnoreligious group,

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or even from an ethnic minority. This is certainly connected with an enormous broadening of the concept; while in the past the notion of diaspora was practically exclusively reserved for the Jews and Jewish communities dispersed outside Palestine or Israel, at the present time the term has won a much wider usage (The New Encyclopedia 1990: 68). In practice it may be applied to any ethnic group which lives separately from the main body of its coethnics. Such a diffuse understanding of diaspora has become quite usual also in the Russian press and scholarly parlance.

In a conference devoted to diasporas in international politics a working definition was formulated according to which a diaspora is "a minority ethnic group of migrant origin in a host country which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin" (Landau 1986: 75; Esman 1986: 333). It seems that the above definition can serve as a point of departure for the purposes of this paper as well. In connection with the definition, at least three points should be made. First, it implies that an investigator of the phenomenon of diaspora needs to take into consideration the triadic nexus of relations existing between the host state, the diaspora, and the diaspora's external homeland. Second, as a corollary, the issue of diaspora has an aspect belonging to the sphere of international relations. The third point, made explicit in the definition, is that the circumstances behind the formation of a diaspora necessarily involve population migration.

In accordance with the above view, a diaspora group, residing beyond the boundaries of the respective nation state, can be seen as one of the participants in a play with three actors, each representing different national aspirations. As Rogers Brubaker (1996: 4-6) has delineated them, the first one is the "nationalising" nationalism of the dominant group in the host country where the minority lives. As a rule, this nationalism strives to strengthen the cultural, demographic, and economic positions of the core nation. Furthermore, it is often conceived that as a state-bearing group the core nation has certain "primogeniture" rights in the polity. On the other hand, there often exists transborder nationalism in the external homeland of the diaspora. It is typical of this homeland nationalism that the rights of co-nationals in other states are monitored and their activities promoted. It is no surprise then, that controversy very easily arises between these two nationalisms; not so rarely homeland nationalists' activities are perceived by the elites in the diaspora's host country as interference in their internal matters. The third actor, the diaspora, finds itself between these opposing nationalisms. Moreover, it also may have a nationalism of its own: The leaders of the community often put forward claims about one or another form of autonomy and call for measures that would keep the real or perceived processes of denationalisation in check. Even though an opposition to the "nationalising" nationalism of the host country represents a common feature for the nationalist pursuits of the diaspora and its homeland country, it does not,

however, guarantee the existence of harmonious relations between the two latter nationalisms.

The above train of thought requires the presence of an international boundary. However, there are grounds to argue that relations, which are in many aspects similar to those discussed in connection with "genuine" diaspora groups, may also be produced by internal boundaries, i.e., all three actors of the drama are found within one and the same state. In regard to the Russian Federation of the late 1990s, one can note that the internal administrative demarcations of Soviet Russia have remained intact and the legacy of the Soviet period of managing nationality issues lives on. It is therefore quite in order to take a brief look at the territorialisation of nationality carried out by the Bolsheviks.

While the Soviet Union as a whole was not a nation-state, on the sub-state level, on the level of those constituent parts which were defined in ethnic terms, an allowance was made which fused together territory and national culture. Thus, during the early years of Soviet rule dozens of ethnically defined sub-state jurisdictions of varying hierarchical rank were set up with the obvious aim that each should provide for the respective group a sort of territorial focus where institutional support of ethnic culture would be concentrated. At the top rung of the ladder were the union republics, semi nation-states with a number of formal symbols of statehood. No wonder that the nationalities endowed with a union republic began to consider it an ethnic homeland. This process, however, was not limited to the titular nationalities of the union republics only. Something similar also happened with the groups having autonomous republics in Soviet Russia. For some of the groups, at least, it became common to view the titular autonomous republic as an embryonic homeland. To be sure, the autonomies did not possess any sovereign rights and even their self-rule remained largely fictional. However, what was important was the constant institutional framework which, despite all of the shifts in nationalities policy, made possible the training of national cadres and the development of languages and cultures (Brubaker 1996: 28-40; Tolz 1998: 279).

Whatever the genuine intentions of the architects of early Soviet nationalities policy, the scope of the establishment of autonomous units was impressive. Even many of the small groups of the Russian interior, which had shown no or very little aspiration towards self-rule, were endowed with an autonomous territory of one or another rung. Accordingly, the Bolshevik-sponsored nation building project for the non-Russians, with the concomitant territorialisation of ethnicity at the sub-state level, contributed to the crystallisation among Soviet nationalities of a more distinctly perceived image of their respective homelands (Schwartz 1990: 127-29). The logic of the policy also envisaged that institutions of ethnic cultural support would to a high degree be concentrated in the newly established autonomies. For most peoples of Russia this meant that an array of completely new institutions–research and educational establishments,

theatres, publishing houses, newspapers, etc.–was created in the autonomies. Moreover, most of those existing bodies of ethnic culture that had functioned in centres outside of the core territory were gradually collected in the autonomous units. Under these circumstances it was quite natural that the authorities of the autonomies also assumed the role of ethnic patron in regard to the cultural and educational needs of their coethnics residing beyond the boundaries of the autonomous unit. Even if this role was a diffuse one, relations resembling those between homeland and diaspora began to develop.

The top level among autonomous jurisdictions of the Russian republic, representing a form of nominal statehood, was that of an autonomous republic. Due to ethnically mixed settlement patterns, it was no simple task to draw the boundaries of the republics. Moreover, incidences of gerrymandering the frontiers are also obvious. As a result, the facts of ethnography did not correspond to administrative boundaries. This meant that from the very beginning all Russian republics were – as they also continue to be – ethnically heterogeneous and in several of them Russians constitute the largest population group. The strong Russian presence, and the extraterritorial cultural autonomy they in fact enjoyed everywhere, was among the reasons why there was not much leeway left for the republican titular elites to take steps which would have upgraded the positions of the republics to that of more genuine statehood.

Still, even symbolic and ceremonial state institutions may turn out important for the emergence of national sentiments and the emotional attachment to homeland. Furthermore, under the rubric of *korenizatsiia* (indigenisation), personnel policies favouring non-Russian nationalities were pursued with considerable vigour in the 1920s, and in the fields of native-language education and national culture many minority groups made great progress. Even when these ethnic cultural activities ran into difficulties by the mid-1930s, the foundation laid earlier in the autonomous republics nevertheless provided a certain ethnic shelter. The mere continued existence of cultural and educational institutions meant that in areas connected with humanitarian scholarship and education the titular nationality was strongly represented and usually held a number of key posts in this sphere.

In a situation when the overlap between the core nation and the total population remains far from complete, the nation builders face the delicate task of relating these two bodies of population to each other so that the whole population will feel loyal and identify with the state. Some leaders of Soviet successor states have tried to get around the dilemma by evading a clear choice between ethnic and civic nation. This becomes obvious, for instance, from Nursultan Nasarbaev's statement that Kazakhstan is simultaneously both a multinational society and also an ethnic homeland for the Kazakhs (Kolstø 1998: 52, 56). In the wake of *perestroika* and the parade of republican declarations of sovereignty,

which gained momentum in 1989-1990, the nature of autonomous formations became an issue of public dispute in Russia as well.

Since the Russian republics are in their ethnic makeup highly heterogeneous, there has been no serious question of turning them into national states in an ethnocultural sense, with the obvious exception of Chechnia. At the same time several republics have strived to put some distance between themselves and the federal centre and to promote nation building projects for the titular nationality. The most outstanding example is obviously Tatarstan. For some time in the surging years of the early 1990s, the republican leadership seems to have hovered between the choice of ethnic and civic nation, even trying to reconcile the two concepts. Indicative of the waning influence of the Tatar nationalist opposition is the fact that while in the republican declaration of state sovereignty of 1990 the right of the Tatar nation to self-determination was made explicit; in Tatarstan's constitution of 1992 the Tatar nation was replaced by the "multinational people" of the republic (Iskhakov 1997: 110-12, 127-28). Even if the euphoria connected with the republican declarations of sovereignty has dissipated, attempts to further the culture of the titular nationality continue, often within a framework which could be called state nationalism. In local Russian nationalist circles this has given reason to express concern over the prospect of ethnic discrimination: Should the leading titular elites "fill up" their territory with the national culture, the extra-territorial cultural rights enjoyed by Russians would become jeopardised in the longer run. Accordingly, the policies of republican leaders and their agendas of nationalising activities may be perceived by inhabitants of the non-titular nationality as efforts towards the legitimisation of the core nationality as the "owner" of the republic (Brubaker 1996: 5, 40).

Thus, developments since the mid-1980s are largely responsible for the circumstance that diaspora status in Russia has acquired a clearer political configuration. Therefore the use of the term "diaspora" also seems acceptable in the intra-Russian context. In the Russian Federation the problem is clearly of enormous scope: About eight million out of those twenty million non-Russians that have a titular autonomous unit in the federation live outside that unit. However, one has to admit here that this understanding of diaspora makes it necessary to stretch the precepts of the earlier definition because not all communities identified as diasporas have come into being through migration. Strictly speaking this means that the communities named here as diasporas are such in a somewhat figurative sense. For this reason one could also use the notion of "quasi-diaspora." One more reservation concerns the triadic nexus of relations between the diaspora, the homeland and the host country. Under Russian circumstances it is necessary to add a fourth pole, the federal centre, into the scheme.

The Mari and their diaspora

Together with the Mordvins, the Mari form the Volgaic branch of the Finno-Ugrian linguistic family. The Mari were also known as the Cheremis but this latter name has fallen into disuse. Since the Middle Ages the Mari's ethnocultural contacts have been basically with the neighbouring Turkic peoples and later on also with the Eastern Slavs, who began to invade the Volga region in the final centuries of the Middle Ages. For the Mari, who belonged to the realm of the Kazan' Khanate, the year 1552 marked a historical turning point: The defeat of Kazan' brought the entire Middle Volga region, including the territories of Mari inhabitation, under Muscovite rule. This subjection took place painfully: The Mari area encompassed pockets of the most tenacious resistance in the Volga valley and a series of uprisings, known as the Cheremis Wars, erupted during the second half of the sixteenth century (Kappeler 1982: 87-94; Ivanov and Sanukov 1998: 21-23). However, militarily and politically the Mari soon had to yield to superior numbers and with the dissemination of the Orthodox faith, which was greatly intensified in the eighteenth century, Russian cultural influence grew enormously.

In the administrative system of the Russian Empire the Mari homeland in the Middle Volga region was divided between the Kazan', Viatka, and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces. Right from the beginning of Soviet rule, the situation changed with the establishment of the Mari autonomous province in 1920. In conjunction with the Soviet constitutional reform of 1936, the province was elevated to the status of an autonomous republic. Since 1992 the Mari autonomous region bears the name of the Republic of Marii El.

The Mari Republic belongs to those poor agricultural regions heavily dependent on subsidies from the federal centre. At the beginning of 1997 the republic had a population of 766,000. According to 1989 data, the shares of the two main nationalities in the republic, the Russians and the Mari, were nearly balanced, at 47.5 and 43.3 percent respectively. In third place are the Tatars with their 5.9 percent population share (Itogi 1989: Table 4). While the Mari still continue to be an overwhelmingly rural nationality, most of the local Russians are urban residents – a circumstance which cannot be without certain repercussions on educational levels and the division of labour between the chief ethnic groups. Together with tough historical experience this has adversely affected ethnic self-consciousness: Like the other Finno-Ugrian groups in Russia the Mari have been yielding to assimilatory pressures.

The Mari are widely dispersed also outside their titular republic. In 1989, the boundaries of the republic embraced 324,000 Mari, which is not more than about half of the total of 671,000 for the whole nationality in the former Soviet Union. In Russia, the Mari total was 644,000 (Itogi 1989: Tables 2-4). Over the decades of the Soviet period, the percentage of Mari living in the titular repub-

lic showed a tendency to decline. However, at the same time it has to be admitted that a really vast majority of the nationality has never lived within the boundaries of the autonomous region. In 1926, for instance, 57.9 percent of all Mari resided in the Mari autonomous province (Vsesoiuznaia 1926a: Table 9; Vsesoiuznaia 1926b: 12).

The circumstance that every second Mari lives beyond the borders of the Mari Republic stems obviously to some extent from administrative gerrymandering in the years when the boundaries of the autonomy were drawn. A much more significant factor, however, has been migration. Moreover, this was a factor hundreds of years before Soviet rule. Thus, population movements triggered by the Russian conquest of the Mari homeland laid the foundations for the most outstanding part of the Mari diaspora, the Eastern Mari, the groups of which are scattered throughout the territories of the present republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and Udmurtia, as well as in Perm' and Sverdlovsk provinces. The current composite number of Eastern Mari exceeds 150,000, and about two thirds of these are found in Bashkortostan. In Kirov and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces, which both border on the Mari Republic, there are some 50,000 Mari (Itogi 1989: Table 4). In contrast to the Eastern Mari, whose communities came into being as a result of historically traceable migration, Mari settlement areas in the territory of today's Kirov and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces have existed from time immemorial. In a strict sense then, the populations of the rural Mari communities of these two provinces do not fit the notion of diaspora. Nevertheless, the basic issues of identity development they face are in many respects similar to those observed among more genuine diaspora groups. Therefore it seems permissible to stretch the concept somewhat in regard to the Mari of the two aforementioned provinces.

One can distinguish three major periods during which the territorial dispersal of the Mari particularly grew. The first one extends from the middle of the sixteenth till the middle of the eighteenth century. While the Kama basin served as a sort of advanced base for Russian expansion to Siberia during this period, it also attracted influxes of peasants from the Russian north and interior, including representatives of non-Russian groups. The Mari were also drawn into the eastward population flow. A large part of these were refugees escaping land seizures, coercive baptisms, and the horrors of war and violence visited upon the Middle Volga region. However, there were among the Mari migrants also people recruited by the Russian military for the fortification and custodianship of the frontiers of the state. Whatever the motives, these population movements laid the foundations for the formation of Mari communities east of the original Mari ethnic homeland. By the middle of the eighteenth century this had resulted in the shaping of the basic contours of Eastern Mari settlement areas (Sepeev 1975: 21-45; Lallukka 1990: 120-21).

Accordingly, there is no doubt about the migratory origins of the Eastern Mari, even though this historic migration has become rather vaguely embedded in the collective consciousness of many of their subgroups–a circumstance obviously connected with the absence of literate layers during the great trek. In this connection a caveat is in order concerning the nature of Mari eastward population flow, often labelled entirely as a forced migration. Certainly, there is no denying that significant groups of Mari were escaping terror and persecutions. However, especially when the political reconfiguration in the Middle Volga had been established, many also moved by choice simply in search of better economic opportunities. Therefore the notion of forced migration does not give a true characterisation of the whole Mari relocation.

In the decades prior to the revolution, Russian authorities set an explicit target to direct peasant settlers from the central regions to the east. This idea was prominent in the agrarian reforms launched by the government of Petr Stolypin. It contributed to some intensification of Mari out-migration from the Middle Volga area. Thus, one can speak of a second wave of migration. However, it appears that in the case of the Mari the wave was not large (Istoriia Mariiskoi ASSR 1986: 231).

Much more important have been the population relocations of the third waves – the Soviet period – in particular those which have occurred since the 1950s. For a general background it is proper to note that the Volga-Viatka macroeconomic region, of which the Mari Republic forms a part, has experienced heavy population losses throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The Volga-Viatka has been a loser in migration exchange with practically all other regions. Especially with the Urals region, the balance of migration has been negative (Moskvin 1991: 73-75). Basically the same holds true also for the Mari Republic. Over the period of severest population outflow, which occurred in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the net migration deficit of the republic reached about 100,000 people (Lallukka 1990: 267). Losses also continued later on, but their scale was much smaller in the 1970s and 1980s. It is true that not all those who left the republic were Mari by nationality. However, their number must have been substantial.

Indeed, a comparison of growth rates in the number of Mari living in the titular republic and outside it shows a remarkable enlargement of the diaspora section of the nationality. Accordingly, in the thirty-year period since 1959, the Mari population beyond the borders of the republic grew by 53.2 percent, whereas the respective figure in the republic was not more than 16.1 percent. By and large, an examination of the growth rates of individual regions discloses that the highest rates are found in the Urals, Western Siberia, and Kazakhstan and in some other far-off regions. This must be connected with the fact that large numbers of Mari participated in such union-wide campaigns as, for instance, the virgin land project of Kazakhstan. No wonder then, that the geographic dispersal of the nationality increased greatly.

Before World War II practically all Mari were rural residents, in both the titular autonomous region and outside it. By 1959 there was no very big change in this situation; 89.0 and 83.0 percent of the Mari respectively in the titular republic and outside it were rural inhabitants. During the next 30 years, the downturn of rural percentages was more marked and in 1989 the figures were 63.2 percent for the Mari of the republic and 53.8 percent for the diaspora. The above figures show that the diaspora section of Mari is somewhat more urbanised than the core group in the republic. Furthermore, the gap in this respect has grown over time.

The Ural Mari, who represent the easternmost group of the Eastern Mari, provide an illustrative example of the fragmentation of diaspora resulting from urbanisation and population movements. The foundation of the Ural Mari community is formed by about thirty villages located in loose clusters on the western foothills of the Urals in Sverdlovsk and Perm' provinces. In the first decades of Soviet rule, the villages represented practically the entire Ural Mari community; there were almost no Mari in cities and towns of the region. At the present time over half of the 38,000 Mari in the two provinces are urban dwellers. Moreover, most of them live far from the rural core of the Ural Mari community in big industrial centres such as Ekaterinburg, Perm', Nizhnii Tagil, and Pervoural'sk. In fact many of the Mari residents of the cities have no ties with the rural core of the Ural Mari since they do not originate from the Urals but from other areas of Mari inhabitation, for instance, from the Mari Republic. Fragmentation of diaspora has also taken place in the countryside of the two provinces: Many residents of Ural Mari villages have moved to villages outside the districts where Mari settlements are found. The dispersal has thus also grown in the countryside. At present the number of Mari in the original village communities does not exceed 15,000 people (Lallukka 2000: 86-90). The whole community has thus changed due to population movements. While some decades ago practically all Ural Mari were members of village communities, at the present time the label of Ural Mari includes groups of varying types and interests, and even geographically scattered individuals who may have very little to do with each other.

The contacts between the diaspora and the ethnic core

With reference to the tsarist period, the question of the existence of links between the Eastern Mari and the ethnic core on the Middle Volga is difficult to address. However, it seems that once the new influxes of settlers to the Eastern Mari communities from outside dried up, the ties could not be very strong. At the latest such reinforcements ceased during the second half of the eighteenth century. Still, it is clear that there remained in the memory of the people an

awareness of the existence of distant groups of kinsfolk. Furthermore, there are some pieces of evidence of intra-Mari communication over long distances as well. This happened often in connection with large sacrificial gatherings which assembled people from several provinces (Werth 1996: 196-97; Ivanov and Sanukov 1998: 77-78). It is also remarkable that in the final decades of the tsarist period, teacher training institutions established by missionaries in order to bring the non-Russians into the bosom of Russian Orthodoxy collected representatives of various territorial Mari groups together and thus contributed to intra-ethnic communication. This is also a factor which facilitated the organisation of the congresses of the Mari people, with representatives of the basic territorial groups, quite rapidly after the collapse of tsarist rule.[2]

Stimulated by the Bolshevik-sponsored policy of *korenizatsiia*, ethnic cultural support advanced in the first years of Soviet rule. In regard to the Mari, one of the main achievements was that the network of national schools became denser. This happened not only within the newly established autonomous province but also in the main areas of Mari diaspora. At the same time higher institutions connected with the national culture became to a large degree concentrated in the titular autonomy. This implied that in matters of education and culture, a role of a diaspora's ethnic patron devolved upon the Mari autonomous province. This also meant that personal links between representatives of the diaspora and the core group intensified. Members of the diaspora went to study in the newly established Mari capital, Krasnokokshaisk (since 1927 the city has been known as Ioshkar-Ola). Simultaneously there was also a movement in the opposite direction: Teachers were sent out for work in diaspora schools, groups of guest artists visited the diaspora communities, and a flow of native-language publications commenced.

It is hard to assess quantitatively the development of the contacts during the Soviet period. By and large, it appears that when the Soviet nationalities policy turned to a direction less favourable for minorities, as in connection to Khrushchev's school reforms, this also tended to affect the ethnic core's relations with the diaspora groups. In fact, there is some evidence from the Urals of the 1960s and 1970s of a lukewarm, if not resistant, attitude on the part of many district-level administrators towards arrangements that would bring troupes of performing artists from Ioshkar-Ola to Ural Mari villages.[3]

In a survey carried out in fourteen Ural Mari villages in 1998, a number of questions were connected with the links between the Ural Mari and the

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[2] About the congresses organised in 1917-20 see, for example, Kulikov (1993: 44-47) and Sanukov (1994: 42-50).

[3] The author's personal communication during an expedition to Ural Mari villages in 1998. For more about the fieldwork, visit the website at <http://www.rusin.fi/eastmari/eng/umexped.htm>.

Mari Republic. Before sifting through the results, it is important to note that from the point of view of the titular republic, the Ural Mari represent the most remote of the major Eastern Mari diaspora groups. As the crow flies, the distance is about 500 miles. Compared with other groups, the Ural Mari are obviously the most isolated. It is also necessary to note that the data pertains to village communities, which certainly present the least mobile section of the Ural Mari.[4]

Informal discussions and visual impressions obtained during visits to Mari diaspora communities suggest that the existence of a titular state formation of the Mari people, even if a long way off, is perceived by many influential members of the diaspora as a matter deserving considerable reverence. Thus, in public buildings of Ural Mari villages, most often in schools and houses of culture, one quite frequently comes across symbols connected with Mari statehood. It is not unusual, for instance, that a school has the map of the Mari Republic painted right on the wall of the entrance hall. Not astonishingly, it is also quite common that the Mari of the titular republic, and the republic itself, are conceived by the Ural Mari as the bearers of the nationality's high culture. Therefore, for many members of the Ural Mari community, the titular republic represents an object of pride, though, perhaps, perceived in a somewhat diffuse or subliminal manner.

Not all Ural Mari, however, have personal, first-hand experience of the Mari Republic. It turned out that 32.0 percent of the respondents to the 1998 survey had visited the republic at some time. The share of relatively recent visitors, or those who had been there during the last ten years, was 14.9 percent. Contacts with the republic can also be considered by educational attainment groups. As one would expect, the more educated a person, the more likely he or she is mobile and has visited the titular republic at some time. Accordingly, in the group with nine years or less of schooling, 18.7 percent had been in the Mari Republic; in the group with 10 to 11 years of schooling the figure was 32.8 percent; and among people whose level of education was 12 years or more, the figure was 45.6 percent.

Those having visited the republic were also asked why they went there. Most commonly they had visited relatives. Over a third (37.9 percent) referred to this motive. In second place with 18.1 percent were those who had paid a visit to their friends. After that followed such reasons as work, amateur artist group visits, and the pursuit of studies – each with a share of about 10 percent.

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[4] To be sure, there were among the respondents also some urban residents who were visiting the villages at the same time when the survey was carried out. The interviewed people were 16 years of age and over. About the survey see <http://www.rusin.fi/eastmari/home.htm>.

TABLE 1. Subscription to periodicals published in the Mari language by educational attainment: Ural Mari villagers, in percent (according to the 1998 survey)

Years of schooling completed	Former or current subscriber	Current subscriber	Absolute number of respondents
0 to 9 years	57.5	11.7	120
10 to 11 years	38.7	8.9	124
12 years and more	44.2	13.3	113
Total	46.8	11.2	357

Since the closure of the Mari-language paper *Sotsializm korno*, which existed in Sverdlovsk province in the 1930s, the Ural Mari have not had any periodical publications of their own. Under these circumstances subscribing to a Mari-language periodical means not only a choice in favour of the ethnic native language but also a certain link with the titular republic and a flow of information from there.[5] As Table 1 shows, nearly half (46.8 percent) of the respondents said that a member of his or her family had subscribed at some time to one or more periodicals in Mari. However, from the next column in the table it becomes clear that not more than 11.2 percent indicated that the Mari-language newspapers or journals were being received at the moment of the survey. The basic reason behind the low percentage is the economic crisis. The circulation of these publications has collapsed from what it used to be in the Soviet period because people simply cannot afford to subscribe. However, it is also true that reading skills in Mari have gone down. Inasmuch as the Mari language has to a large extent been phased out from the curriculum of the schools of Ural Mari villages since the 1950s, a situation has developed in which the Mari literary language is commanded best by those who went to school in the 1950s and earlier. However, the ranks of this group are thinning. One should also note that the people with stronger Mari reading skills have, as a rule, completed less schooling than the members of the younger generations. This circumstance explains why the table shows that people with lower levels of education are more apt to be subscribers. This becomes most visible in the column representing the former and current subscribers together: The highest figure (57.5 percent) belongs to respondents with the least schooling.

Considering the long distance, relative isolation, and rural nature of the examined communities, it is hard to judge whether the percentages of individuals having paid a visit to the titular republic of their nationality should be inter-

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[5] Besides the Mari Republic, periodicals in Mari (three newspapers with rather small circulation) also exist in Bashkortostan. However, not more than six of the respondents of the 1998 survey subscribed to a paper (*Cholman*) from Bashkortostan. All other Mari-language periodicals came from the Mari Republic.

preted as large or small. At the same time it seems clear enough on the basis of Table 1 that the role of the press as a means of communication between the Ural Mari and the republic is not very essential at the present time. Moreover, it has experienced a clear decline in the post-Soviet years. One link which seems to be doing better is theatre, as visits of groups of actors from the Mari Republic commonly occur during the summer. This form of communication has the big advantage that it does not require Mari literacy. To be certain, the current economic depression has affected these guest performances as well; they are not happening as regularly as earlier. In any case, this type of communication remains the one with by far the widest coverage. According to the 1989 survey, 64.4 percent of the respondents had been spectators of guest performances in the last three years. Plays and other performances by guest artists are very popular and are anticipated by the villagers. It seems that guest performances are important because they reach so many Ural Mari and simultaneously also offer them images from outside to contemplate in terms of their ethnicity and the niche they occupy as the members of the whole Mari people.

The post-Soviet Mari Republic's response to the diaspora issue

As a part of ethnic mobilisation around the turn of the 1990s, many peoples of Russia rediscovered their diaspora. This resulted in the growth of publications of both journalistic and scholarly nature on the topic. Among the more active nationalities, such as the Tatars, schemes were devised on how the issue should be handled. Due to Tatar radicalism and the magnitude of their diaspora, these schemes were often far-reaching in substance and involved many regions. In the most turbulent years, at least, this was also a source of concern for the federal managers of nationalities policy; Tatar nationalists and even the republic were blamed for interfering in the internal matters of other parts of the federation. This crops up in the claim by Valerii Tishkov, federal minister of nationalities affairs in the early 1990s, that the agreement between Tatarstan and Moscow should include a clause which would minimize Tatarstani interference in the matters of the Tatar diaspora (Iskhakov 1997: 104, 196-98). Instead of an all-Tatar consolidation, Moscow preferred policies directed at the strengthening of local diasporic identities. This gave the Tatars, or at any rate, the Kazan' Tatars, grounds to accuse the centre of pursuing "divide and rule" policies.

Because of the lesser developed ethnic consciousness of the Mari and a more acute lack of financial resources, the Mari Republic has adopted diaspora policies that are more low-key than Tatarstan's. Yet the question still exists. The republic's official approach to the question is fixed in the "Outline of state na-

tionalities policy in the Republic of Marii El" adopted in 1997. There are two main points in the document addressing the question of diaspora. The essence of the first one is "the assistance for the cultural development of the Mari living outside the republic in conformity with the principles of national-cultural autonomy" (Natsional'nye otnosheniia 1997: 78). This prescription is directly linked with the federal law on national-cultural autonomy passed a year earlier. The second point indicates that both state and social organisations shall offer assistance "to the ethnic diasporas of the Mari and the other peoples of the republic in order to meet their national-cultural needs on the basis of agreements contracted between the Republic of Marii El and subjects of the Russian Federation and foreign states" (Natsional'nye otnosheniia 1997: 85).

As a matter of fact, the policy of concluding agreements with other republics and provinces has been in practice since the early 1990s. One of the first such documents was made with neighbouring Tatarstan in 1992. It included a statement according to which the two republics coordinate their actions relating to the Mari and Tatar diaspora groups living on their territories (Ianalov 1997: 74). In addition, there exists an array of agreements with districts where compact diaspora communities are located. Since the spheres of culture and schooling represent the main concern, the contracting party from the side of the Mari Republic is usually either the Ministry of Culture and Nationalities Affairs or the Ministry of Education. More or less connected with the agreements, some progress has been made in recent years, for instance, in reintroducing the teaching of the Mari language in diaspora schools, opening centres of Mari culture and bringing members of the diaspora to Ioshkar-Ola for studies in pedagogical and humanitarian disciplines in the higher educational establishments (Ianalov 1998: 8-9). According to Vasilii Ianalov, the republic's deputy minister of Culture and Nationalities Affairs in the late 1990s, cooperation in these matters runs quite smoothly with republics of the federation, whereas with Russian provinces the matter is not that easy (Ianalov 1999: 174). The main hindrance, however, is clearly the lack of adequate funding.

In October 1998, Viacheslav Kislitsyn, who at that time was the president of the Republic of Marii El, paid an official two-day visit to the Republic of Bashkortostan, where the most sizeable part of the Mari diaspora (about 100,000 people) lives. Even though Kislitsyn is himself an ethnic Russian, contacts with local Mari played a prominent role in his program. It is therefore appropriate to devote some attention to his visit.[6] The procedures that followed also show that practices had developed between members of the federation in matters of diaspora that are in many ways similar to those observed between independent states.

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[6] For press accounts of the visit see: Shamiev (1998: 1) and Izibaev (1998: 1).

The scene of the first part of the visit was Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan. Together with Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of the host republic, Kislitsyn signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the republics. The document is written in Bashkir, Mari, and Russian and is of a very general nature. Collaboration in the fields of culture and the teaching of native language is just briefly mentioned.[7] However, the leaders seem to have exchanged quite a lot of verbal compliments on this topic. Thus, in his speech, Kislitsyn, who during his tenure of power did not usually pay very much attention to questions of nationality, especially expressed his gratitude to the leadership of Bashkortostan for its care for the Mari population's well being. Rakhimov replied by assuring that the state authorities in his republic take all possible measures to preserve the traditions, culture, and languages of the peoples of Bashkortostan. According to press reports Kislitsyn also had a warm meeting with the representatives of the Mari community in Ufa.

The next day the visit continued in the district of Mishkino, which is overwhelmingly inhabited by Mari. Therefore the district is sometimes called a "Little Marii El." As the main centre of Mari in Bashkortostan, the district has relatively frequently been visited by high officials of culture and education from the Mari Republic, but not before by the president of the titular republic. During Kislitsyn's visit an agreement was signed between Mishkino and the Morki district of the Mari Republic. The guests also went to take a closer look at some enterprises, objects of culture, and a village school as well, where Kislitsyn presented new ABC-books to first-graders. Two months after the visit a further step was taken that may add a more state-like nature to the relations between the republics: Basically in order to facilitate the implementation of the new treaty, Kislitsyn nominated a plenipotentiary representative of the Republic of Marii El to the Republic of Bashkortostan. Consequently, Pavel Bikmurzin, the chairman of the Bashkortostan section of *Marii ushem* (the Union of Mari), began to work in this capacity (Bashkortostanyshte: 1).

On the basis of the pieces of information presented above, it is clear that coethnics living beyond the borders of the Mari Republic have not remained unnoticed by the authorities of the republic. Moreover, it seems to be widely recognised in the homeland republic that the diaspora needs ethnocultural and educational support. For several reasons, the steps taken in this direction have been modest and circumspect. First of all, the Mari Republic is one of the poorest regions in the Russian Federation. In 2001, of the 89 federation members, it was sixth from the bottom in terms of per capita income (Narod ne buntuet: 4). Accordingly, the host regions of the Mari diaspora are economi-

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[7] The full text of the agreement has been published in *Cholman*, 2-8 December 1998 (no. 45-46).

cally better-off than the homeland republic. This implies that the latter has not been able to allocate essential funding for the ethnocultural support of the diaspora. Moreover, the authorities in Ioshkar-Ola have carefully avoided all possible charges of interference into the internal affairs of the diaspora's host republics/provinces.

In lieu of a conclusion: towards a typology of Mari diaspora communities

There are good reasons to suppose that diasporic identities tend to be particularly fragmented and multi-layered. Therefore it does not appear reasonable to generalize about the identities observed in diaspora communities. In order to outline various possible identity trajectories for diaspora Russians in the former Soviet republics, Pål Kolstø (1996: 609-39) has devised a taxonomy which brings a certain clarification to the complex field in which identity development takes place. In what follows an attempt will be made to apply a modification of Kolstø's typology to Mari diaspora communities.

The horizontal dimension of Table 2 represents the territorial focus of the diaspora's cultural orientation. In the table three basic options are singled out on this dimension: (1) cultural identification with the main ethnic body in the Mari Republic, (2) development of a specific and largely self-sufficient cultural identity that, however, shares fundamentally the same framework with the Mari culture of the titular republic, and (3) identification with the dominant culture of either the host republic/province or the Russian Federation at large. The vertical dimension of the table depicts the political aspect of identity. The main options in this dimension may be presented in the following way: (1) loyalty directed to the titular republic, (2) an orientation toward establishing a separate autonomous formation, (3) loyalty to the republic/province of current residence, and (4) political orientation directed basically to the federation as a whole.

It goes without saying that the employed scales of gradation are not able to reproduce the finely divided shadings which would better correspond to the reality on both dimensions. It would appear that on the dimension of cultural identity, in particular, there can exist a great variety of different options. In addition, one has to reiterate the fragmented nature of identities, the simultaneous feelings of loyalties to different bodies. Nevertheless, a cross-tabulation of the dimensions makes it possible to systematise the situation to some extent. In principle, a chart with twelve cells is obtained. However, some of the cells seem to be improbable and can thus be omitted. Moreover, there are also cells, most notably those representing irredentism and territorial autonomism, which in the case of the Mari seem largely superfluous for the time being.

TABLE 2. Basic options for territorial orientations of identities of diaspora Mari in the Russian Federation.

		Direction of cultural orientation		
		The Republic of Marii El	Own cultural construction	Other republic/ province or the Russian Federation as a whole
Direction of political sympathies	The Republic of Marii El	Irredentism or repatriation sentiments		
	New autonomous unit		Territorial autonomism	
	Other republic/province	Local integration (a)	Local integration (b)	Russification or other assimilation
	The Russian Federation as a whole	Russia-wide integration (a)	Russia-wide integration (b)	Russification

If the possible variants of identification orientations are considered by column, then one first comes across in Table 2 the column representing those members of the diaspora who look upon the titular republic as an unconditional bearer of their ethnic culture. If, in addition, political sympathies are directed at the same republic, the question is about sentiments, which could be characterised as irredentist or repatriationist. However, among the diaspora Mari such attitudes come out very rarely. For instance, there seems to be no serious talk in Mari communities of Kirov province, many of which are immediate neighbours of the Mari Republic, about redrawing the boundary in order to find oneself on the "right" side of the boundary. In regard to repatriation, it touches only the layer of diasporic intelligentsia because the cultural and educational institutions of the titular republic exert on it a certain pull. In connection with this, it is important to note again those actions that are taken in the Mari Republic in order to offer members of the diaspora special admission quotas to educational establishments (Ianalov 1998: 9). Even if these activities are not directed at encouraging repatriation, one can suppose that after completing their studies many of the representatives of the diaspora remain in the Mari Republic.

In a lower position in the same column, there is the case of local integration in which political loyalty is fundamentally directed not to the titular republic but to some other subject of the federation. However, this case presupposes that cultural orientation to the titular republic is maintained. As a hypothetical example one could think about some Mari community in Tatarstan, in which the political values of Tatarstan's state nationalism, such as highlighted by the slogan "we the Tatarstanians," has found a response. The bottom cell of the first column refers to those members of Mari diaspora who feel culturally attached

to the Mari Republic but whose main political sympathies are directed to the federation as a whole. Certainly, this kind of orientation can also be found in the republics. However, one can suppose that it is more widespread in the groups living in Russian provinces basically surrounded by Russians. Thus, for instance, the two basic poles which seem to attract identity trajectories of the Ural Mari in Perm' and Sverdlovsk provinces are Russia-wide integration and Russification.

If a diaspora community has in matters of culture a strong initiative of its own, then its activities may be directed to the strengthening of its own specific cultural resources, more or less independent of the homeland republic. The middle column of Table 2 refers to this type of cultural construction. Quite possibly, this kind of activity concurs with strivings for self-rule. If the two aspirations coincide, a question of territorial autonomy is also likely to arise. In regard to the diaspora Mari, one cannot find many written references to claims to autonomy. One of the few is the idea put forward in the early 1990s about the foundation of a Mari autonomous district (*okrug*) in Bashkortostan.[8] At the present time there is complete silence surrounding this question. More realistic are obviously those occasional discussions which concern the level of villages and rural administrations. Some leaders of diaspora communities have expressed the idea of a sort of "national" rural administration: When it is possible, Mari villages should be joined under the same administration – a measure which would help to keep the ethnic culture alive. But even this is a remote dream. Finally, the two lowermost cells of the middle column are analogous to the respective cells of the former column. Here, however, the question is about integration which takes place simultaneously with pursuits to develop the ethnic culture self-sufficiently, separately from the main group in the titular republic. Generally it appears that only the largest group, the Mari of Bashkortostan, may possess enough resources to make their own cultural construction possible. Even regarding Bashkortostan, however, one has to take into account that the Mari of that republic do not by any means constitute a single and unified community.

The column on the right side of the table represents those cases in which the ethnic culture has lost its importance to the members of diaspora to such degree that they are orientated towards the culture of some other people, or attach themselves with the federation-wide culture based on the Russian language. As a result, assimilation processes have accelerated in groups of this kind. It is clear that for the Mari who find themselves in this situation the main road is Russification. Moreover, this takes place both in provinces where the Mari's ethnic contacts are very heavily Russian-dominated, and also in republics where the ethnic environment is usually more mixed. However, assimilation can also take other directions: In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan one also can find evidence about some Tatarisation of the Mari.

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[8] The idea is mentioned in passing in Ibulaev (1997: 275).

Advanced ethnic blending and erosion of ethnic boundaries certainly complicate the investigation of diaspora communities found inside the Russian Federation. The above typology presents a reconnaissance of the ways in which it would be possible to bring about some systematisation to the multitude of potential intra-Russian diasporic identities. There is no doubt that for the Mari – and the same holds true also for the other Finno-Ugrian groups in the Russian Federation – the most relevant alternatives of the scheme presented in Table 2 are those found on the two bottom lines. Accordingly, integration and assimilation processes in their various forms constitute the setting that defines the parameters of the existence of the Mari diaspora.

With the above typology one necessarily comes to the conclusion that from the point of view of the Mari diaspora the substance of integration poses a question of utmost importance. In regard to the authorities of the host republic/province, among the issues of their concern a prominent place is occupied by the task of making sure that a maximal number of citizens are politically loyal to the state. In terms of the typology, this suggests that the authorities' main attention would be directed to the vertical (political) dimension. In a federal state, however, there can be some ambiguity about how the citizenry's political sympathies should be distributed between the entire federation, on the one hand, and one or another of its constituent parts, on the other. It is also evident that different federation members have dissimilar views about this. Even if the authorities usually regard the vertical dimension as one of prime importance, the two dimensions are conceived as interwoven. For this reason the leadership may be not convinced of the loyalty of an ethnocultural minority to the same degree as that of the dominant group. This has caused ambiguity concerning the question of integration: Is it enough that a minority is politically integrated, which would mean that it can maintain its cultural specifity, or should it be integrated also culturally into the culture of the titular group? (Cf., Kolstø 1996: 621 and Kolstø 1998: 52). It is quite possible that statements of some leaders of the republics and provinces are intentionally vague in this respect. However, if the cultural aspect is involved, integration can easily turn into assimilatory policy.

Notwithstanding their weakly developed ethnic consciousness, the Mari belong to those groups which right at the outset of the Soviet rule were granted an autonomous unit with which they could identify. Consequently, ethnicity became territorialised: An array of issues which might have remained basically regional acquired ethnic content. Formal spatially-bound outlets for ethnocultural aspirations also brought up the question of diasporas. In post-Soviet Russia there exists a strong lobby for turning back "ethnic" to "regional." Two basic solutions contributing to this end have been offered. The first is the "symmetrisation" of the federation by means of enlarging its constituent parts and, along with this, abolishing republics and other ethnically defined formations. Not surprisingly, this approach has become an object of fierce resistance from the side of the

republics and minorities. Another approach which, as it is hoped, would contribute to neutralising the internal boundaries is extraterritorial cultural autonomy. The 1996 federal law on national cultural autonomy is advocated as a means by which, in particular, the problems of intra-Russian diaspora groups can be solved. However, the absence of the principles for a civil society poses serious obstacles for the implementation of the law. For this reason there is a lot of skepticism among the diaspora communities about the real possibilities that the law has to offer.

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Interethnic Relations and the Acculturation of the Non-titular Population in Estonia and Lithuania: A Sociopsychological Perspective

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ABSTRACT. The empirical social-psychological study of interethnic interaction in Estonia and Lithuania was a part of the project "Democratisation and The Ethnic World: models of regulation of ethnopolitical crises". The main aim was to study a social-psychological discourse of interethnic relations and the degree of its overlap or contradiction with the ethnopolitical (public) discourse. In this paper, we shall focus on some data from this project that regards acculturation and those elements of the discourse that have to do with adaptation of the non-titular populations to the changing contexts of their societies in a time of broad political and economic reforms and democratisation.

Introduction

The survey was carried out in October-November 1996 in the capitals of Estonia and Lithuania among the titular ethnicity and among the Russian residents. The data that was analysed come from 32 Estonians, 35 Russians from Estonia, 34 Lithuanians, and 42 Russians from Lithuania who were chosen on the basis of random sampling. All of the surveyed were residents of the capital cities; the majority of them worked, had families, and were relatively far from politics. The samples are weighted according to sex and age.

The methods used come from empirical research and are mainly oriented to the actualisation of social-perceptive images of cross-cultural interaction: method of ethnic auto- and heterostereotypes (Katz D., Braly K.W, 1933), Bogardus' scale of social distance (Bogardus E.S. 1959), "Who am I?" test (Kuhn M. & Mc Partland T. 1954), measure of satisfaction with realisation of the life sense of Crumbought (1968) adapted by Yadov and Muzdybaev, etc. There has been also a focus on so-called 'ethnic' values and 'universalist' Western values such as democracy, human rights, and liberalism for studying the relationship of these value blocks in the consciousness of different groups and their leaders.

Identity block

We calculated the share of answers (the open ended question 'Who am I?' – Kuhn & McPartland's test) that refer to ethnicity and those that refer to citizen-

ship/civicness (Table 1). Ethnic belonging is most significant for Estonians and Lithuania's Russians, and much less significant for Lithuanians and Estonia's Russians. Concerning that, 5.7 percent of Russians in Estonia and 4.7 percent in Lithuania indicate negative self-characteristics related to their ethnic background[1].

Naming oneself as a citizen of one's respective country is most frequent among Lithuanians (23.5 percent), and significantly less so among Estonians. It is mentioned by some Russians in Lithuania but does not appear at all among Estonia's Russians. Certain parity between the two types of identification is noticeable only among Lithuanians, while all other groups have a predominantly ethnic dimension, completely unpaired with the civic in the case of Estonia's Russians. These data reflect the complex relationship between ethnic and civic identity and the fact that the ratio between them in each group may be shaped by different reasons.

In outlining the project, we assumed that the identity structure of most respondents in the surveyed settings ('border of East and West') would be complex due to the specific background of overlapping ethnic, religious, and political influences. The differing structures of self-identity were confirmed by the answers to the range of suggested identity options, where respondents would answer "Who do you feel to be the most?" (Table 2).

Among the Estonians, ethnic identity clearly dominates, followed by civic and European options. Estonia's Russians also have ethnic identity in first place, followed by identification as a citizen of Estonia and as a citizen of the former USSR. Among Lithuanians, ethnic identity is also first, but civic identity does not lag far behind, as in the situation among Estonians. Lithuania's Russians stand out with high rate of identification as a citizen of the former USSR; both groups in Lithuania have a clear layer of religious identity. Thus, ethnic identity is number one in the self-identification structure of all the groups. Citizen of a country is the second most highly rated option among the titular groups and Estonia's Russians; a feeling of European identity in the titular groups is paralleled with a feeling of being a citizen of the former USSR among the Russians.

What is the basis of the prevailing ethnic identification? The basic elements which are felt to tie the respondents with their co-ethnics are language, culture, and way of life (Table 3). There are also differences: Land and nature are significant sources of self-identification for the titular ethnic groups, but not for Russians. Psychology and history predominates among the Lithuanian Russians and means that their ethnic identity is primarily idealistic.

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[1] Such as 'other origin', 'stranger', 'immigrant' (in Russian: "инородец", "изгой", "иммигрант").

Acculturation

Group stereotypes

The major dilemmas that lay in the basis of a certain acculturation model regard the relation to one's own ethnic culture (and background/belonging) and to the culture of dominant ethnicity. The same issues shape the attitudes of the dominant ethnic groups vis-à-vis the groups of other ethnicities.

The study of ethnic auto- and heterostereotypes is one of the methods to analyse the aforementioned relations. We asked the respondents to list five features characteristic of the typical members of their own ethnic group, and five features of the neighbouring ethnicity. The answers received were divided into three clusters: prevailingly positive features; positive and negative features; prevailingly negative features (Table 4).

Russians in both Estonia and Lithuania exhibit tense social-psychological mechanisms that are defensive in relation to influence from other cultures. This is confirmed by the high rate of predominantly positive autostereotypes. The 'titular ethnicities' have fewer outstanding positive autostereotypes, which reveals a positive self-perception without the defensive psychological tension.

As heterostereotypes show, both groups in Estonia see each other as having more negative than positive features. This means that both groups are closed inside themselves and defensive mechanisms are active in their group consciousness, supposedly preventing the influence of the outsider culture. The same picture of group consciousness (with a still higher rate of heterostereotypes) comes from Lithuania's Russians. The Lithuanians, however, feel a lot more comfortable, which is reflected in a higher rate of positive stereotypes about Russians.

Another indicator is emotions related to ethnic background/belonging, in other words, positive or negative self-identification with one's ethnic group (Table 5). While positive identification prevails in all the groups, the titular ethnicities have higher rates than Russians. Russians, especially Lithuania's Russians, have a rather high rate of negative feelings related to their ethnicity. This means that there is an evident negative element (in emotional terms) in their ethnic identity: Understanding oneself as Russian is connected to negative feelings.

Socialising

An important indicator for assessing acculturation is the degree of involvement in social circles of an ethnicity other than one's own, especially in one's free time. In the research, we asked the respondents to identify with whom they mainly socialise (in ethnic terms) at work and during leisure time (Table 6). In spite of the fact that the percentages of Estonians and Russians in Estonia are quite comparable (roughly 60 percent and 40 percent), they barely get in touch at work

or socialise in intra-ethnic circles. In Lithuania this separation is not as clear, and there is higher rate of Russians who are surrounded by co-workers from the titular ethnicity; however, it is quite surprising that most Russians (less than 9 percent of the population) succeed in communicating equally with Lithuanians and Russians when working, while a fourth of them stay in predominantly Russian circles. Taken generally, it seems that both titular and minority ethnic groups are successful in avoiding or seeking to avoid interethnic communication.

The differences are even sharper when leisure socialising is compared, especially in Estonia: Estonians practically do not socialise with Russians, and only 17 percent of Russians communicate with Estonians. In Lithuania the separation is less pronounced – about a third of Lithuanians and a fourth of Russians are involved in interethnic communication during leisure time. The question then is what the reasons are for such a sharp division and closure in the separate ethnic 'rooms': language barrier, antipathy, or something else? Let us review these factors in more detail.

Language barrier as a dividing factor

The knowledge of languages is better viewed in dynamic terms, in particular on the basis of three generations: the parents of the respondents, themselves, and their children (Table 7). According to the responses, the middle generation knows Russian best, and a large share of their parents also know the language. However, a fourth of the children have no knowledge of Russian, and less than a fifth know it well. The vector of exclusion of the Russian language by the Estonians is evident. At the same time, Russians exhibit the opposite vector, with each generation knowing Estonian better. The poor knowledge of the elder generation is not surprising as many of them spent part of their life in Russia. It is notable that Russian children already know Estonian to a greater degree than their Estonian peers know Russian.

What surprises in Lithuania (after noting that it is middle generation that knows Russian best) is that children of the respondents know Russian relatively well. It means that vector of excluding (*отторжение*) the Russian language is not really evident among Lithuanians. While Lithuanians lead in their knowledge of language of the out-group (in all generations), Lithuania's Russians also know Lithuanian quite well, especially the younger generation.

In general, even though the official language is not known by the Russian residents well enough yet, there is a clear trend of increasing knowledge of the respective languages. This leads one to believe that the language barrier will no longer be among the reasons for interethnic separation. However, this is not an entirely mutual process in Estonia, as the vectors of knowing the out-group language are opposite in majority and minority groups.

Apart from the language barrier, there can be also other reasons for the distances between the groups (see Table 8). Not knowing the language of the out-

group is admitted as a barrier by 46 percent of Russians in Estonia and 31 percent in Lithuania. Lithuanians and about a fifth/fourth of the Russians in both countries mention the specific behaviour of the ethnic out-group. Almost a fourth of Lithuania's Russians assume there is antipathy towards them from the side of Lithuanians. A slightly smaller part of Estonia's Russians and Lithuanians think the same about their neighbouring group. Only a small portion of Estonians admitted they feel some antipathy. Apparently this question was not simple for the 'titular' ethnicities – around half of them refused any specific answer; a fifth of the Russians also omitted it. In any case, language does not seem to be the crux of the problem for the dominant groups in the Baltic countries.

Social distance and tension in interethnic relations

When checking the degree of and the barriers for accepting the out-group member (in the questionnaire, we used a modified version of Bogardus's scale of social distance), we noticed that quite a large portion of all groups (~31-45 percent) is ready to accept the ethnic out-group member as a spouse, but only a small portion of the titular groups (9 percent) agrees to accept Russians as spouses for their children (Table 9). This could be an indicator of an emerged vector of distancing from the Russians.

From the suggested list of causes of interethnic tension, the titular nationalities mainly noted the unwillingness of the Russians to obey the law (Estonians emphasise it more, Lithuanians less), the discrepancy between the law and the expectations of Russians, and the difficult historical legacy. Russians of both countries agree that the laws don't match their expectations but do not think at all that Russians do not wish to obey the law. At a similar rate (43 percent) as the dominant groups, they agree that the reasons for the tension lie in the historical past. But the range of reasons with significant rates indicated by Russians is quite broader, including 'economics', 'competition for power and redistribution of wealth', and 'radical nationalism' (23 percent by Estonian Russians is the highest rate) – extending beyond the narrow "unwillingness" to obey the law.

So, respondents in all groups indicated the burden of the past, which most likely means the policy of the USSR in the Baltic countries during the Soviet period. The end of Soviet rule might have been expected to mean the removal of the main cause of the tension and, accordingly, improvement in interethnic relations. However, the majority in all groups noted that state independence had little influence on the *interpersonal* relations between the members of the titular and Russian groups. Sixteen percent of Estonians indicated that independence improved the attitude of the Russians they know, and none of the Lithuanians and Estonians surveyed mentioned the complication. From fourteen to seventeen percent of Russians in both countries, however, feel that the attitude of their acquaintances from the majority ethnic group towards them has worsened. There

are sharper differences in evaluating the change of interethnic relations after the gain of independence in general terms (rather than in terms of acquaintances as above). The majority of Estonians declare a considerable or relative improvement (75 percent). A third of the Lithuanians indicate some improvement and a third indicate some worsening. The majority of Russians indicate a relative or considerable worsening in interethnic relations after independence (68 percent in Estonia and 69 percent in Lithuania). Evaluations of the current situation (Table 10) confirm the same general tendency: The majority groups perceive interethnic relations in their country as more or less good, and Russians feel more tension (although a considerable portion of Russians, especially in Lithuania, also admit that relations are 'calm').

Suppression of rights

It seems quite logical to assume that differences in those evaluations may have to do with the suppression of the rights of the minority population; it has to be noted that it also refers to the suppression that could have taken place in the past, and in relation to the 'titular' population. Quite a high number of Russians in both countries indicate the suppression of their rights; as do almost half of the Estonians and less than a fifth of the Lithuanians (Table 11). In psychological terms, current experiences outweigh the memories about the suppression of rights in the past.

For those segments of the titular groups who did declare that they have experienced the suppression of their rights due to their ethnic background, the spheres of culture, politics, and social mobility (Estonians) or culture and politics (Lithuanians) dominate. Besides public services and political rights in Estonia, and services and education in Lithuania, Russians in both countries mention employment (getting a job) and social mobility (advancement at work) at high rates (Table 12). Although the sphere of employment appears as most critical, it is quite complicated to obtain direct measures of discrimination. Instead, we inquired about the attitude to the very principle of taking ethnic background into account in employment[2] (Table 13). Half of the Estonians, 18 percent of the Lithuanians, 3 percent of the Russians in Estonia, and 7 percent of the Russians in Lithuania accept the principle of ethnic discrimination. Seventy-three percent of Lithuanians, 93 percent of Lithuania's Russians, 41 percent of Estonians, and 31 percent of Estonian's Russians disagree with it. Two-thirds of the Russians in Estonia could not answer this question. This hesitance and the differences in the answers of Estonians and Es-

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[2] Question: Some people think that when there is a shortage of jobs, employers should give priority to people of the titular ethnicity instead of people from other ethnic backgrounds. Is that just, in your opinion?

tonia's Russians is a clear indicator that employment relations are not free from the influence of ethnicity.

Some differences in mutual perceptions

In measuring the attitude to the laws regarding citizenship (Estonia) and language (Lithuania), we asked the respondents to assess to what degree these laws are fair, and how they would assess the issue if they belonged to their ethnic out-group. The majority of Estonians consider the Citizenship Law as unjust but either necessary or useful for the country (50 percent); the same perception is expected from the Russians (by 56 percent). However, the majority of Estonia's Russians consider the law to be unjust, unnecessary, or even harmful for the country's future (63 percent); 26 percent admit it is useful or necessary. Russians expect that 25 percent of Estonians would also think that the Citizenship Law is unfair, unnecessary, or harmful (in fact, 3 percent of Estonians do). It shows that Estonians and Russians have no clear picture of how the neighbouring ethnic group perceives the problematic law; rather, they expect the other group to think in their way. This is largely determined by the closed circles of intra-ethnic communication, which does not allow the verification of opinions concerning other groups.

Most Lithuanians see the Language Law as necessary at this stage of development (53 percent), and around a fourth consider it as the only fair case possible. But they expect the Russians to be less positive about this law and see it as unjust though necessary for the country (62 percent). In fact, only a fourth of Russians admit it; 62 percent see the law as unnecessary, unfair, or harmful. Russians in Lithuania also have some illusions, but to a lesser extent: the rate of those who would consider the law unjust if they were Lithuanian corresponds with the real rate among the Lithuanians ($\sim$26 percent), and rate of those who would see the law as unjust yet necessary is also close (45 percent in Russian view; 53 percent in fact). No Lithuanians believed that the law was unjust, despite the expectations of some Russians.

The Russian respondents were asked whether they knew any instances when state officials would 'soften' the requirements of the aforementioned laws in practice. About a third of them in each country claimed to know such cases. The prevailing explanations as to the possible reasons behind this behaviour of the officials are 'softness, humanism' (Lithuania) and 'understanding the unfairness of the law' (Estonia). However, Russians in Lithuania also suspected the officials to have more profane motives such as 'demonstrating one's superiority' and 'economic advantage' (i.e., expectation of a bribe). Most respondents look at such officials 'with understanding', although again, there are noticeable attitudes of 'indifference' or 'despise' (around 24 percent in Lithuania and 20 percent in Estonia).

Assessing the country of residence

After the previous discussion of a range of factors that shape the sociopsychological climate for the adaptation of non-titular groups, let us review a few typical statements that some Russians would make in an attempt to assess their situation in the new environment of the independent states. Fifty-seven percent of Russians in Estonia and 60 percent in Lithuania disagree that 'For people like us, living conditions in Russia are worse than here'. Concerning 'Conditions in this country are better than in Russia for improving one's life quality', 46 percent of Russians in Estonia are positive, but almost two thirds of Russians in Lithuania do not believe so. Seventy-four percent of Estonia's Russians and 43 percent of Lithuania's Russians do not think they could find a place in Russia easily (in case of necessity). Sixty-three percent of Russians in Estonia see certain advantages of their situation in comparison to Russia ('more order, more stability, possibility to earn rather than steal, better protection of property), while the majority in Lithuania do not (yet 21 percent mention some advantages: 'there's no war, authorities at least pretend to account to the people, salaries are paid, autonomy'). Thirty-one percent in Estonia and 29 percent in Lithuania assume there are no disadvantages in their country of residence in comparison to Russia; others most often mention distance from the culture, danger of assimilation, exclusion, inequality on nationality basis, suppression of rights, etc.

The distribution of reasons that could possibly stimulate a Russian resident of Estonia or Lithuania to move to Russia shows that factors of ethno-cultural type prevail (Table 14). Once again, we see the difficulties in acculturation, such as the language barrier and the wish to live among one's 'own kind' (in Estonia, absence of citizenship is also an important factor). In the groups of our Russian respondents, about half in Estonia and a third in Lithuania visit national-cultural associations, to which they primarily come to fulfil such expectations as 'to remain Russian without moving to Russia,' 'socialise the children into the Russian culture,' and to realise 'the spiritual needs'. In Estonia, they mention defence of rights (31 percent) more often than in Lithuania; in Lithuania, some more have mentioned social support (21 percent). However, about a third in each respondent group declared that they don't see any sense in such associations.

Internal logic of interethnic attitudes

The discourses and the perceptions of interethnic relations are differently reflected in the consciousness of the four groups discussed. It is quite likely that the mass media may have had enormous influence in shaping those psychological attitudes of the titular population that would justify and support the internal

policy towards the Russian populations. Whatever the whole set of opinion-shaping factors is, we are interested in understanding how interethnic attitudes are formed and on what they are based. Here we shall try to note the links between different attitudes and opinions which altogether constitute the 'internal logic' of understanding the 'Russian issue'.

As the "New Russian Diaspora" project has revealed, understandings of the situation of Russians clearly differed both between countries and between the titular and Russian groups within countries[3]. There were 26 statements about the Russians for respondents to assess. After this, factor analysis was carried out and generalising statements were extracted. In the consciousness of Estonians, the exclusion/repulsion (*отторжение*) of Russians and demand for their loyalty and obedience for the law prevail, in spite of the fact that statements related to obedience and loyalty have received considerable acceptance among the Russians themselves. Among the Estonians, there was no group of interrelated attitudes that would be responsive to the Russians' wish for 'justice and equal treatment'. Again, it seems quite a contrast given the evidence of the 'stay and obey' attitude among the Russians. This deafness and mechanical (rather than emotional) attitude is reinforced not only by the external influence of mass media or politicians, but also by the closed social circles that prevent closer communication and breakthrough of the externally supplied stereotypes. In the consciousness of Lithuanians, two tendencies compete: defending independence from Russia and Russians, and acceptance of Russians, with a slight prevalence of the latter. In contrast to Estonians, both the Lithuanians and the Russians themselves exhibited some analogous perceptions of the Russians' situation: they note the fear of Russians regarding their fate, and have adequate responses of 'pity' and 'human kindness'. Among Lithuania's Russians, the attitudes of 'obedience to the law,' 'attitude to acculturate,' and 'Lithuanian patriotism' are apparent (along with fear and understanding of inequality). In Lithuania, there are coinciding vectors that give hope for the smooth integration of the ethnic groups into some kind of political nation (for more, see Lebedeva 1997: Ch.3 and Appendix). These results were the background for a further study of interethnic perceptions. Further, we present the correlation analysis of various attitudes from the "Democratisation and the Ethnic World" project (Tables 15-18). By tracing the links between specific variables, we can see what underpins more general attitudes and ethno-political trends.

Estonians (Table 15). The justification of ethnic discrimination in the consciousness of Estonians rests on the image of Russia as an enemy of the country's independence and is based on trust in the mass media of Estonia. The Citi-

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zenship Law then appears justified and fair, and the reason for interethnic tension in the country supposedly lies mainly in the unwillingness of Russians to adapt (obey the law). Russian values are approached negatively; this judgement is closely linked with the prevalence of 'an eye for an eye' type of justice. Closure in mono-ethnic circles (spending free time with Estonians mainly) helps to maintain the conviction that the success and recognition of the country by the international community does not depend on the humanistic or moral character of the laws. Another trend is also evident, albeit much softer. Opinion that morality and justice should be matched in law relates to a perceived lack of Russian values in the country. Radical politicians are judged as unacceptable and dangerous no matter whose side they are on.

Estonia's Russians (Table 16). Closure in mono-ethnic circles (free time with Russians mainly) correlates with perceiving the authorities as strange and hostile. The evaluation of independence depends considerably on whether one knows the titular language (knowledge allows a more positive attitude). Knowledge of Estonian allows a more negative evaluation of Russian values and an acceptance that law and morality may differ. Length of residence has an influence on the perceived expulsion of Russians by means of the Citizenship Law.

The perceived weakness of Russian values in the consciousness of Russians is connected to the conviction that morality and law should be in accord. Obedience to the law is conditioned by the fairness ('morality') of that law in their consciousness. If all residents have to pay taxes, all of them should be entitled to citizenship. The perceived unfairness and cruelty of the law leads to uncertainty about the future and dissatisfaction with democracy. Conviction about the unfairness and harm of the Citizenship Law is linked with increased social (interethnic) distance and ethnic intolerance.

Lithuanians (Table 17). Trust in the Lithuanian mass media is related to satisfaction with life, increased social distance with the Russians, and a belief that the Language Law is fair. The refusal of ethnic discrimination is based on accord of law and morality. Knowledge of the Russian language relates to the conviction that citizenship must be granted to all residents; it is also connected with a more negative evaluation of Western values.

The lesser emphasis on ethnicity in self-identification is matched by close social distance to Russians. At the same time, Lithuanian patriotism allows one to treat the law and morality separately. Personal political activity, though, implies a requirement to match the law and fairness. Trust in parliament and government is also linked to a conviction that democracy depends on the accord of the law and common human values. The belief that radical politicians are a source of danger is linked to satisfaction with democracy. Conflict between Lithuanians and Russians is not seen as a likely danger, and this is connected with a positive attitude towards Russian values.

Lithuania's Russians (Table 18). Emphasis on ethnicity in self-identification by the Russians in Lithuania relates to confidence about the future; it also brings certain emotional support ('understanding') to the officials who in practice would soften the requirements of the Language Law. Disagreement with ethnic discrimination corresponds to satisfaction with life. The perceived suppression of rights is linked to dissatisfaction with how democracy works in the country. Personal involvement in politics has to do with perceived unfairness of the law. The judgement that radical politicians are dangerous relates to the conviction that democracy depends on accord between the law and common human values.

Positive ethnic identification is connected to a positive attitude towards Russian values. Ethnic tolerance (positive hetero-stereotypes) implies a positive attitude to Western values. A pro-independence attitude depends on communication with Lithuanians. The decreasing social distance with Lithuanians is brought about by children speaking the titular language.

Conclusions

The results of this study reveal that the acculturation process of the Russians in the given Baltic countries has been going on at an urgent pace and therefore has some features of crisis.

Forced ethnicity

As an outcome of ethno-cultural isolation and the dominance of ethnocrats in the state-building process, part of Estonia's Russians are experiencing a crisis of ethnic identity. This crisis could be well described as a 'syndrome of thrust, or forced, ethnicity'. The syndrome of forced identity includes tight correlation (at the level of $p=0,01$) between the following:

a) increase of the ethnicity-relevant identity markers in self-identification;
b) rise of the so-called 'ethnic' values ('to remain Russian', 'to live among Russians');
c) rise of negative emotions associated with one's ethnic background;
d) neglected rights of ethnic minorities;
e) negative heterostereotypes;
f) increasing cultural distance in relation to the titular ethnic group;
g) attitude to migrate.

When there is no attitude to migrate, the given syndrome appears as 'escape from ethnicity,' expressed through acceptance of the suggested scheme of strict assimilation and abandonment of the previous cultural background. It is inter-

esting to note that in the Russian consciousness, the attempts to decrease the cultural distance towards Estonians happened to be related to a negative evaluation of Russian values and an allowance for incongruence between morality and law. This is not really surprising since the same cluster appears in the consciousness of the Estonians.

Estonia. Ethnopolitical discourse. The aforementioned changes in the ethnic identity of some Russians in Estonia are directly connected to the ethnopolitical social-psychological discourse that dominates the consciousness of the titular ethnic group. The social-psychological discourse of interethnic relationships has an effect on the consciousness of Estonians through the strong influence of the mass media, which uses the image of Russia as an enemy of independent Estonia. Then, there is a direct link to justify the ethnic discrimination of the splinter of this Russia which illegitimately resides on Estonian soil.

Presently, the variants of acculturation suggested by Estonian society for the non-titular population look gloomy: assimilation or segregation in the best case, and marginalisation in the worst, though most likely, case. The emphasis on categorising people on the basis of ethnic background also involuntarily makes the titular ethnic group experience internal contradictions and sacrifice moral principles. This emphasis is certainly not the very best socio-psychological background for building new statehood and may cause a delayed crisis to rise from general resentment, when mechanisms of psychological compensation (the justification of immoral decisions by referring to political goals; exaggerated optimism, etc.) will no longer be effective in resisting reality. At present, the illusion of the dominant ethnic group that "everything is going well" is supported by the division of the communication circles into the intra-ethnic. This largely artificial division is less a consequence of the limited knowledge of the Russian language by the Estonians, and more an unwillingness on the part of Estonians to socialise with the Russians (possibly also due to covert feelings of moral contradictions).

The Russians express a very strong willingness to acculturate into Estonian society and hope that the Estonian government will realise the injustice of the current situation and will take some steps in favour of the Russians. However, very strong feelings of dissatisfaction with life, repression (*подавленности*), and no hope in chances to improve one's situation go along with the aforementioned.

Lithuania. There is a different social-psychological background of acculturation of the non-titular (Russian) population in Lithuania. Lithuanians do not refuse to learn Russian, are positive about Russian values, and declare their state as multiethnic. Along with the significant ethnic identity, civic identity has a definite place in their consciousness.

Russians in Lithuania have a positive ethnic identity and an 'escape from ethnicity' has not been noticed. They realise their cultural isolation from the

core of the Russian culture and seek to diminish this gap. Many politicians in Lithuania (both Lithuanians and Russians) state that civil society already exists in Lithuania, and the perceived injustice of the Law on Language stimulates the Russians to be active in politics, which can be seen as a feature of a relatively developed democracy.

Along with the above, there are certain difficulties in acculturation for the Russians. The difficulties may have to do with the smaller population and reduced social support. Many of the Russians born in Russia, especially the elderly, experience certain psychological difficulties in acculturation and transformation of ethnic and civic identity. If the attitudes of the prevalent population are directed towards the comprehensive integration of non-titular nationalities, there will be better chances for the Russians in Lithuania to cope with these psychological difficulties.

Background of culture

The empirical sociopsychological research in Estonia and Lithuania reveals that the political discourse of interethnic relationships created by political leaders and political parties has significant influence (especially through the mass media) on the discourse of the population. Nonetheless, there are discourses in the group (ethnic) consciousness of the respondents in all of the groups surveyed that are opposite to the ones prevailing in politics. According to my understanding, a given discourse is influenced by moral imperatives stemming from a broader background of culture: the moral legacy of Christianity, principles of justice, and broadly taken humanist values. Consequently, the laws and principles of social order are perceived and assessed from the point of view of those moral-ethical perceptions (no matter within which ethnic group). If the newly formulated principles of social order contradict the (much less visible) moral criteria of popular consciousness, then the proponents of the new order must invest considerable effort to legitimise and balance the contradiction between the 'need for justice' and the 'mistaken reality'.

I suppose that due to this, the psychological mechanisms of causal attribution of Estonia's population (especially Estonians) are in constant tension. They have to connect the real and the ideal. Moreover, the great significance attributed to ethnicity in Estonia has an important social-psychological function: It removes the Russians from the in-group (group of 'us') and introduces the mechanisms of intergroup relations (in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination). Group consciousness somewhat eases the burden of contradiction felt by an individual: In relation to 'strangers', even non-ethical behaviour is acceptable, especially when it is justified by historical offences and the presently complicated demographic situation.

Mapping coexistence

The single evaluation of the situation and policy outlines are, of course, complicated. However, the introduction of 'double standards' in order to justify current political gains may have an effect similar to a time bomb as it damages the ethical bases of popular (and ethnic) consciousness. International experience concerning the development of multiethnic societies suggests striving for policy that does not require necessary cultural losses (assimilation) from the non-titular population, does not encourage 'ghetto-isation' (segregation), nor leads to a combination of the two that would result in marginalisation. The education and social legislation of such societies could emphasise the benefits of pluralism and teach about the social and personal costs of prejudice and discrimination. The national surveying of knowledge and attitudes towards multiculturalism could help in monitoring and achieving a harmonious social climate. But the changes in social institutions must cope with the cultural diversity.

On the individual level, the non-titular population must learn that there are benefits, such as psychological security and social support, in maintaining one's culture. This may be achieved through the activities of cultural organisations, which would also lead towards decreasing assimilation-related stress. On the other hand, increased participation in public and governmental institutions (education, employment, legislation, etc.) could decrease separation-related stress and would help to realise the danger of marginalisation (when neither maintenance of the cultural background nor participation in the dominant society are achieved).

What needs an emphasis, is that acculturation and integration means mutual accommodation. The mutual concessions must be made evident: the school system and other state services on the dominant ethnicity side, and loss of certain elements of the original culture on the side of the acculturating groups (those elements that may nonetheless seem valuable, but are not adaptive). In spite of the apparent difficulties in managing the mutual accommodation process, other policy directions (not seeking integration) may lead to bigger losses, especially in case of segregation or marginalisation (Berry 1991).

Psychological evidence shows that people with no clear sense of self (i.e. without the 'own' cultural identity, which in fact needs a certain degree of support) and those who experience prejudice and discrimination on a regular basis pay a high psychological cost. Such a situation brings costs to the dominant population as well (through un-avoidable social conflict and social control). At the same time, those members of the minority cultural groups who refuse to understand and accept the main elements of the host society risk invoking dissatisfaction within the dominant culture, ultimately leading to conflict.

After a certain point, it becomes quite complicated to teach the advantages of and nurture the acceptance of multiethnic societies. Some of them, however, are worth listing an extra time: 1) it gives more colour to life; 2) it encourages healthy competition; 3) and most importantly, it increases the adaptive abilities of the society. This means that the social system has richer resources of alternative life styles in itself when it faces ecological or political crises.

In case of *de facto* multiethnic societies in Estonia and Lithuania, it is hard to expect any other more successful strategy of acculturation by the non-titular ethnicities than integration, i.e. tendency to preserve own cultural background along with the tendency to absorb (*овладеть*) the culture of the 'titular' ethnicity. However, it requires some form of multicultural ideology from the side of the prevalent ethnic group that would include acceptance of the existence of different ethnocultural groups in society and uninhibited accommodation of the social institutes to the needs of the different cultures. The current popular tendency to see 'open society' and 'ethnically divided' society as contradictory is little misguided: Both tendencies are important for successful development. The point is a harmonious balance between the two. In the context of our research, it means that people attempting to acquire new social identities must not be forced to give up their cultural background in exchange (as is the case of juxtaposed cultural and civic identity). Preserving both of these basic elements of a positive social identity is a precondition for ethnic tolerance, and therefore, social peace in a given region.

The form of social organisation for preserving both aspects of identity could be a viable Russian diaspora that would offer civic involvement without losing cultural background (I have argued for the diaspora model in the Baltics in Lebedeva 1997). Even though such a diaspora model is sometimes viewed with suspicion by politicians, it would allow for the harmonious development of the non-titular population from the sociopsychological point of view. Thus, the emergence and organisation of a Russian diaspora is actually in the best interests of both minority individuals and the state.

REFERENCES

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TABLES

Identity block

TABLE 1. Ethnic and civic self-identification in the Kuhn-McPartland test (answers to the question "who am I?")

Self-identification / (%)	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Ethnic	56,3	31,5	35,3	42,8
Civic	9,4	0	23,5	4,7

TABLE 2. Self-identification on the suggested option list.

Self-identification / (%)	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Citizen of the world	18,75	11,4	14,7	19
European	31,25	5,7	41,2	14,3
Citizen of the USSR	6,25	28,6	5,8	52,4
Ethnic identity	87,5	62,8	70,6	71,5
Half-Estonian/-Lithuanian, half-Russian	0	20	4,1	0
Citizen of the respective country	31,3	54,3	55,9	9,5
Catholic	12,5	0	20,6	0
Orthodox	0	0	2,9	21,5
Resident of the respective country	0	11,4	0	45,2

TABLE 3. The uniting elements: What ties you with your co-ethnics?

What unites / (%)	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Land, nature	28,1	5,7	32,4	4,7
History	31,3	17,1	17,6	30,9
Language	84,4	91,4	79,4	90,4
Culture	46,9	40	26,4	73,8
External outlook	6,3	0	2,9	4,7
Way of life, customs	62,5	54,3	70,6	28,6
Psychology	21,9	51,4	26,5	35,7
Religion	21,9	11,4	14,7	11,9
Other	0	2,8	0	0
Hard to say	3,1	0	0	0

Acculturation

TABLE 4. Group stereotypes

Type of stereotype / (%)	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
AUTOSTEREOTYPES:				
Positive	43,8	74,3	55,9	73,8
Positive and negative	28,1	8,6	20,6	11,9
Negative	9,3	5,8	17,5	11,9
No answer	18,7	11,4	5,8	2,4
HETEROSTEREOTYPES:				
Positive	12,5	17,2	50	26,2
Positive and negative	15,6	14,3	11,7	23,8
Negative	53,1	57,2	29,4	45,2
No answer	18,7	11,4	5,8	4,7

TABLE 5. Emotional identification with one's ethnic background/belonging (%)

Emotional background:	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Positive	90,3	82,8	91,6	85
Negative	12,5	14,3	5,8	30,9
No answer	18,2	14,8	5,6	2,4

TABLE 6. Circles of socialising (%)

Socialise mostly with	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
AT WORK:				
'titular' ethnicity	93,8	2,9	64,7	14,3
'titular' ethnicity and Russians equally	6,2	34,3	35,3	57,1
Russians	0	62,9	0	28,6
AT LEISURE:				
'titular' ethnicity	93,8	0	67,7	0
'titular' ethnicity and Russians equally	6,2	17,1	29,3	23,8
Russians	0	82,9	0	76,2

TABLE 7. Knowing language of the out-group (%)

%	Estonians			Estonia's Russians		
Knowledge of the language:	parents	respondents	their children	parents	respondents	their children
good	50	43,8	18,7	0	11,4	22,9
average	18,8	34,4	21,8	22,8	22,8	37,1
bad	12,5	18,7	3,1	14,3	51,5	11,4
No knowledge	12,5	3,1	25	34,3	14,3	8,7

%	Lithuanians			Lithuania's Russians		
Knowledge of the language:	parents	respondents	their children	parents	respondents	their children
good	52,9	82,3	35,3	7,1	42,9	38
average	26,5	17,7	23,5	19	38	35,7
bad	11,7	0	2,9	26,2	16,7	9,5
No knowledge	8,8	0	5,8	21,4	2,4	0

TABLE 8. Reasons of hardships in interethnic communication

Reasons: / %	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
I don't know their language	9,4	45,7	0	30,9
They don't know my language	15,6	2,8	17,6	0
Peculiarities of their behaviour	9,4	20	20,6	26,2
I assume there is antipathy from their side	0	17,1	14,7	23,8
I feel antipathy towards them	6,25	0	0	2,3
Other	6,25	2,8	2,9	9,5
No answer	53%	20	44	21,5

TABLE 9. Indicators of social distance between ethnic groups (%)

Ready to accept an out-group member as:	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Citizen of a country	3,1	0	14,7	0
Colleague at work	9,4	5,7	0	2,3
Neighbour (in residence)	21,9	20	11,8	14,3
Personal friend	21,9	11,4	23,5	14,3
Relative – as a spouse of a child	9,4	14,3	8,8	23,8
Spouse	31,35	45,7	41,2	38,1

TABLE 10. Evaluation of the current state of interethnic relations (%)

Relations are:	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Very good / благополучные	12,5	0	8,8	2,4
Calm / спокойные	65,6	28,6	73,5	40,5
Tensed / напряженные	15,6	62,9	2,9	52,4
Critical / критические	0	5,7	0	2,4
Hard to say	6,2	2,8	11,8	2,4

Suppression of rights

TABLE 11. Suppression of rights due to ethnic background (in the past and/or present, %)

Intensity:	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Often	6,3	20	5,8	19
Sometimes	40,6	51,4	11,8	59,5
No	34,4	20	73,5	14,3
Hard to say	12,5	8,6	8,8	7,1

TABLE 12. Spheres of the ethnicity-related suppression of rights (%)

Spheres:	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Getting a job	6,3	31,4	0	38
Advancement at work	12,5	28,5	2,9	38
Communication at work	3,1	5,7	0	7,1
Social insurance	3,1	17,1	2,9	9,5
(Public) Services	9,4	34,3	2,9	23,8
Culture	12,5	11,4	5,9	19
Education	9,4	11,4	2,9	23,8
Political rights	12,5	31,4	5,9	19
Other	0	0	0	0
Have not experienced suppression	53,1	25,7	79,4	16,7

TABLE 13. Evaluation of the principle of ethnic discrimination in employment (%)

	Estonians	Estonia's Russians	Lithuanians	Lithuania's Russians
Agree	12,5	0	2,9	4,8
Rather agree	37,5	2,9	14,7	2,3
Rather disagree	34	14,3	61,7	26,2
Completely disagree	6,3	17,1	11,7	66,7
Don't know	6,3	65,7	8,8	0

TABLE 14. Reasons for potential migration (%)

Reasons:	Estonia's Russians	Lithuania's Russians
Material hardships	25,4	30,9
Absence of citizenship	31,4	2,3
Language barrier	42,8	38,1
Departure of friends and acquaintances	8,5	19,1
Wish to live among 'own kind'	31,4	57,1
Other	5,7	11,9
No answer	25,7	11,9

Correlation analysis

Tables 15–18: correlation coefficient is valid on the level:
* – p = 0,05; ** – p = 0,01; *** – p = 0,001

TABLE 15. Results of correlation analysis: Estonians

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
1	Agreement with ethnic discrimination	Russia is a danger for the country	40*
2	————"————	Trust in Estonian mass media	53**
3	————"————	Citizenship has to be limited	49**
4	Reason of tension is unwillingness of the Russians to obey the laws	Citizenship Law is fair	51**
5	————"————	Success and recognition depend on harmony between the laws and common human values	51**
6	Interethnic relations have improved	Independence has had positive influence	48**
7	————"————	Solidarity with government/ authorities	50**
8	————"————	Radical politicians in Russia are a danger for the country	39*

TABLE 15 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
9	———————"———————	Citizenship has to be limited	43*
10	Russian values are not strong enough	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the laws	51**
11	Negative attitude tw. Russian values	"an eye for an eye"	47*
12	Taking part in politics is risky/ dangerous	Citizenship has to be limited	63***
13	———————"———————	Citizenship Law is fair	42*
14	Radical politicians in Russia are a danger for the country	Citizenship has to be limited	53**
15	———————"———————	Radical politicians in Estonia are a danger for the country	55**
16	Russia is a danger for the country	All the citizens must learn the language	64***
17	———————"———————	All the citizens must obey the law	70**
18	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in the ruling party	42*
19	———————"———————	Trust in Estonian mass media	46**
20	Free time with co-ethnics (Estonians) mainly	Success and recognition does not depend on harmony between the laws and common human values	36*
21	Positive auto-stereotypes	Positive hetero-stereotypes	64**
22	Negative auto-stereotypes	Reason of tension is unwillingness of the Russians to obey the laws	42*

TABLE 16. Results of correlation analysis: Estonia's Russians

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
1	Free time with co-ethnics (Russians) mainly	Poor knowledge of the titular language	45*
2	———————"———————	Government/authorities is / are strange and hostile	53**
3	Good knowledge of the titular language	Pro-independence attitude	45*
4	———————"———————	Solidarity with government/ authorities	51**
5	Interethnic relations have deteriorated	Government/authorities is / are far from people's troubles	38*
6	Length of residence in the country (Estonia)	Citizenship Law is / are aimed at expulsion of Russians	45*
7	———————"———————	Dissatisfaction with democracy	41*
8	Russian values are not strong enough	Success of democracy depends on morality of the laws	43*

TABLE 16 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
9	Independence has had negative influence (on quality of life)	Government/authorities is / are strange and hostile	50**
10	Uncertainty about the future	Citizenship Law must be 'softened'	42*
11	————"————	Government/authorities is / are strange and hostile	60***
12	————"————	Distrust in the ruling party	44*
13	————"————	Distrust in parliament	46**
14	————"————	Dissatisfaction with democracy	36*
15	————"————	Officers have not softened the application of the law	45*
16	Conflict between Estonians and Russians is a danger for the country	Radical politicians in Estonia are a danger for the country	46**
17	Taking part in politics is risky/ dangerous	Radicalism in politics is danger for the country	46**
18	Dissatisfaction with democracy	Officers have not softened the application of the law	67***
19	All the citizens must obey the law	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the laws	38*
20	Citizenship Law is unfair	Citizenship Law is unfair also from the point of view of titular ethnicity (Est.)	68***
21	Desire for citizenship	Absence of citizenship is a reason behind Russian emigration	41*
22	————"————	National (Estonian) patriotism	36*
23	Living in Estonia is better than in Russia	Young age	46**
24	Positive auto-stereotypes	Positive hetero-stereotypes	44*
25	————"————	Success of democracy depends on morality of the laws	41*
26	Negative hetero-stereotypes	————"————	46**
27	Good knowledge of the titular language	Negative attitude tw. Russian values	45*
28	————"————	Morality and justice must not coincide in the law	36*
29	Children know the titular language	Problem of Russians is exaggerated	48**
30	Increased social distance with titular ethnic group (Estonians)	Independence has had negative influence	44*
31	————"————	Citizenship Law is unfair and dangerous	38*
32	Problem of Russians is urgent	Citizenship Law is unfair	41*
33	Citizens must pay taxes	Citizenship must be available for all	41*

TABLE 16 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
34	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the law	———"———	42*
35	Officials have softened the application of the law	They did so because they realised that the law was unfair	78***

TABLE 17. Results of correlation analysis: Lithuanians

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
1	Satisfaction with life	Independence has had positive influence	42*
2	———"———	Trust in Lithuanian mass media	42*
3	———"———	Increased social distance with Russians	37*
4	Good knowledge of Russian	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the law	41*
5	Interethnic relations (with Russians) have improved	Trust in the opposition	45*
6	———"———	Have experienced suppression of rights in the past	41*
7	———"———	Positive attitude tw. Western values	38*
8	———"———	Russia is a danger for the country	38*
9	Disagreement with ethnic discrimination	Problem of Russians is exaggerated	42*
10	———"———	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the law	37*
11	Positive attitude tw. Western values	Independence has changed life	60***
12	Trust in Lithuanian mass media	Increased social distance with Russians	41*
13	Conflict with the Russians is not a danger for the country	Russia is not a danger for the country	56***
14	Radical politicians in Lithuania are a danger for peace in the country	Satisfaction with democracy	56***
15	Satisfaction with democracy	Trust in the parliament	49**
16	Trust in Lithuanian mass media	Language Law is fair	42*
17	All citizens must obey the law	Language Law is fair	51**
18	———"———	Language Law is also fair from the point of view of Russians	49**
19	Acquaintance with the Language Law	Language Law expresses the care about Lithuanian language	64***
20	Positive auto-stereotypes	———"———	36*
21	Positive hetero-stereotypes	———"———	40*

TABLE 17 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
22	———”———	Radical politicians in Russia are a danger for the country	50**
23	Good knowledge of Russian	Negative attitude tw. Western values	41*
24	———”———	Granting citizenship is a solution for the problem of Russians	38*
25	Agreement with ethnic discrimination	Old age	50**
26	Positive attitude tw. Russian values	Conflict with the Russians is not a danger for the country	36*
27	Language Law expressed the care about reviving Lithuanian language	Language Law is not fair but is useful at this point	36*
28	Lithuanian patriotism	Morality and justice must not necessarily coincide in the law	46**
29	Political activity	Morality and justice have to be in harmony in the law	37*
30	Trust in parliament; trust in the ruling party	Success of democracy depends on morality of the law	39*
31	Ethnic self-identification is negligible	Small social distance with Russians	37*

TABLE 18. Results of correlation analysis: Lithuania's Russians

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
1	Ethnic self-identification is outstanding	Certainty about future	31*
2	———”———	Understanding of those officials who have softened the application of the laws	37*
3	Satisfaction with life	Disagreement with ethnic discrimination	45**
4	Socialising with titular ethnicity (Lithuanians)	Pro-independence attitude	30*
5	———”———	Willingness to learn titular language (Lithuanian)	36*
6	Knowledge of titular language (Lith.)	Attitude of Lithuanians has improved	37*
7	Reason of tension is language barrier	Positive attitude tw. Western values	32*
8	Attitude of Lithuanians has become worse	Officials have not softened the application of the law	34*
9	Interethnic relations have deteriorated	Have experienced suppression of rights in employment	40**
10	———”———	Dissatisfaction with democracy	37*
11	———”———	Language Law is unfair	38*

TABLE 18 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
12	Interethnic relations are balanced/calm	Independence has had positive influence	36*
13	———"———	Radical politicians in Russia area danger for the country	34*
14	———"———	Language Law concerned with the care about reviving Lithuanian language	32*
15	Have experienced suppression of rights	Problem of Russians is urgent	34*
16	———"———	Increased social distance with titular ethnicity (Lithuanians)	32*
17	———"———	Independence has had negative influence	42**
18	———"———	Language Law is aimed at expulsion of Russians	31*
19	Disagreement with ethnic discrimination	Language Law is unfair	37*
20	———"———	Success of democracy depends on the morality of the law	31*
21	Influence of Russian values is too weak	Officials have not softened the application of the law	35*
22	Uncertainty about future	Government/authorities is/are strange and hostile	35*
23	———"———	Distrust in any mass media	42**
24	Was born in Lithuania	Language Law concerned with the care about reviving Lithuanian language	43**
25	———"———	Wants to be a Lithuanian citizen	38*
26	———"———	Young age	39**
27	———"———	Independence has changed life	35*
28	Was born in Russia	Wants to be a Russian citizen	36*
29	———"———	Language Law is aimed at expulsion of Russians	44**
30	———"———	Independence has had negative influence	34*
31	Wants to be a Lithuanian citizen	Knows titular language (Lith.)	31*
32	———"———	Interethnic relations have improved	37*
33	Officials have softened the application of the law	Understanding of those officials who have softened the application of the laws	31*
34	Positive auto-stereotypes	Positive attitude tw. Russian values	40**
35	Positive hetero-stereotypes	Positive attitude tw. Western values	46**

TABLE 18 continue

Nr.	Dimension x	Dimension y	Corr. coef.
36	Satisfaction with life	Independence gives feeling of certainty about future	49***
37	Children know titular language (Lith.)	Decreased social distance with titular ethnic group (Lithuanians)	35*
38	Western values have too much influence	Negative attitude tw. Western values	34*
39	————”————	Language Law is unfair	44**
40	Language Law is unfair	Political activity	51**
41	Radical politicians in Lithuania are a danger for the country	Language Law is aimed at expulsion of Russians	31*
42	————”————	Success of democracy depends on morality of the law	36*

Social Exclusion and Double Marginalisation: Roma in Slovakia after 1989[1]

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ABSTRACT. The article deals with an issue that is becoming one of the most important challenges to Slovakia and its social, political, and economic development in the 21st century. The article describes the factors that led to the rise of the debate on Roma issues in Slovakia. The author is intrigued by the specificity of Roma as a national minority, and he describes the pre-1989 conditions of the current unfavourable socio-economic situation of Roma communities in Slovakia. In an attempt to explain why whole communities of Roma have been sliding deeper into poverty, the author focuses on the policies of the communist state toward Roma, the demographic behaviour of Roma, the unpreparedness for the social and political changes of 1989, and consequently, the process of the ethnicisation of poverty. The article describes the processes of social exclusion, social isolation, and double marginalisation of Roma in Slovakia and analyses the strategies that the Roma and the majority population use to deal with poverty.

The shift in understanding the so-called Roma issues

Rise of the debate

The Roma issue has become the hottest topic in Slovakia during the last 10 years. Politicians and celebrities have realised the importance of investing significant amounts of time, money, social capital, and especially political will into solving the so-called Roma issue. This was a remarkable shift from the past, in that Slovakia's political and social elite, regardless of their motives, began to understand the complexity of the issue and the urgency of dealing with it. Interest in dealing with the issue was encouraged by the following three motives during the last few years:

1. *Morality and the importance of human rights*: Some began to realise their obligation to help the Roma, and that inappropriate, misguided, or directly discriminatory methods and policies applied to Slovaks in the past should no longer be tolerated on Slovak soil. This reasoning,

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[1] Based on the research conducted for the World Bank from November 2000 to April 2001.

however, is limited to a relatively small group of people who call themselves liberal democrats.

2. *Integration and pragmatism*: A significant number of Slovak representatives understand the importance of finding a solution to the Roma issue because the country's integration ambitions and efforts to join the European Union and NATO depend on it. The deteriorating socioeconomic status of the Roma and the majority's strongly negative perception of them are becoming the most important challenges. Slovakia has the largest Roma minority of all EU-hopeful countries, and the one with the worst social status. The European Commission has repeatedly stressed that the situation of ethnic minorities in candidate countries aspiring to join the EU was acceptable, with the exception of that of the Roma.

3. *Self-defence*: A considerable proportion of the majority, represented mainly by the parliamentary opposition, admitted the necessity of solving the issue because of fears that stem from Roma demographic developments and the practically uncontrollable birth rates in Roma settlements (Vašečka 2001).

After the 1998 elections, a position of deputy prime minister for human rights, minorities, and regional development was created, and new government also created the position of governmental plenipotentiary for resolving Roma issues. However, what has remained unchanged since the elections of 1998 is the relationship between the majority population and the Roma. Due to the increased efforts of Roma to emigrate to EU countries and, consequently, visas imposed on Slovak citizens, in some ways attitudes toward the Roma in Slovakia have grown even worse.

Roma in Slovakia

Roma are the second largest ethnic minority in Slovakia. The latest census in 1991 (when Roma had a chance to claim their ethnicity for the first time) showed a total of 75,802 citizens claiming Romany nationality, or 1.4 percent of the population. However, various estimates put the Roma population at exponentially higher figures. Head counts conducted in 1989 by local and municipal administrations showed that there were 253,943 Roma (4.8 percent of the population); however, these statistics registered only socially dependent citizens. Therefore, it can be assumed that the number of Roma in Slovakia is even higher today. Current estimates by experts put the total number at between 420,000 and 500,000, a number continuously on the rise due to the high Roma birth rate. Many European countries have larger Roma communities than Slovakia, with the largest one in the world living in Romania (estimated popu-

lation between 1.8 and 2.8 million). However, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia have the largest per capita Roma communities in the world (8 percent to 9 percent of the country's population).

The Romany community has many different sub-groups. The most common are colonies of settled Roma (Rumungres) and nomadic Vlachika Roma; the remnants of the Germanic Sints represent a separate group. The Roma also differ by the language and dialects they use – in a Slovak environment, they use some Slovak language words and dialects, while in the Hungarian environment of southern Slovakia, they use Hungarian. Like the majority population, the Slovak Roma can also be distinguished by their place of origin (i.e. whether they are influenced by an urban or rural environment) as well as by their affinity to a particular region of Slovakia. The existence of culturally diversified and disassociated complex groups complicates the understanding of the Roma situation both within and outside the community.

Regarding such differences, some experts on the Roma observe that the old caste system continues inside the Roma community, determining in advance a person's role within the social system (in the case of Slovakia, we may speak of clans and groups). The distinctiveness of the Roma minority is also illustrated by questions of whether the Roma are a nation or merely an ethnic group. As recently as 1991, the Slovak Roma ceased to be perceived merely as an ethnic group and were treated by the country's legislation as a full-fledged ethnic minority, equal to other ethnic minorities living on Slovak territory (Vašečka 2001).

Yet the Roma constitute a truly distinct minority, and it requires a rather complex approach. The unsatisfactory socio-economic situation of most Roma in Slovakia raises the question of whether they are becoming a social, as well as a purely ethnic, minority. Expert and professional circles see the Roma becoming an underclass, a term that perhaps describes Roma settlements best. The basic characteristics of the underclass are long-term unemployment, fragmentary work history, permanent success on the secondary labour market only, and dependence on social welfare benefits or on activities that have to do with the shadow economy (Massey - Denton 1993). The underclass environment is understood as anomic in comparison to the majority environment and could be characterised by general resignation, low respect for authorities, a low level of self-control, reliance on welfare, and poor labour ethics. These general characteristics of the 'underclass' environment perfectly capture the situation of those Roma who dwell in Roma settlements and, increasingly, those who reside elsewhere.

Discussion of the underclass, which has been going on for several decades in some other countries, is perceived in Slovakia as having an ideological basis; many people seem to erroneously interchange the terms 'underclass' and *lumpenproletariat*. Nevertheless, opening such a discussion in Slovakia is vital for the country to prevent further negative consequences of the transformation

from a modern industrial society to a post-modern, post-industrial one. Otherwise, the gap between the majority and Roma will continue to widen, and ethnic poverty will intensify.

Pre-1989 policies toward Roma in Slovakia leading to their social exclusion

Policy background

The communist regime deformed the general understanding and observance of civic and political rights, while developing social rights, which have been significantly expanded. In contrast to other totalitarian regimes, this one changed the system that determined the course of the economy, making it unable to compete by disregarding the rules of demand and supply. But the most significant intervention into the functioning of society was the forcible effort to change the organisation of society, changing its natural stratification. Within the frame of these efforts, a systematic favouritism towards the lower social stratum of society, at the expense of higher ones, while directly discriminating against several segments of the pre-communist elite and intelligentsia.

The majority of Roma belonged to the lower layers of society, and they were the targets of different experiments by the communist regime aimed at the improvement of their social status. The change that came in 1989 caught the Roma by surprise, with most authors writing about these issues agreeing that no stratum of the Romany population had been prepared for these changes.

The communist regime assumed that if the living standard of the Roma reached the average living standard, the reason for the differences between them and the majority population would be eliminated. In order to achieve this, different measures, which could be characterised as social engineering, were employed, such as:

- The diffusion of the Roma (within Slovakia but also from Slovakia to the Czech Republic), directed and supported by state policy,
- The disintegration of natural Roma communities,
- The movement of the rural Roma population from Roma settlements to cities and industrial areas,
- The destruction of the natural binding between the Roma community and the majority population,
- Insensitive and administrative (forcible) allocation of flats to Roma from socially disadvantaged environments,
- Forced compliance with the general compulsory labour service, under the threat of imprisonment,
- Statutory enforced obligation of school attendance by children,
- Obligatory participation of the Roma in the health care scheme.

These seemingly positive results were achieved by forcible means, using measures that imposed external pressure without the active participation and acceptance of the Roma community. This was reflected by the behaviour of some Roma towards the property that was allocated to them. Despite the fact that the government managed to achieve a much higher standard of living for most Roma in comparison to previous decades, many of the forms of behaviour typical to a traditional Romany family remained. The process of modernisation of the Roma community during the era of the communist regime was predominantly one-dimensional, taking place only on the level of material improvement.

The characteristic attributes of a traditional Romany family include the following:

- Life in an extended family, thus lacking the motion towards the nuclear family,
- Community oriented life style,
- An absence of borders between what is private and what is public (privacy is non-existent due to the way of life, but also because of the relationship to property),
- Considering the present housing as temporary or provisional,
- A clear division of roles in the Romany family (man as the provider, woman responsible for household maintenance),
- The demographic characteristic of Romany families is multiple family members.

The Romany community can be characterised as a non-agrarian society that is not able to sustain itself from their own resources, thus traditionally entering into relationships with agrarian cultures. Agrarian cultures, with their relationships of private ownership to land and through land to the territory, have contributed to the establishment of institutional and customary norms in the non-Romany population. Since the Roma have never had an agrarian culture and their relationship to land has always been rather tepid, they did not establish mechanisms and institutions related to the agrarian type of private ownership relationships. Thus, the Roma never belonged to a territory and never attributed importance to the acquisition of property. On the contrary – their way of craftsmanship found demand thanks to their flexibility in relation to the territory.

The different relationship and responsibility of Roma towards ownership and their different relationship towards premises gives rise to the specific social structures of the Roma, which are based on kinship ties. These specific cultural norms of Roma can be called a strategy of permanent conditionality. Education in its institutional forms (formal and contextual) puts limits on the Romany strategy of conditionality. The educational institutions of the majority population thus lack an equivalent to the institutional structure of the Roma community. This

is a cause of conflict between the two types of social systems. The participation of Roma in two important activities – work and education – is from the Romany point of view a confrontation with a different world. Their incorporation into these two spheres is an asymmetric process, with Roma entering a game in which they did not contribute to the rules or regulations in any way; they are marginal and their only choice is to adjust.

Many of the measures undertaken by the communist regime undoubtedly contributed to an improvement in the living standard for the Roma population. But on the other hand, these measures were to the disadvantage of the Roma because of the insensitive placement of Roma families, adapted to the disadvantaged environment of a settlement, among the majority population. It often caused unsolvable problems in city housing estates, becoming a source of hate on both sides. This fact is at the roots of present outbursts of violence and racism.

The Roma community became, through the policy of resettling, diffusion, and employment, a part of the social provision system, which helped them to escape the situation of total material need reflected in absolute hunger and malnourishment. The result was that Roma gradually got used to state paternalism, which came to replace traditional family solidarity. This process led to the establishment of a new culture of dependence on state institutions.

Slide into poverty

In the pre-industrial era (until the beginning of the 20th century) the most important jobs of Roma included working as smiths or as musicians, although many also processed raw materials. Since Roma did not own land, they had to purchase basic foodstuffs from peasants. The peasant in turn needed a cheap labour force to collect potatoes, harvest grain, take in hay, build houses, dig wells, or prepare wood for the winter. The Roma usually demanded pay in food, used clothing, old furniture, or household items. The convenience of this system of coexistence for both sides has also been reflected in the relationships between Roma and peasant families. With the arrival of industrialisation these relationships gradually broke down and the Roma were forced to become a labour force for heavy industry. After 1989 the majority of them became useless in the new economy, mainly due to their qualifications, and the former relationships between Roma and the majority have almost disappeared.

The non-existent relationship to ownership and the strategy of conditionality influenced the access of the community to opportunities. The gradual social closure of Roma communities led to the social exclusion of the Roma. The process of social closure took place in two ways: one was marginalisation and the other incorporation. The result of marginalisation was a limitation of choices, often leading to the reproduction of poverty. During the communist regime, the government tried to solve the problem of marginalisation within the state-or-

ganised economy by incorporating citizens from rural areas into newly created zones of heavy industry, employing them mainly as unqualified workers. This incorporation had the form of illusionary integration, since it did not lead to an improvement of social status.

The determining influence on the social situation of inhabitants of the country during the communist era was the second economy. Only those who based their living strategies on participation in both economies had a chance to improve their social status. The second economy required the existence of financial household management and production (own land and own means of production). But this has never been an option for the Roma. Their exclusive dependence on the formal economy was the main factor for their deeper fall into poverty compared to the majority population.

The poverty of Roma during the communist era thus reached more significant forms than the poverty of the majority population with a similar degree of education and qualifications. Roma were much more dependent on income from social assistance, which made up a greater proportion of their income than did the income generated by work. Apart from the second economy, another significant factor contributing to the maintenance of the living standard of the majority population and their incorporation into the society was the participation of both partners in the working process, the so-called two-income family model. The risk factors contributing to Roma poverty included the fact that many Roma families had only one source of income (Roma women stayed at home with their children), not to mention the fact that the majority of families had many children.

Income differentiation and living standards in communist Slovakia did not match the degree of education achieved. Certain branches of industry, mainly the manufacturing ones, were preferred, and from the point of view of achieving a certain social status, there was a principal of collective, not individual, mobility. Education was not exclusively understood as a means of reaching a certain living standard and social position. The possibility of working in a certain sector, while having the type of education required there, was the guarantee of securing a living standard. The overall educational structure in Slovakia was adjusted to this principle, with the majority of citizens having only primary or secondary education without a certificate of apprenticeship. The orientation on these types of education became a trap after 1989.

Thus the relationship towards education and placement in the labour market was determined by two basic factors. The mechanism of closure of the Roma community led to a life on the edge of society, ultimately resulting in the reproduction of behavioural patterns in the area of education and the labour market. The new generation of Roma from the closed communities do not perceive or feel the need to choose a different educational strategy than the one chosen by their fathers and mothers. In this area the behaviour of the Roma minority dif-

fers significantly from the behaviour of other minorities, for example the Jewish minority. The Roma in the given community prefer the reproduction of approved patterns with an overwhelming orientation to the present. But education is connected with an orientation to the future. This reproduction of patterns was supported by the behaviour of the majority population, who knowingly or unknowingly failed to create the conditions for the improvement of education and qualifications for the Roma ethnic group. The communist form of extensive economy required a large unqualified work force, the Roma therefore did not need to improve their education or qualifications.

The historic experience of the Roma resulted in specific types of reactions and behaviour towards the majority population. Their withdrawal to the borders of society resulted in the Roma behaving as an endangered group – multiplying the cohesiveness of the community, with domineering strategies of escape (provisional escape–readiness to leave) or an offensive, almost aggressive strategy. This broadened the degree of seclusion and marginalisation of the Roma.

Demographic patterns

Family has always played a very significant role in the life of Roma. The head of the family is always the father. When it comes to raising children, Roma usually pay attention to the older ones, who then also take care of the younger children. Roma children are very reluctant to leave their parents, even once they reach adulthood and establish their own families. In general it is possible to conclude that the Romany family represents the traditional type of multi-generational family. This is also the most important difference between the Roma and majority population family; the traditional Romany household is only beginning to divide into its nuclear forms at present, while the same phenomenon took place in the non-Roma population during the first half of the 20th century.

The Romany family thus presently represents a different type of family, but the difference is not determined by ethnicity but rather by a drift in time. This is the reason why it is possible to talk of a phase drift in regard to this area, rather than of specific ethnic behaviour of the Roma. The data on the demographic behaviour of the Roma population in Slovakia strongly resemble data describing the demographic behaviour of the non-Roma population several decades ago, or are comparable to data from developing countries. As an example one can mention the data on child mortality that in the Roma population during the 1980s was very similar to the data from the whole of Czecho-Slovakia in the 1950s. The life span of the Roma minority between 1970 and 1980 was similar to the situation in Czecho-Slovakia between 1929-1933 (for Roma men) and to the era after the Second World War (for Roma women). It is realistic to assume that the present Roma population will reach the demographic characteristics of the majority in one generation.

The demographic boom did not occur among the Roma until 1945 because of high child mortality and inadequate health care. With a certain degree of simplification it is possible to conclude that the health of the majority of Roma was and still is worse than that of the non-Romany population in Slovakia (*The health needs...*, 2000). The communist regime achieved significant success in the overall improvement of the health of Romany population – lowering child mortality, increasing median life span, and eliminating certain diseases. It was mainly the mandatory health insurance scheme, improved living conditions, and quality of food that contributed to the significant growth of the Roma population during the communist regime. It is possible to assume that an important role in the demographic behaviour of the Roma was played by the population policy of the communist state (economy of full employment, social policy), which did not cause the people to consider or re-evaluate their own reproductive behaviour.

Despite the fact that health care was improved during the communist regime, the estimated median life span of the Roma population has been lagging behind the estimated median life span of the majority population. This is due mainly to their unhealthy life style, socially disadvantaged environment, high incidence of alcoholism, and most important of all, low quality, cheap food[2].

Changes after 1989: from social exclusion to social isolation

When social, economic, and political transformations after 1989 began, the situation in regard to the Roma population could be characterised by the following:

1. A relatively tense relationship between the majority population and Roma, originating from feelings of unjust re-distribution of resources.
2. The Roma had fully adjusted to the conditions and rules of the game introduced by the communist regime.
3. The existent differences between some groups of Roma were marked as socially pathological behaviour patterns and some Roma communities as socially not adapted. The state approached them on the basis of these conclusions; the differences characteristic of the Roma were considered to be manifestations of social pathology. Social policy was targeted at their elimination.

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[2] The basic ingredient of the Romany diet has traditionally been entrails prepared in various ways. The food considered to be the most typical Romany dish is called "goja" and consists of washed pork large intestine, turned with the fat side inside and filled with potatoes, corn meal, grits, or rice. Also, floury pastry dishes traditionally dominated the diet in Romany families, with a low consumption of vegetables.

4. Roma entered the transformation period with considerably lower quali-
fications in comparison to the majority population and, in addition, with
working habits inadequate to the requirements of the transforming
economy.

The gradual reconstruction of economic, political, cultural, and social life
of the society took away all of the securities obtained during the communist
regime by the Roma. And the Roma were not prepared for any of these changes.

Education and health

The liberalisation of constraining rules related to education, the school system,
the placement of children in children's homes, the pursuance of control, and
obedience to the law is resulting in an increased number of absences and tru-
ancy by the Roma children. During the communist regime these situations were
solved with the assistance of police, the placement of children into institutional
care, a reduction of social benefits, etc. The Roma children from separated or
segregated settlements are handicapped in three ways: the first time at their ar-
rival in the primary school, the second time at the entrance exams for schools of
higher education. The third way occurs when, after considering their chances,
they do decide to continue with further education, and they end up choosing
mainly apprenticeship schools (whose choice mostly depends on their availabil-
ity-distance from home). Later they are trapped in the position of unemployed
graduates of apprenticeship schools, without a chance of finding employment
within the official formal economy, in the close surroundings of their home. If
they finish their education, they go back to their original environment, where
they reproduce the behaviour of their parents. They fall into the social safety
net, and the young generation begins to perceive and consider this to be the
normal way to behave. If they do get employed, it is mainly informal jobs, ille-
gal work, or short-term jobs – opportunities for them diminish with growing
segregation.

The change in the area of health care to an insurance system with an empha-
sis on personal responsibility for health (an example being the cancellation of
mandatory public health insurance) is beginning to show effects on the worsen-
ing state of health of the Roma population. This is also related to the orienta-
tion of Roma on the present, neglecting preventive health care. The bad socio-
economic situation and inadequate housing and infrastructure in the place of
residency are the reasons behind the worsening health of the Roma after 1989.
All available data reflect the worsening state of health, mainly in the constantly
growing, isolated settlements. Many diseases eliminated or controlled on the
national level are still found in the Roma settlements. The socially disadvan-
taged environment is also associated with a high incidence of different levels of
mental retardation.

Housing

In the area of housing, there was nearly total privatisation. This includes flats and houses, as well as the land adjoined to the given houses or flats. Ninety percent of rental flats have been privatised, and the real estate has new owners. The land, which was in the so-called private holding, could be given to the tenants free of charge if the following two basic conditions had been fulfilled: 1) The house standing on the real estate had a valid building permit, or had been awarded the appropriate approval in the term given by the law, 2) The real estate was registered in the land-office, and no application had been filed for its restitution. When these conditions had been met, the tenant was free to apply for the transfer of the property to his name. While the majority of the population showed a significant lack of information concerning these procedures, the lack of information among the Roma was even more profound. The issue of ownership of land was non-existent during communism. Thus the changes after 1989 uncovered a large group of Roma living illegally on the land of other people. And also, the conditions for the legalisation of property have become very complicated, with increased demands and pre-conditions for the issuance of a building permit (it requires 32 individual permits). The houses of many Roma do not fulfil the norm dictated by the law and the Roma lack financial resources for the reconstruction of their houses. Even they have the resources, they often cannot use them, because they do not legally own the real estate.

After 1989 the government system of several types of loans for acquisition of housing, as well as the building of new houses by the state was cancelled, and the issues related to the problem of housing were transferred to communal municipalities and city councils. They began to behave just like any other economic unit. High demand has led to an increase in the prices of flats and houses, extreme from the point of view of citizens with an average income. The chance of gaining and maintaining housing has thus become minimal for the Roma because they are unable to succeed in this competition.

The building of housing estates in Slovakia after 1989 has been inadequately low compared to the demand. Despite savings programs and limited loans from the state, a system that would allow a citizen with an average income to obtain a flat in real time is non-existent. Thus the public reacts very sensitively to any kinds of unfair decisions regarding housing policy, allocation of flats, provision of low-interest loans, etc. Social housing as a partial solution to the situation with housing estates falls far short of covering the demands and needs of families in social and material need. The Roma are understandably not alone but are unquestionably the least successful at solving this problem. Rental price liberalisation and privatisation of flats, which led to the significant increase in housing related expenses (rent increases of 200 percent, similar to the increases of expenses related to water, gas, garbage, etc) pushes the Roma to cheaper flats or lodging-houses. The lack or absence of a realistic policy of social housing is

dealt with by the Roma by withdrawal strategies; they go back to the settlements, revitalising them. The reason for this is simple: Housing in settlements has minimal or no expenses related to it.

Unemployment

The unemployment rate among the Roma has risen to extremes (see Graph 1), reaching 100 percent in some settlements. Precise statistics for Roma unemployment do not exist, and one can only make estimates by assessing the overall situation in Slovakia's more troubled regions. Districts with the highest share of Roma are also the most severely hit by unemployment. The only data available on Roma unemployment, which still cannot be considered fully representative, are the unofficial data of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family, which were recorded by district labour bureau officers who wrote the letter "R" in the dossiers of Roma job applicants. Since this practice was illegal and discriminatory, it was discontinued after the 1998 elections. Unfortunately, one negative effect of that decision is that Slovakia now lacks a database on Roma unemployment. Nevertheless, unofficial data from the previous period show that the number of unemployed Roma in Slovakia is permanently increasing, and that the Roma represent a significant majority of the long-term unemployed in Slovakia. The main factors influencing the high unemployment rate among the Roma are the following: their low level of qualifications, the lack of interest among employers in hiring Roma due to the high supply of workers on the labour market, the poor work ethic of some Roma, the lack of interest among some Roma to find a job on public work projects, and the general scarcity of job opportunities, especially in regions with large Roma populations.

GRAPH 1. Numbers of unemployed Roma in Slovakia (on 31st December of each year)

1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	k 31.8.1999
40257	51412	46103	55374	62532	66750	76172	80586

Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family of the Slovak Republic, 1999

According to expert estimates, approximately 10 percent of Slovak citizens are dependent on social security benefits, a significant proportion of whom are Roma. The disbursement of social security benefits to the Roma has become one of the main causes for the growing tension between the minority and the majority population. The majority argues that while doing nothing, the Roma receive large sums of money, which they waste on alcohol. The government's inability to better plan the disbursement of welfare benefits, as well as widespread usury among the Roma, argue for the development of a supervisory mechanism through which the government could control the Roma's spending of their social benefits. The most serious objection to the approaches was that they were implemented across the board, without applying individual criteria. The scheme was tested during the first half of 1999, and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family is not now considering a broader application.

Unemployment, especially the long-term and permanent unemployment so common among Roma, perpetuates the cycle of poverty and the unemployment trap (Graph 2). Roma become dependent on social security benefits, resulting in a high rate of long-term unemployment. The situation is then passed from one generation to the next. Consequently, the number of families in which both parents and children are permanently unemployed is also increasing; moreover, children have no experience of stable and permanent employment. Hence, all current conditions support a subculture of unemployed Romany youth.

GRAPH 2. Percentage of Roma out of the numbers of unemployed according to the period of registration (1999)

Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family of the Slovak Republic, 1999

Strategies to cope with poverty among the Roma and the majority population

Changes in social stratification

The aforementioned changes demonstrate the new type of social stratification defined by new types of relationships in society. The forerunner of this new stratification was two stratification pyramids formed during communism: the pyramid of the establishment (social capital) and the pyramid of the second economy (private capital). These pyramids have been merging, with social capital producing opportunities for the creation of and access to material capital. Roma did not belong to either of the pyramids providing the potential for integration into a higher class of society. They did not have the chance nor did they manage to fulfil, with the help of the double life strategy (social and material capital), the requirements for integration into the new market relationships. Nor were they able to successfully master the new rules of the game on the labour market or the market with privatised property.

Poverty existed during the communist regime, and it was a problem for the Roma who had an above average standard representation in the category of poor citizens as well. After 1989 the term poverty gained a new facet, based on the inequality between individuals on one hand and whole social categories on the other. The individual criteria involve the old demographic poverty, where the basic factor of poverty is the number of children. This type of poverty can be escaped by individual strategies, mainly changes in reproductive behaviour (this strategy was implemented by the majority population in the middle of the 20th century). The communist regime implemented the same concept of poverty as demographic, which means poverty pushed into families and was connected to a certain living situation. Thus it transformed poverty from a public issue to a personal problem, which meant that poverty lost its dimension of social status. Poverty was understood as personal failure. The state regulated this poverty with means based on strong re-distribution, subventions into the infrastructure, prices of basic foods, and incomes.

The group characteristic is being described as the new vertical poverty, which, through changes in the structure of employment, moves a whole social category into social dependence. The main factor is not the number of children but a low degree of education in fields that are vanishing; whole branches of industry are disappearing, resulting in long-term unemployment. The specific characteristic of the Roma minority is the combination of the old demographic poverty with the new vertical poverty. In the case of group vertical poverty, individual living strategies are an unavoidable prerequisite to finding a successful solution but in itself it is not enough. The chances are determined by the system of social provisions and rights. The state of vertical poverty is the result of systemic changes

and not of individual failures. The degree and scale of poverty of the Roma is mainly related to their lack of integration; but the inequality of income and property is the direct result of this lack of integration.

From the point of view of the economic structure, the Roma in Slovakia are to a large degree a homogenous group when it comes to social class and qualifications. A majority of them belong to the socio-professional category of non-qualified workers, which is the reason why they have such a high representation among the low-income groups of the Slovak population. From the point of view of employment, a certain "monotype" of the Roma family could already be observed during the communist regime: Romany families were those of unqualified building or agrarian workers, without professional or general higher education, with a low average income per family member, and with a prevailing majority of men working away from the place of their residence. Since 1989 the unemployment of Roma men, as well as the number of families with both partners unemployed, has been on the rise.

The state reacted after 1989 by creating a system of social assistance, a social safety net. But it narrowed the comprehension of poverty to a state of so-called material and social need. The state does not create nor reflect poverty as a social status, thus narrowing its comprehension to the procurement (excluding entitlements for those who respect the norms regulating behaviour of the status bearers). The absence of entitlements and emphasis on procurement reflects the comprehension of poverty as individual failure and leads to the provision of social assistance by testing, measuring, and monitoring individual behaviour and strategies. This reproduces and strengthens the culture of dependence with all the signs of reproduced poverty: feelings of marginality and being in danger, fatalism, desperation, passivity, aggression, communal closure, impulsiveness, absence of planning and saving, and distrust towards the authorities.

Coping strategies

The basic coping strategy of both the majority and the Romany populations is family cooperation and the differences are in the type of help provided by the family, and whether it is actually able to provide any help at all. Family strategies stem from the cultural and historical background and living conditions of individual families. Which type of family strategy becomes prevalent in a settlement or village depends much more on its socio-cultural character and the micro-climate in the settlement than on demographic characteristics of the families. The socio-cultural character of separated and largely segregated settlements is a type of collective marginalisation and social exclusion without the potential for mutual help. A living strategy oriented to family networks is ineffective in these circumstances. The more homogeneous a settlement is, the smaller the

chances are for supporting family networks to be effective. In segregated settlements these living strategies have zero effectiveness. Some NGOs are trying to replace the absence of family support networks and mutual help with their own activities, i.e. creating community centres.

In the new social conditions, it is mainly old, well-known, and time-proven family strategies that are being implemented as coping mechanisms. The traditional majority family revitalises (apart from family networks) the strategy of self-catering and departure with the goal of finding work abroad. But the method of self-catering has never been used by segregated Roma communities in the past nor in the present (so there is nothing to revitalise). The non-acceptance of this strategy by the Roma is considered by the majority not to be a result of traditional or typical behaviour patterns for the Roma but as proof of laziness and predisposition towards theft – choosing the easy way and unwillingness to actively change their living situation. The more open a Romany community is, the more heterogeneous the environment is, the greater the chance for reproduction of the self-catering strategy.

The Roma are left with only one active strategy – departure. This strategy is not possible in marginalised, segregated settlements (because a departure requires some resources). A specific phenomenon for the Roma is collective departure, the departure of entire families from a certain locality, while in the majority population usually one member of a family leaves to work. The collective departure of Roma creates and multiplies the tension existing in the society; the majority population is being "punished" by the introduction of visa requirements for certain countries (defensive measures by countries trying to stop the inflow of Roma). It is not easy to establish a clear profile of the typical Romany asylum seeker from Slovakia according to classic demographic categories. Most asylum seekers came from the Košice and Michalovce districts, especially from the town of Michalovce and the villages of Pavlovce nad Uhom and Malčice. The typical Romany asylum seeker:

- Hails from eastern Slovakia (the western Slovak territories have remained virtually unaffected by Roma migrations);
- Speaks Slovak (Hungarian-speaking Roma do not migrate often);
- Resides in towns and larger villages (smaller villages and settlements have also remained virtually unaffected);
- Enjoys an above-average social status (most migrants are recruited especially from members of the Romany middle class);
- Has an above-average education (most migrating Roma have completed primary, some of them even secondary, education);
- Has experience working outside his own region (among migrants, a significant number of Roma have worked in remote regions of Slovakia, abroad in Prague, or in the mining region of northern Moravia);

- As far as Romany sub-ethnic differentiation is concerned, most migrants are Rumungres and not Vlachika Roma (although in terms of their habits and traditions, Vlachika Roma are much closer to a nomadic way of life than Rumungres).

All of the aforementioned strategies have the character of short-term and fast solutions, lacking the perspective of significant long-term improvements in the living situation. The revitalisation of strategies with long-term effects, typical in rural areas during the pre-communist era, like the development of agrarian small-scale production, animal husbandry, or retail handicraft, is rather sporadic and uncommon. Apart from lack of experience, there is also a lack of government support. For many villages, after the disappearance of the "Collective Farming Cooperatives" and state farms, which employed an overwhelming part of the majority and Roma population in agriculture, the aforementioned activities are the only possibilities for job creation. The cessation of agricultural production thus leads to the departure of the majority population – either happening through shuttle migration to working places or the abandonment of rural homes. The typical Romany handicrafts, being mainly supplementary production or services adjoined to these types of production, thus lost demand in these villages. Some NGOs are trying to supplement the absent government support, running several projects for the revitalisation of "classical" handicraft, several of them successfully.

Poverty enclaves: The double marginalisation

In the cases of some Roma settlements or in the case of a socio-spatial marginality of an area, there are instances of up to 100 percent unemployment in some places. Thus a situation is created, which within the Slovak circumstances has been given the title "valley of hunger," being areas with visible "islands of poverty". A "valley of hunger" is endangered by total social disorganisation and the creation of the culture of poverty as the only possible form of adaptation to the situation. Its results include the formation of a so-called underclass, rural and urban. Besides the structural dimension, the transformation after 1989 also had a territorial, regional, and micro-regional dimension. Some territories have been shifted to the margins of socio-economic development, becoming socio-economically marginalised territories. Marginalisation has its roots in the previous period of the so-called socialist industrialisation and industrial urbanisation of Slovakia. After 1989 the socio-economic marginality of the inherited regions has deepened, continually spreading to other territories. The marginalisation that has taken place within the economic transformation has created large compact entities within marginal territories in borderland regions of northern, eastern,

and southern Slovakia. These territories are inhabited by minorities, and that is why the issue also has an ethnic dimension.

Generally, the regions have several dispositions in common. They have increasing or "stabilised" levels of unemployment as well as other problematic qualities. These dispositions refer especially to human potential, as well as to the infrastructure, spatial position of the region, and the persistence of imbalance inherited from the past. They also share spatial, civil, and other marginal positions. There are concentrations of old demographic and new vertical types of poverty, low entrepreneurial spirit, and little influx of capital. Marginal regions are characterised by a decline of civilisation and cultural standards. Problems with access to education and social and cultural activities have been observed, adjoined to the limited potential for social and civil development. These regions have problems adapting to the current transformation, lacking social subjects able and willing to take the initiative and responsibility for the activation of the region. Marginal regions are seldom entirely marginal. Marginality is especially a problem in some villages. These regions are ethnically mixed, which adds political meaning to this feature of marginal territories.

The Roma living in segregated settlements of marginalised regions thus find themselves in a situation of double marginalisation. The weakened and very limited possibilities of a marginalised region in combination with the absence of potential for self-help, self-organisation, and activation require specific approaches, i.e. support and developmental social programs targeting the marginalised regions and the marginalised segregated settlements of the regions. Any concrete program cannot achieve long-term success without systemic changes, especially in the areas of employment policy and housing policy (social housing). It is not possible to overcome double marginalisation with an individual living strategy (unless it means moving). The multiplied effects of disintegration and marginalisation are reflected among the Roma in long-term lack of material security and life in absolute poverty. Material security means the availability of food, drink, clothing, housing, and warmth, enabling biological survival, the fulfilment of primary needs, and the organisation of activities leading to the fulfilment of this necessary security. But this is an orientation on survival, not on life. The orientation on material security is the bridge, a precondition to the achievement of social security and the fulfilment of secondary needs – mainly of self-identity, self-affirmation, education, culture, etc.

The most basic requirements for the achievement of social security are social contacts, which are the only possibility of incorporation into the social organisation of the society. The segregated Roma live under the pressure of trying to reach material security, leaving them without the potential for other activities for the benefit of themselves or others. So they themselves cannot ensure their participation in informal social networks. Their creation for the Roma and with the Roma is the most basic task for all social activists. The strategies of

segregated Roma oriented on survival make them dependent. This dependency is of a material character because their survival depends on state social assistance benefits and other institutions. The double marginalisation of the Roma is accompanied by material and social dependency. This double dependency causes a loss of self-confidence and self-respect.

Last but not least, the importance of examining the broad range of extreme experiences of Romany social life has to be mentioned. Too often discussion on the current situation or future planning lacks a clear conceptualisation of social processes. Too many pro-Roma programs are failing because they are aimed at integration, their procedures are assimilating, and in the long-term they lead to segregation. There is also general uncertainty on the political level about how to construct a society in which the Roma and the majority can coexist. Roma themselves are also far from reaching a consensus about the form of coexistence, balancing between assimilation and integration. One phenomenon of recent years is the radicalisation of Roma politics; some Roma leaders are pursuing the creation of separate Romany political, social, and economic structures.

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Dimensions of Social Integration: Appraisal of Theoretical Approaches

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ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on the main theoretical points of the concepts of social integration, social participation, social exclusion, and social capital. They cover determinants that condition a certain position in the social environment, as well as possible resources that determine different integration strategies or adaptation routes in different groups. I consider them in the context of ethnic studies and the social and cultural status of ethnic minority groups in particular and highlight their relevance for developing empirical research. References to various social studies and research are used to illustrate analytical methods and their empirical implications.

Constant changes in contemporary societies challenge their members to be ready to adjust. Social actors are in constant search for new strategies of integration and often have to concentrate all their skills in order to take advantages of available opportunities. During the great transformations in Eastern Europe over the last decade, ethnic groups were often confronted by new requirements emerging from redefined citizenship, civic loyalty, knowledge of the state language, value changes, participation in the newly formed bodies of the private or non-governmental sectors, etc. Ethnic groups had to respond in a more active or passive way or avoid adaptation through emigration, segregation, or life in closed communities. Both minorities and majorities went through multiple processes conceptualised in different terms, such as adaptation, acculturation, assimilation, or integration. This paper takes a look at how the concept of integration can help to understand ethnic processes in the social formation of a new nature and quality.

Besides being a basic element of the vocabulary of social science, "integration" came to dominate the ethnic policy discourse in most countries of Eastern Europe after 1990. New legal mechanisms, rights, international conventions, and treaties were intended and declared to promote the integration of national minorities. In Lithuania, most discussions on the issues of ethnicity and national minorities were concerned about the civil and political loyalty of the minorities. Therefore, the idea of integration was also politicised, particularly in the framework of public opinion. Nonetheless, the creation of a proper legal framework for minorities has been more or less successful. Yet the legally defined mechanisms, even if crucial to the development of civic society, are not sufficient for social developments. Ethnic processes remain a social challenge in that

some problems have not yet been overcome – e.g., negative attitudes, concerns with ethnic purity, symbolic and real cleavages in the labour market and the public sector, treatment in the mass media, etc.

Despite the perspective of social integration lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical basis, it is a useful framework for fruitful studies of ethnic processes. The advantage of the integration perspective comes from its focus on various social dimensions that are crucial in the evolution of ethnic groups. This paper focuses on the main theoretical points of the concepts of social integration, social participation, social exclusion, and social capital. I discuss them in the context of ethnic studies and the social and cultural status of ethnic groups in particular. Each of these concepts could be further elaborated on a separate basis, but this paper emphasises those aspects that can inform and be applied to further analysis in empirical research. The concepts chosen for discussion cover determinants that condition a certain position in the social milieu, as well as possible resources that determine different integration strategies or adaptation routes in different groups. References to various social studies and research are used to illustrate analytical methods and their empirical implications.

Theoretical aspects of social integration

On the theoretic level, social integration indicates principles by which individuals (actors, agents, or subjects) are bound to each other in the social space and it refers to relations among the actors, i.e. how the actors (agents) accept social rules. Integration of a social system means the reciprocal interaction of segments of a certain social structure. Regardless of the direct meaning of integration as a word, it is not presumed that the relations or interactions are harmonious. Integration covers conceptions of conflict as well as order, so the same concept could be applied to forms of stability of social relations and compensation of balance among different social units and groups. In the broadest sense, the term integration is used to define developments that determine connections of related diverse elements into the social whole, system, community, or other unit. The concept of integration is a fundamental one in functionalist theories, and it defines a mode of relations of the units of a system by virtue of which, on one hand, they act to avoid disrupting the system, and, on the other hand, they cooperate to promote its functioning as a unit. The conception of integrity is important in other theoretical perspectives that use other concepts as well, e.g. consensus, solidarity, correspondence, etc.

When discussing ethnic processes, the concept of integration is not just closely related to the processes of socialisation, acculturation, and assimilation, but it is also an inseparable part of the course and result of these processes. Every phenomenon of social integration is conditional and insufficient because it is a

continuous process, a certain level of which is necessary for the functioning of every social system. Considering the concept of integration in the context of the theories of ethnicity, relations among ethnic groups, conceptions of integration, assimilation or pluralism can be discussed in a broad continuum, i.e. different aspects provide a great variety of possible interpretations.

When developing integration theories for contemporary multicultural societies, it is necessary to overstep reductionistic "objective" interpretations, i.e. if earlier the focus was on economic, political, or residential integration, at the moment cultural matters of difference, symbolic resources, and "cultural hierarchy", as well as mutual relations between individuals and different groups are taken into account in the discourse of integration (e.g. Gordon, Price, Esser, Smith, and others). The majority of contemporary researchers and theorists assume that integration is a social issue rather than an administrative, bureaucratic, or legal one[1] (e.g. Kamali 1999). The widely applied variables of integration, such as profession and incomes[2], do not take into account an active role and creative actions of members of social groups in influencing the social environment that surrounds them or constructing social reality. Traditional sociological explanations of the prevailing race, ethnic, and gender inequalities in the labour market are theoretically and empirically grounded in the contemporary paradigms of social stratification, i.e. status attainment research and segmented labour market theory, both maintaining that the above-mentioned groups have a lower level of education and less labour market experience and therefore find themselves in the periphery (Smith 2000). Quite recently, a growing body of research has begun to examine labour market inequalities as a function of differential social capital, generally defined as the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures (Portes 2000). For example, when analysing inequalities in the labour market in respect to race, ethnicity, and gender, Sandra Smith takes into account other factors such as the abilities of individuals to convert their education into social capital. This researcher states that the decisive role is played by social networks, the possession of which increases opportunities for status, income, and professional achievements. Another illustration could be a theory of status construction that main-

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[1] The analysis of the EU documents, studies, and research enables one to expect that the general policies of the EU will be developed in a similar way. During recent years a greater emphasis has been put on the formation of general integration policy, considering problems of different socially vulnerable groups (e.g., the disabled, ethnic groups, women, migrants, long-term unemployed, etc.). It has slowly become clear that legal procedures alone are not enough to ensure social integration.

[2] I strongly agree with the authors maintaining that society is more than professional groups. Also, it is worth adding that a subjective aspect is characteristic to social integration, i.e. the attitudes, values and beliefs of individuals and different groups in respect to the social order in which they act.

tains that when constructing a certain network, individuals take into account the differences of others, i.e. gender, race, or ethnicity, and they rate each other according to the amount and symbolic value of resources possessed. The knowledge of the competencies that differentiate and rate individuals according the characteristics ascribed (such as ethnicity) is generalised and applied in social interactions. As a consequence, certain groups, regardless of their competencies, are "excluded" (putting this in another way, "protected") from networks and systems that provide power (McGuire 2000).

Recent research and studies conclude that the differences and inequality of social groups can not be analysed and evaluated only in terms of distribution and control over economic resources (Melucci, Smith, Portes, and others). The structural analysis of social misbalance should cover the differentiation of social positions that distribute powerful symbolic resources. In addition, it is important to consider whether cleavages and different positions are a result of personal or structural exclusion/inclusion.

Moreover, identities, attitudes, behaviour, and participation in the social sphere of ethnic groups are influenced not only by the matters that take place within the boundaries of ethnic groups or in relation to other groups, but by the processes that take place in the broader society. What matters is how ethnicity will be treated in the future, how it will affect social mobility and participation in majority society. On the other hand, social integration is related to an individual's position in the social topography and an individual's capabilities and opportunities to apply those capabilities. Also, it is very important to consider the status or position in the social topography that an individual ascribes to her/himself, how s/he perceives her/himself in the social context. In addition, an important matter is what could be defined as an individual's "visibility" in the social topography, i.e. the symbolic significance of the position held. Hypothetically, less educated, less organised, and less mobilised individuals and their groups are less visible. Generally speaking, a discussion of such a complex phenomenon as integration requires a concrete discussion about differences and different strategies employed by various members of social groups.

Several theoretical conceptions, which are closely related to the outcomes and results of social, structural, and institutional integration are discussed. Although social participation, social exclusion, and social capital could be the subject of separate studies, here they are presented in the context of social integration.

Social participation

The outcome of the successful adaptation and integration of the majority of the population of different ethnic groups is social participation in full. A multidimensional concept of social participation is used here in the broadest sense and

covers a lot of issues, e.g. ethnically indivisible civic and political participation; involvement in the economic, political, and cultural life of society; representation at different levels of governance, participation in groups of fellow citizens; etc. Such a conception of social participation enables maintaining that it ensures stability and irreversibility of integration (of course at different levels of intensity and activity). Also, since participation is considered a process and a flexible concept, it can mean various things under different circumstances for different individuals, groups, or institutions.

Social participation could be described as one of the dimensions of social integration, i.e. participation in the construction and reconstruction of social reality or in the production and reproduction of social life. Another dimension could be based on exercising and having a sense of belonging and satisfaction (Kamali 1999). When participating in social life, individuals get involved in social relations that comprise grounds for successful strategies and satisfaction (for example, being a teacher is not just giving lectures and participating in daily activities in educational centres, but also participating in the reproduction of society through transferring human capital. It also means accepting the very basis of the educational system. This acceptance of the system is not, however, based on the belief in pre-existing 'rules' or 'truths'; it depends on a process of incorporation of characteristics (habitus) that determines how one acts, thinks, understands, and evaluates one's own and others' actions. Further elaborating this example in respect to a teacher working at a Lithuanian school of ethnic minorities (or to be more precise at a school with instruction in a minority language) being a teacher means not only rendering the cultural values of minorities, but also rendering the cultural conceptions of the majority's society.

Participation in social life encompasses abilities and opportunities to recognise social reality and at the same time to be recognised by members of other community groups. The integral social action of an individual is a dialectical self-realisation process that takes place in a known social context that provides appropriate means for meaningful social action. These means cover positions and opportunities that are necessary to act for individuals and groups according to their dispositions, i.e. according to incorporated knowledge of social life (Kamali 1999).

Relations between an individual and social reality develop through the individual's skills and competencies that enable acting according to structural rules of social reality. Therefore, in defining ethnicity and ethnic groups, such characteristics as civic loyalty to the state and symbolic and cultural aspects are more important than ties of blood, language, history, or common decent. When analysing the influence of social reality on different forms and levels of participation, Anderson states that participation is socially learned and socially stimulated. Such statements are based on empirical studies that lead to the conclusion that, for

example, politically active and politically inactive citizens differ in demographic characteristics, but not in their attitudes towards politics. Despite the fact that the "activists" are usually higher on the social scale and are men, their attitudes do not differ from those of non-active citizens (Anderson 1996).

In general, participation is qualified and rated depending on membership and activity in social bodies or organisations. When considering political or civic participation in particular, ways of conventional (e.g., voting, petition writing, participation in meetings) and non-conventional (e.g., protests, pickets) participation are distinguished. If the tendencies of participation between the majority and minority groups are similar, to a certain extent they could be treated as an index of integration.

Generally speaking, more or less active participation in social life can take different shapes and natures and is one of the most important factors of social integration. On the other hand, insufficient participation by the members of ethnic groups in different levels of the social sphere may be one of the factors forming ethnic cleavages or social exclusion. In its own turn, a real or conceived ethnic inequality creates a vicious circle of problems: it becomes grounds for the political mobilisation of ethnic groups or it may condition the atrophy of civics and indifference, avoiding the social and political life of the country (Kasatkina, Leončikas 2000). Also, the politicisation of the decisions that influence community life requires group organisation and emphasises the need for organisation and mobilisation. An ethnic group becomes a comfortable means for demanding certain rights and therefore a means to regulate social relations.

In terms of orientation towards action, ethnicity or cultural differences can become a criterion according to which the defence of a group's interests against discrimination, marginalisation, or social exclusion are organised. Also, these differences may become a channel to express demands for new rights or to define a civic (and political) space for socially excluded groups. In this context ethnicity is best understood not as a phenomenon of common origin, or descent (genetic phenomenon), but as a strategic choice of individuals, which (ethnicity) under other circumstances could be expressed as a "membership" in other groups applied to achieve certain power or rights.

Social exclusion

The concept social exclusion[3] has recently taken root in sociology. It indicates marginalisation in the broadest sense of the term, i.e. it covers the out-

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[3] The concept of social exclusion is more used in European discourse; in an Anglo-Saxon context the term "underclass" is more usual. The latter in fact rejects class theory and indicates existing social groups that are under the boundaries of the "main" society or

comes and results of processes that determine and define certain groups as being not a constituent part of "normal" society. Different authors present different definitions of social exclusion, but on the whole it is agreed that this phenomenon is related to the scarcity of material and social opportunities and the lack of skills to participate in economic, social, political, and cultural life in an effective way and is related to alienation or estrangement from the main part of society (Klasen 1998; Combes 1998; Andersen 1999; and others). On the other hand, the term also covers the denial and non-realisation of the civic, political, and social rights of citizenship (Klasen 1998), i.e. it can be treated as an expression of the unequal distribution of various rights. In this way social exclusion is a universal category that includes economic, political, cultural, religious, and social aspects and discusses multidimensional mechanisms that exclude individuals or groups from participation in social exchanges and rights for social integration (Andersen 1999).

Also, the term implies the existence of at least two distinct groups: a closed group (the social dimension, society) and a second group that does not exhibit those attributes of developing membership that are the defining characteristics of the first group (Combes 1998). As was already mentioned, the term is related to processes and their outcomes; therefore, both mechanisms of the process and agents or subjects can be analysed. There is always an open question of whose perspective the term presents: of those excluded or those who are not excluded, i.e. those who are included. Once again, exclusion prompts several kinds of reactions. The first one is of powerlessness and alienation in which the individual internalises the failure and descends into apathy because s/he feels that it has been pre-ordained by fate. The second, on the contrary, leads to what is often delinquent behaviour aimed at overturning the barriers to participation and integration.

On the other hand, an individual has certain resources that can be applied to overcome social exclusion. At the centre of these resources is "relational" capital or integration into social relations. The different spheres in which an individual participates or to which s/he belongs could be ranked according to the

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society of the majority (Goldberg, Andersen). This term is usually applied to the unemployed, poorly paid groups, single parent families, etc. (Murray, Giddens, Gans), and it focuses mainly on the economic aspects of social exclusion. Although a lot of discussions take place on the resources of exclusion, in recent discussions it is usually mentioned that even the structure of individuals' or groups' consciousness, life style or the lack of certain skills could be a resource for social exclusion. Goldberg maintains that the concept of social exclusion can be treated as the European form of racism: it is exclusion at a distance or "internal exclusion" (Goldberg 2000). In fact, structural mechanisms operating in society that determine a certain position of one or another group, as well as social exclusion are discussed in this paper.

level of their integration or inclusion of other individuals in separate or common spheres of interests and to the level of their exclusion. Thus, social exclusion, as an opposition to inclusion, could be analysed as an outcome of disintegration or as an alternative to integration.

It is worth discussing one more aspect. The granting of economic, political, cultural, and civic rights plays an important role. Establishing mechanisms that enable the effective use of these rights for those who lack these rights and to which these civic rights are addressed is also crucial. This process could be defined as the empowerment of separate groups or their units. With reference to the ethnic groups in Lithuania, the recently empowered groups are the largest minority groups (Poles and Russians), whereas the Roma still lack some kind of empowerment.[4]

Empowerment, as well as social capital, is closely related to human capital, i.e. it is the formation of knowledge and skills that determine increasing participation, greater power and control in decision-making, as well as a transformative action. Politics of empowerment[5] and inclusion (as well as participation) should include differences in respect to ethnicity, gender, and age and transform these differences into stable but flexible coalitions operating on different levels. On the level of social integration a paradigm of social exclusion is relevant analysing the changing balance[6] of power between social actors or agents.

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[4] An indicator of empowerment could be the number of non-governmental organisations established by the ethnic groups, although their social effectiveness or roles in terms of civic society as a mediator between governmental structures and different groups of citizens could be a separate topic for discussions. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the activities of Polish or Russian organisations and political parties are more effective than those founded by the Roma. Still a certain paradox between the high number of NGOs of national minorities and their poor social efficiency is obvious. In 2001, 244 organisations representing 20 national minorities were registered in Lithuania, e.g. the Russian minority has 56 organisations, Polish – 53, Jewish – 29, Romany – 13, German – 32, Greek – 5, Belarussian – 18, Tartar – 12, etc. It is possible to state hypothetically that the majority of the NGOs established by ethnic groups could be defined as self-help organisations. Wann indicates the following main characteristics and fields of activities of self-help groups: emotional support, information, advice and practical aid, recruitment of new members, publicity and education, fund raising, etc. In the communities of ethnic groups, the purposes of self-help groups are of a more general nature (they are not specific); they encompass voluntary activities that are closely related to the empowerment and achievement of equality in society (Wann 1995: 58). In fact, such organisations and groups are related to the need of people to have their own sphere. They also become a visible social unit.

[5] The concept of empowerment is closely related to the analysis of social movements (Melucci, 1999).

[6] Melucci states that social exclusion or marginality are defined in terms of the system and if these differences are denied both internally and externally in respect of the system, the misbalance of power becomes invisible (Melucci 1999).

Social capital

The concept of social capital has become one of the most popular in sociological discourse of late years and lots of literature[7] on this topic have appeared. Like the other concepts used in this paper, a multidimensional concept of social capital could be interpreted in different ways and mean different things. Also, a theoretical discussion of this concept could be the subject of separate studies. It is worth noting that there is no common agreement on what perspectives or aspects of social reality should be defined as social capital[8]. The empirical aspect is rather problematic: how social capital should be measured, what measures or indicators should be used, etc. Summarising the works of different authors, it is possible to state that social capital is usually discussed as being present or absent. It is obvious that it is quite complicated to distinguish certain levels of this phenomenon.

Generally speaking, social capital is an outcome of participation in the social context. It could be defined by horizontal interrelations of social agents (both individuals and groups) based on trust, communication, and activities that comprise the grounds for material or symbolic exchanges or deals, as well as for different associations. The perspective of social capital is relevant to discussing the social empowerment of individuals or social groups and defining the level of individuals' participation in the social sphere. On the other hand, social capital indicates characteristics of a social organisation in the broadest sense: relations, principles, norms, social trust, and structures increasing the effectiveness of social agents and inducing mutual communication and co-operation.

Lesser maintains that in the literature of social capital there are two primary perspectives of thought that focus on the structural aspects of relationships. The first perspective is primarily related to the connections that individual actors have with one another. The second is referred to as the sociocentric approach of the network structure. This perspective asserts that social capital is based on a person's relative position within a given network rather than the individual's direct relationship with people in the network (Lesser 2000). So it is possible to distinguish two levels of social capital that could be relatively defined as fol-

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[7] P. Bourdieu, J. Coleman, R. Putnam, V. Verba, F. Fukayama, G. Badescu, T. Rochon, and others.

[8] Generally speaking, two factors are the most obvious when discussing social capital – they are "social" and "capital" and they determine a dominating discourse that, on one hand, focuses on social networks and the development of social relations and, on other hand, is analysed in comparison to other types of capital, such as economic, usually when discussing resources and their distribution and influence. Also, social capital is closely related to human capital, i.e. the knowledge, skills, and capacities of individuals that ensure social and economic development, e.g. P.Rich analyses the connections of social capital, culture, and political culture, focusing on the symbolic aspects of the capital.

lows: (i) the internal one concentrating in or generating certain resources, skills from interpersonal or intergroup relations; and (ii) the level of social capital that is external and generated from the structures of collective actors (e.g., organisations, communities, regions, nations, etc.)[9].

Bourdieu, who was the first to present a systematic analysis of social capital, as well as other authors analysing these issues, apply the concept of social capital in an instrumental way, i.e. by first of all indicating the benefits that individuals, groups, or other social agents gain from participation in the social sphere and from constructing social resources. In this sense two elements of social capital can be distinguished: social relations that enable social agents to reach resources and the quality and quantity of the resources.

Most authors tend to agree that the best field for the expression and development of social capital is the civic society, in the context of which people, as the result of mutual communication and co-operation create and get involved in a network of voluntary associations for the sake of their families, beliefs, interests, ideologies, etc. The interconnection of social capital and civic culture is based on the main part of social capital and trust (Foley 1998). Generally, it is agreed that social capital comprises three main components: trust, social networks, and norms. These main components could be divided in a more detailed way, for example, obligations, exchanges, solidarity, expectations, values, results of activities (benefits, profit), etc.

The functional[10] perspective of social capital is also related to the problems of social integration discussed above. Portes distinguishes three main functions of social capital: social control (based on closed relations, mutual obligations), support (usually attributed to the roles of family), and social network (Portes 2000). The third function of social capital is usually used in the field of social stratification. In this sense the concept of social capital is explained as the possibilities or skills to find a job, issues of social mobility, and the success of different social (and economic) transactions. The authors previously mentioned[11] recognise that the social network and social participation are instrumental to an individual's mobility (e.g., informal recommendations). Also, social capital places an emphasis on the significance of the infrastructure, the importance of the systems of education, health, transport, and communication in the context of the processes of social integration.

A systematic analysis of social capital should also include several issues that could be identified as the bearers or subjects of social capital, needs for resources

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9 In other words, micro and macro levels can be distinguished.
10 The functional perspective is based on the works of J.Coleman, who focuses on mechanisms that generate social capital.
11 The research and studies of Smith, McGuire, and others could be mentioned in this context.

of social capital and the resources themselves. Usually, only the positive effects of social capital are discussed, but the negative ones such as exclusion, isolation of outsiders, infinite pretensions to the members of the group, the restriction of individual freedom, downward levelling norms, etc. should not be ignored. The same strong networks and social relations that produce benefits for the group members usually limit the access of others, e.g., monopoly units, homogeneous units. Ethnic groups also use social capital to gain economic, social, cultural, and relevant benefits.

Empirical perspective

Moving from theoretical considerations to possible empirical solutions, I would like to discuss indicators that could be used in the empirical measurement of social capital, social participation, or social inclusion. Stolle and Rochon produce a reasonable set of the indicators of social capital (Stolle and Rochon 1998). It is possible to distinguish four main groups of indicators. The empirical data of those four groups provides a notion of an individual situation in regards to social capital.

The first group covers issues related to participation and involvement in the social field, e.g. participation in various political, civic, or non-governmental organisations. These activities could range from contacting public officials to taking part in boycotts, demonstrations, and election campaigns, as well as getting involved in community responsibilities or writing a community letter or article for a newspaper. In a more passive way of acting, the indicators of this group could be operationalised as interest in politics, strength of political interest, propensity to discuss political matters with friends, etc.

The second group of indicators is related to the issues of trust and community. These indicators involve issues of trust in others and whether people would try to take advantage of someone if they got a chance. Generalised and more specific forms (e.g. interpersonal, intergroup) of trust could be distinguished. Here questions of social distance are relevant. This group of indicators has to deal with a qualitative dimension that involves different modes of community in different organisations or groups. In addition, being a member of one group increases the trust in other group and creates possibilities for hostility towards other groups, i.e. some distinctiveness of the groups could be observed.

The next group of indicators is related to political trust, i.e. confidence in the people running the executive branch and governing bodies and trust in parliament, parliamentarians, governmental institutions, government officials, the judicial system, etc. It also involves issues of political efficacy, the belief that governmental officials care about the public interests and the ability to influence politics or make claims on officials.

The last group includes indicators of attitudes: tolerance, free-riding, optimism, and future prospects. Attitudes towards outsiders and marginalised people could be measured. Free-riding or independent activities combine responses to questions about cheating on taxes when having a chance, avoiding fares, claiming governmental benefits to which you are not entitled, etc. The last subgroup of this set of indicators indicates a positive or negative outlook about the future, plans for the next several years, and related issues.

The first groups of indicators (participation, involvement) are more easily measured and observed. Of course, a detailed set of the indicators relevant to one or another study is a separate object of discussions. Operationalisation of the concepts and discussion of their methodological validity is therefore always a task before undertaking any particular research.

The aforementioned empirical indicators, if measured in respect to ethnic differences (including both minority and majority groups) and combined with other data, could reveal the existing ethnic structure and indicate possible cleavages, balance of power and patterns of domination in a given society or its subsections. Moreover, the data collected through these indicators reveal the expectations and conceptions of both the minorities and the majority and can provide serious input to policy formation.

As a brief summarisation, it is possible to state that social integration or the politics of inclusion (as opposite to exclusion) is expressed and realised through social participation that is based on agents' social capital. The dimensions of social integration discussed in this paper (social participation, social exclusion / inclusion and social capital) are distinguishable only to a certain extent as they are sufficiently underpin and interconnected concepts. However, they remain useful perspectives that explain the processes, facts, and other phenomena related to the integration of ethnic groups.

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II Policies, politics, and minorities

Discursive Realities: The Construction of National Identity in the Documents of Lithuanian Cultural Policy

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ABSTRACT. In this paper the author has tried to map a possible conceptual approach, which would combine both discourse studies and cultural policy studies and to apply this theoretical framework to the analysis of state policy documents. The paper focuses on the case of Lithuania, an Eastern European country that experienced secessionist nationalistic upheaval in the late 1980s and currently faces the process of European integration. The ongoing debate about Lithuanian cultural policy, which started in the very early 1990s, is an exemplary case of the complex process in which traditional local thinking about nation, culture, and identity clashes, merges, and/or coexists with ideas and norms imported from Western Europe. The author argues that during the whole of the last decade Lithuanian cultural policy maintained its nationalistic character and the ongoing process of European integration is not diminishing the power of ideas characteristic to traditional Lithuanian nationalism.

> *For language is in every case not only communication of the communicable but also, at the same time, a symbol of the noncommunicable. This symbolic side of language is connected to its relation to signs, but extends more widely – for example, in certain respects to name and judgment.* (Walter Benjamin "On Language as Such and on Language of Man" (1916))

In this way, Walter Benjamin says that discourse produces "non-reality" or "silenced reality," where silent respect replaces critical debate. Moreover, he says that the discourse itself is a symbol of silence. The more we talk about words or the textual side of reality, the more probable it is that there is something we want to hide. This is a good starting point to address the question of the power of discourse: This question is crucial in any inquiry into cultural policy, the field where culture meets power. My paper presents the first stage of a wider research project that is dedicated to exploring the development of the ideological mechanisms of cultural policy discourse in the Baltic countries during the 1990s. In this paper I have tried to map a possible conceptual approach that would combine both discourse studies and cultural policy studies and to apply this theoretical framework to the analysis of state policy documents. I also try to demonstrate the basic logic of the functions of "sovereignty," "identity," and "security," the core ideas defining a nation-state, in the state cultural policy discourse.

110

The paper focuses on the case of Lithuania, an Eastern European country that experienced secessionist nationalistic upheaval in the late 1980s and currently faces the process of European integration. Going from one union to another, though certainly of a totally different kind, has triggered heated debates about the destiny of the sovereignty, authenticity, and identity of Lithuania. The ongoing debate about Lithuanian cultural policy, which started in the very early 1990s, is an exemplary case of the complex process in which traditional local thinking about nation, culture, and identity clashes, merges, and/or coexists with ideas and norms imported from Western Europe.

In this context, I take the official cultural policy discourse as one of the instruments of the construction of Lithuanian national identity. I will show that during the whole of the last decade Lithuanian cultural policy maintained its nationalistic character and the ongoing process of European integration is not diminishing the power of ideas characteristic to traditional Lithuanian nationalism. It is not possible to answer why there is this absence of change due to the space limitations of this paper. Nevertheless, I will argue that the historical legacy of political ideas and pragmatic reasoning of policymakers may explain this phenomenon of stagnation.

National identity is defined as the highest goal of a state's cultural policy. In turn, common past, territory, culture, and authentic national character are emphasised as the main elements that ensure the integrity of the state. The ever-present theme of threat goes hand in hand with a strategy of sameness (protection and preservation) emphasised in all cultural policy documents. This heavily charges the use of "identity" in cultural policy with reactionary overtones.

Cultural policy understood as a general field, in which a state affects culture through intentional and unintentional forms of governing, is not a new political phenomenon. Obviously, most state policy influences culture, and many cultural spheres are politically significant. But the development of cultural policy as a distinctive sphere of governing and administration, with its own personnel, forms of expertise, and administrative apparatus is intimately related to the development of the nation-state. Hence, as Tony Bennett notes, among other processes, the most important are the secularisation of culture and the growing public significance of culture as a part of national patrimonies (Bennett 2001: 14). And even today, despite globalisation and the development of transnational networking among NGOs, cultural policy instruments still belong to the nation-state.

In turn, cultural policy studies is quite a new discipline, one which has partially developed within the framework of public policy and public administration studies. Today cultural policy studies is mostly rationalist-empirical (exploring and evaluating the efficiency of cultural policy instruments) or ethic-normative (seeking to create new definitions of culture and integrate them with other political principles, e.g. tolerance, recognition, decentralisation, and sustainable

development). Such cultural policy aspects as the symbolic mediation of state power, propaganda, and the construction of collective memory have been analysed in history, sociology, cultural studies, and other disciplines. However, it would be difficult to distinguish cultural policy studies as a separate academic discipline[1]. Such normative cultural policy bibles as *Our Creative Diversity* (1995) and *In From the Margins* (1997) do present attempts to re-define the universalistic definition of culture and its relation to state institutions and to present arguments that would be acceptable for diverse governmental systems about its social relevance. However, they hardly touch upon scientific inquiry into the field. State cultural policy, though it has de facto existed for several centuries, roughly since the emergence of the sovereign nation-state, is still in the stage of self-construction and searching for legitimacy as an academic discipline.

Notably, discourse analysis is not very often applied either to cultural policy or to other public policy spheres (Hill 1997). On the other hand, cultural policy is more and more frequently defined as a process of conflicting meanings. Hence the methods of discourse analysis are being employed in order to assess a previously omitted, but crucially important side of public policy. The representatives of social constructivism claim that not only scientific methods of administration, but also categories, rhetorical strategies, and strategic arguments shape the basis of public policy (Stone 1988; Fox and Miller 1995; Fischer and Forester 1993).

Policy and discourse

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines policy as "a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, party, ruler, statesman, etc.; any course of action adopted as advantageous or expedient" (OED 2002). Further, policy can be identified as a dual process of decision-making and implementation. Some researchers distinguish politics and policy merely by the scale of action (Roberts and Edwards 1991). Nevertheless, traditionally policy refers to a specific program and less to a general field of conflicting interests and power. According to Hill, it is difficult to define conditions when policy really exists, because, on the one hand, it may manifest itself as a plain action, not legitimised by any decisions taken. On the other hand, policy may refer merely to diverse decision groups or to the inexplicit orientation of an action. Further, policy is a dynamic, ever-changing process, characterised by either top-down or down-top movements (Hill 1997: 6-8).

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[1] It was only in the middle of the 1990s that cultural studies "discovered" cultural policy as a "neutral" object of analysis, whereas before it was fiercely criticised as one of the strategies of hegemony. See e.g. Bennett, T. (1998) *Culture as a Reformer's Science.* London: Sage; McGuigen, J. (1996) *Culture and the Public Sphere*. London: Routledge.

I limit the scope of my research to the official decision-making level. In this paper, cultural policy discourse includes only official state level documents, such as cultural policy regulations and government programs. Namely, this discourse generates a discursive reality, the most valuable one in a discourse economy, according to David Campbell (1992). The reality effect is created with the help of arguments and rhetorical forms, which are used as if they are self evident and are not critically assessed. Nevertheless, the real effect of rhetoric is always questionable, but I will not try to assess its impact on specific practices in this paper. Thus, my attention is focused not on effect or efficiency, but on the political nature and significance of cultural policy.

I have already mentioned the close relation between nation-state and cultural policy as a specific form of government. Here as a theoretical framework I will use David Campbell's ideas that relate identity and security as constitutive components in a state's foreign policy. According to Campbell, a state does not have any independent ontological status except certain actions that create its reality. For example, its status as a sovereign unit in world politics is produced by means of a primordial and stable identity discourse. In its turn, any state identity is maintained only with the help of constant repetition (Campbell 1992: 9). Further, Campbell says that identity discourse is in principle related to security discourse. The existence of identity is based on a permanent emphasis on threat. Here state identity is produced through a certain "evangelism of fear," which depicts the surrounding world as non-complete and dangerous:

> Foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities) is thus to be retheorised as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in which name it operates (Campbell 1992: 68).

For our purposes, it is useful to apply Campbell's definition of foreign policy to cultural policy:

"Cultural policy (conventionally understood as a course of state action meant to create conditions for the positive development of pre-existing culture) is thus to be retheorised as one of the boundary-producing practices, central to the production and reproduction of culture and identity in whose name it operates".

The production and constant reproduction of meanings is crucial in contemporary politics. According to Laclau, deconstruction operations, which reveal the power games structuring the meaning of categories, have become an integral part of both theory and political life since political categories have lost the universalist nature they previously possessed (Laclau 1994: 2). National identity can rightly be included in the group of such categories since nation has been declared a historical product of modernisation and constant discursive reconstruction (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). Moreover, there

is a growing interest in the discursive strategies of the construction of national identity, where discourse is understood not only as a text, but also as a social practice (Fairclough 1995; Wodak, de Cilia et al. 1999), while language is interpreted as a constitutive field of social and political power (Bourdieu 1991).

The labyrinths of legal discourse: framing Lithuanian cultural policy

Since regaining independence in 1991, the main issue in all discussions about Lithuanian state cultural policy has centred around the creation of state cultural policy regulations that would legally define the state's priorities and responsibilities in the whole field of cultural administration. First of all, why was there a belief in the necessity of such a legal document? Would it not have been enough to have certain legal acts regulating separate fields, like organisation, copyright, etc. laws? To answer this question we can turn to Hill, who says that public policy itself performs a symbolic role, because having a policy renders the actions of a certain group as rational and purposive, enhances visibility and shapes the basis for discussions, and thus provides the possibility for a rational choice (Hill 1997). On the other hand, the acceptance of certain regulations could be interpreted as the empowerment of a certain group, which in turn stimulates the mushrooming of "discourse coalitions" (about discourse coalitions see Hajer 1993). Therefore, so called objective or neutral wordings of regulations are indeed the traces of ideologies of competing groups and a formative source of a hierarchy of subsequent discourses.

In relation to this, we can distinguish two ways of thinking about Lithuanian cultural policy. They are sometimes inconsistent, but do not necessarily contradict each other. Firstly, there is an articulation of cultural policy as based on national interest and national rhetoric. Here the categories of identity and security are dominant and are closely connected to the categories of sovereignty, state, and ethnicity; all of them penetrated with a common denominator of threat. Secondly, the geopolitical context of European integration and the tradition of cultural policy conceptualisation, as developed in the Anglo-Saxon world, are certainly influencing the formulation of Lithuanian cultural policy and function as an a priori higher (but not always understood and used) discourse, reproduced in a Lithuanian context. Hence the categories of sustainable development, cultural democracy, decentralisation, diversity, and transparency are introduced into texts but not fully integrated.

Curiously, there are no wider debates about the definitions and usages of the categories mentioned above. On the contrary, a rather negligent attitude towards the consistency of conceptualisation is characteristic. "We should not mystify words, even those such as 'cultural policy', we should think about what is to be

done instead," stated Mr. V. Sventickas, the head of the Writers' Union, when summing up the discussion "Does Lithuanian Cultural Policy Exist?" (4 May 2000). Therefore, in most cases the discourse is merely reproduced by policymakers, bureaucrats, and clients, who use the discourse to support their pragmatic arguments. This can be interpreted as a symptom of strategic essentialism, which ensures for certain truths (such as tradition, national culture, ethnos) an existence beyond semantic or political analysis, in such a way that it enables discourse coalitions to monopolise the reality discourse (see Herzfeld 1997: 31).

In what way does culture matter for the Lithuanian state?

Lithuanian nationalism is often included in the group of cultural nationalisms that are characterised by the habit of using culture as a political principle. Hence culture as a matter of politics and as a basis of national identification has been restricted to the Lithuanian language and folklore. The newly created Lithuanian state (1918) did not have its own continuous tradition of political sovereignty. Throughout the preceding centuries it had existed as part of a federation with Poland and then as part of the Russian Empire. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Lithuanian elites followed the path of German and not French nation-builders, in choosing a local culture and not a political system as the source of a national identity.

This tradition of thinking about nationhood as based on and rooted in culture was established during the interwar period (see Rindzeviciute 2003) and was forcefully revived in the beginning of the 1990s. The function of culture in the life of the state was especially politicised during the romantic period of the Sąjūdis movement (1988-1991). For example, the philosopher and political activist Krescencijus Stoškus was completely sure that "one cannot expect substantial changes in politics, law, economics or ecology without reviving an entire culture. Therefore, such policies that are not also cultural policies can be of little help today" (Stoškus 1990: 10). And further:

> The Republic needs a type of cultural policy that will best suit the character of her people and their national mentality, their historical past and preserved values […] A defence of culture has always been the permanent anxiety of the nation, her most coherent policies, which she has fulfilled sometimes through active protest, sometimes through passive disagreement, and with a conservative faith in the customs of ancestors. The survival of Lithuania is in a big part the result of these efforts (Stoškus 1990: 11).

It is not an accident that I am using Stoškus's quotation to illustrate the persistence of the pan-cultural tradition of Lithuanian nationalism. First, this wording continued to be relevant to public debate during the 1990s. As I will

show further, although the rhetoric in the documents of cultural policy changed slightly, the same framing of the state-culture relationship persisted. It is an ethnic culture, which is of importance to the state and is the carrier of a state's identity and sovereignty whilst it faces a constant threat. Culture is conceptualised as a historically legitimate basis of a state whose continuity is constantly threatened. Namely, this function of culture and its relation to the state has been gradually institutionalised in the documents of Lithuanian cultural policy.

Second, I have chosen this quotation because of its author. It is necessary to make constant references to policy-makers while analysing the discourse on Lithuanian cultural policy. Indeed, my hypothesis is that the official discourse on cultural policy is not necessarily the result of the consensus of different societal groups. That is, the ideas and values constructed within this discourse are not necessarily the values dominant in the society but those employed and promoted by interest groups. Hence Stoškus, as an intellectual and political activist in the Sąjūdis movement, can be seen as a representative of one of the interest groups that have been active in shaping the ideology of cultural policy during the 1990s. He has been a leader of the Cultural Congress, an informal organisation established in 1990 and registered as an NGO in 2002, which has sought to become an arms-length body in state cultural policy. This organisation has functioned as a lobby group, and this fact has been well reflected on the level of discourse as well. The ideas promoted by Stoškus's group not only influenced the wording of current Lithuanian cultural policy regulations but even resulted in a separate legal act, the Law on Protection of Living Ethnic Culture, which has no analogies elsewhere in Europe. Going deeper into this case is especially interesting due to the strategic use of national identity ideology.

To reconstruct and defend: culture in the programs of the government of the Republic of Lithuania

Though cultural issues did not occupy the most important part in the programs of the government, each program devoted a considerable space to mapping the priorities and goals of state action in the field of culture. The first government program (*Market, Democracy, Freedom*, 1991) emphasised the rejection of Soviet ideology and as the basis of state cultural policy listed the "free self-expression of the individual," the "natural development of culture," the "openness of national culture", "democratisation," and "decentralisation" (*LR Vyriausybės…* 1991). The theme of identity sounded much more loudly in the 1993 program of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The program defined the "historical continuity of Lithuania's culture" as the main goal of cultural policy, which could only be achieved by "restoring the damaged relation between our

cultural heritage and today's culture," "guarding the Baltic authenticity of Lithuania's culture", and "promoting a creative dialogue of native culture with European and world culture" (*LR Vyriausybės…* 1993).

This element of openness diminished in the following year's program (1994), which introduced an externally directed defensive policy that sought to "protect the spiritual authenticity of Lithuania's culture from the flood of mass culture coming from the West" (*LR Vyriausybės...* 1994) The programs written in the period 1996 – 2000 sustained a strong normative orientation while emphasizing "nationhood," "Balticness," and the "integrity of émigré culture".

Principles as instruments? The regulations of cultural policy

The voicing of a need to create and approve Lithuanian cultural policy regulations (CPR) was present in all government programs. The first CPR project was drafted during the First Cultural Congress in 1991 and was followed by numerous drafts. The drafts often served as a basis for debates in the Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) and Ministry of Culture, but not all of them were officially registered, and almost none of them were delivered in a published form for public debate. In this context, I will analyse only those projects that were officially registered. In the further discussion of the CPR documents, I will distinguish the principles of identity and nation as being the nodal points in the CPR discourse of culture.

Both projects concerning "The Regulations of the Reforms of Lithuanian Cultural Policy" submitted in 1996 and 1997 distinguish identity as one of the main principles:

> The principle of identity demands that one takes care of the culture of one's own country, its heritage and ethnic culture as a guarantee of the existence of both the nation and the state. It [the principle] protects culture from cosmopolitan homogenisation and the nation – from disappearance (Lietuvos kultūros politikos... 1996).

Further, the regulations set out to "develop and protect culture as a force for the integration and creation of the society and the state, as a basis of the unique identity of the nation and her historical unity and continuity of life" (*Lietuvos kultūros politikos…* 1996). At this point the principle of identity overlaps with that of nation.

These projects (1996, 1997) were prepared by an initiative group, which had a large number of members also active in the Cultural Congress (CC). Therefore they also sought to institutionalise the Cultural Congress as the organisation that would make decisions about state cultural policy. This idea was criti-

cised by the legal department of the parliament, which noted that in this way the CC would perform the function of the Ministry of Culture. This ambition to acquire and to institutionalise power enables us to define the Cultural Congress as a particular discourse coalition, operating with openly politicised categories of identity, culture, and nation.

The CPR projects (1996, 1997) define the nation as "a particular community of people unified by cultural traditions that have developed historically and possessing a self-consciousness, a particular character, and the ability to create culture as conditioned by its character. The culture of a nation is its creation, a form of its life, and a condition of the preservation of its identity". However, this cultural definition of nation is also highly politicised: "the survival of a nation's culture, therefore the survival of the nation itself can be guaranteed only by policies of a government that follow the changes in people's life and culture, quickly react to them, and foresee the perspectives of a life" (*Lietuvos kultūros politikos…* 1996). In turn, ethnic culture is defined as "the traditional culture of Lithuanians and other nations living in Lithuania," and is perceived as the most important source of the "integrity, uniqueness, and stability of national culture". The state must take care of this kind of culture, because it "supports the national identity and the dignity of the nation, strengthens self-consciousness and resists cosmopolitanism, snobbism, and cultural unification" (CPR 1996).

These quotes may be interpreted as a symptom of a lack of trust in civil society, because they assume that only the state can protect the "dignity and identity" of the people. By using medical rhetoric, they imply that "the people" [nation] are a passive and helpless body, needing constant and careful protection and reanimation. On the other hand, there is an obvious incoherence. The CPR states that "only an independent state may guarantee the preservation of the nation's culture," and then has no problem in assuming that the "cultures of other nations," living in Lithuania will be satisfied not being governed by their own independent state.

The Cultural Congress has tried to secure an ideological monopoly in state cultural affairs by employing these ideas. Though this "discourse coalition" proclaims decentralisation and defines itself as a kind of arm's length body, the creators of the projects are heading towards a normatively centralised model of state cultural policy. Their identity argument promotes sameness instead of today's unquestionable diversity, which is readily apparent in their desire to avoid using such words as culture in the plural. On the other hand, the authors of the project far too easily combine the multiple ethnic traditions present in Lithuania into one notion of an all embracing ethnic culture.

Similarly, a strong rhetoric of identity, sovereignty, and security was expressed in the project entitled "A Law on Protection and Promotion of the Culture of the Republic of Lithuania" (1997, not approved). The proposed law opened with a declaration: "The Seimas […], hereby fulfilling the will of the nation to pro-

tect the spirit of the nation, native language, writing, and customs," acknowledges that "the nation can develop an open, just, and harmonious civil society and legal state only while being grounded in its own cultural heritage". The obvious problem is that "own" is always a "conquered own," as all the cultural traditions exist at the crossroads of different states. Therefore, one may say that "own" is always the result of a conflict and therefore bears the sign of a conflict. In this sense, the Hobbesian state of war is also applicable to the domain of culture, tradition, and identity, if they are perceived as being possessed by states, organisations, or individuals. This is particularly true in the context of Lithuania, where talking about traditional culture often involves biased opinions about the contribution of the surrounding countries, such as Poland, Russia, and Belarus. On the other hand, the very principle of "own culture" as the basis of civil society is obviously questionable in itself. This presupposition that "own" is the core quality of social and political coherence implies that such multicultural states as the United States seem to have no chance of ever becoming open civil societies: Who would dare to formulate the "own culture" of the U.S.A that could possibly satisfy all the diverse groups in domestic society?

The problem of the ethnicisation of the notion of culture can be added to this already fairly problematic matter of ownership and cohesion. Culture is defined as a "structure of spiritual and material values" that distinctively belong to the nation, whereas ethnic culture is again based on the "national self-consciousness of the strata of a nation (ethnos)". Thus the notions of nation and ethnos are perceived as being identical and consequently the general definition of culture possesses a strong ethnic character.

These ideas were advanced in "The Law on Fundamentals of State Care of Ethnic Culture of the Republic of Lithuania" (approved, 1999 September 21[2]). This law, as the Lithuanian mass media proudly repeated, had no analogy in Europe. The law was prepared by the Cultural Congress group and was thus saturated with the conservative values that had been promoted by this coalition since the early 1990s. The state was depicted in this law as a supreme diagnostician, who attends to the damages of national cultural health: "different forms of Lithuanian ethnic culture and especially its living tradition are obviously threatened by the danger of decay" ("The Law on Fundamentals of State Care of Ethnic Culture of the Republic of Lithuania", Preamble, 1999). One may also note that, in contrast to former CC documents that had taken the existence of ethnic groups other than Lithuanians into account, this law is explicitly concerned with ethnic culture of Lithuanians only.

Finally, "The Regulations of Lithuanian Cultural Policy" (CPR) were approved on 19 May 2001. This text contains less naturalistic ethno-nationalistic rhetoric than was channelled into the law on the protection of ethnic culture.

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[2] Etninės kultūros valstybinės globos pagrindų įstatymas. 1999. *Valstybės žinios*. Nr. 82-2414.

Nevertheless, identity is still the formative principle around which the norms of cultural policy are set: "Lithuania's culture is an expression of the creativity of the individual and the nation, a guarantee of their identity and survival" (CPR 2001). Even after attributing to culture the power to promote diversity, the CPR (2001) turns back to identity and defines the Lithuanian language, ethnic culture, and heritage as the main objects and priorities of the CPR. In addition to these paradigmatic "bricks," meant for the wall of nationhood, other goals of cultural policy are centred on the category of ethnicity. Even society itself is defined as consisting of individuals and ethnic communities and "Lithuania's culture is an expression of the creativity of the individual and the nation, the guarantee of their identity and survival" (CPR 2001).

Through the mist of hegemony: Lithuanian cultural policy and international norms of cultural policy

Hence, we can ask if the use of this kind of nationalistic rhetoric in a state's cultural policy is traditionally inevitable. Why else would culture matter for the state, if it did not contribute to social cohesion by acting as a basis for national identity and patriotism? Indeed, the answer depends on the character of the state we are talking about. Various ways to comprehend statehood and the purpose of the state result in different approaches to cultural policy. This becomes particularly clear if we look at the cultural policy norms functioning in Western Europe.

In 1967 during a UNESCO round table discussion, cultural policy was defined purely in a rationalist way as "a whole set of operational principles, administrative and budgetary practices and procedures that form the basis of a State's cultural action" (*Cultural Policy: A Preliminary Study* 1969). According to this document, cultural policy should be related to "personal realisation and social development". On the other hand, a state's right to support cultural development as a basis of nationhood was recognised as being acceptable in "certain developing countries" (ibid.: 8-9).

After World War II nationalism was a threatening word that needed to be avoided and contested by the emerging idea of a united Europe. Consequently, the aspects of a state that were not explicitly related to nation-building were emphasised, such as social welfare, etc. For example, the criticism of Harald Swedner falls within this logic, when he accuses the pan-nationalistic conceptualisation of cultural policy to be "one of seven deadly sins of Swedish cultural policy" (Swedner 1978: 8). In contrast, some years later, *In From the Margins* (1997), initiated by the Council of Europe, emphasised the development of cultural identity as the first goal and the basis of state cultural policy. However, the more detailed discussion of this principle placed national identity last, after a long list of

all other possible forms of collective identification (*In From the Margins* 1997: 45-46). The monolithic principle of national culture is also criticised in *Our Creative Diversity* (1995), which sets out to promote a discourse of diversity. These publications are the cornerstones of the internationally "appropriate" discourse, which doubtlessly matters to Lithuanian cultural policymakers. Nevertheless, as we can see from this analysis, this discourse can hardly be called hegemonic in relation to the local Lithuanian nationalist discourse.

Certainly, the concepts of decentralisation, regionalisation, diversity and others are incorporated in the texts of Lithuanian cultural policy. Nevertheless, these concepts (originally being the expression of a deeper discourse structure) did not succeed in modifying the nationalistic core of Lithuanian cultural policy. Instead, they were inserted rather mechanically, despite their apparent ideological contradiction with local terms. For example, the principle of diversity strongly contradicts the principle of "one common ethnic culture," which fails to embrace diversity on the basis of ideological myths of tolerance. The principle of sustainable development clashes with a principle of "cultural mummification," which can be seen in the reactionary and defensive attitude presented in the CPR and other documents.

The argument commonly used by most Lithuanian cultural policy makers fits into a scheme of reactionary rhetoric mapped by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1991). Hirschman's thesis of futility can be seen in the usage of a victimised construct of the historical past, enabling one to render each geopolitical and social change as an actual or potential threat to national identity. Even the earlier ideological construct of the Lithuanian "return to Europe," which had served as one of the strongest arguments underpinning and motivating the secession from the Soviet Union, has become a challenge to the sterilised concept of national identity.

Conclusion

I have tried to demonstrate the formative function of national identity in the official discourse of Lithuanian cultural policy. Though national identity is defined in a primordial manner as a natural part of objective reality, the documents assume that only the state's cultural policy can ensure its stability and continuity. This assumption has its pragmatic reasoning. In this way, cultural policy discursively positions itself as politically significant by presenting the categories of culture, identity, and sovereignty as being constitutive to one another and maps conservative and defensive strategies in order to maintain the status quo.

The internationally approved rhetoric of cultural policy cannot compete with this discourse, which is so heavily rooted in the nationalistic tradition. The con-

tents of discourses possess their own symbolic capital and are valued differently in various discourse markets. In this way, the concepts that are traditionally connected to the idea of sovereignty are rated highest in nation-state politics. Consequently, the categories of ethnicity, culture, identity, and language are enormously politicised. Their legacy has deep historical roots and they are traditionally constitutive to the Lithuanian idea of political sovereignty. The constitutive role of these ideas in the discourse of cultural policy may be interpreted as one of the means of the institutionalisation of Lithuanian national identity. It is the task of my future research to address the multiple questions connected to the cultural policy discourse's relation and function within social practices, questions which have remained unanswered in this paper.

I hope that the case discussed in this article contributes to an increased understanding of the fact that the construction of national identity takes place not only on the level of cultural policy implementation, but also on the level of cultural policy as a bureaucratic and legal system. The discursive reality discussed here might look rather detached from everyday reality, almost as if it was locked in the corridors and drawers of the ministries. Nevertheless, it is closely related to the social world, as the official discourse maps the categories and normative landmarks that are later reproduced by both organisations and individuals acting in the domain of culture.

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Ethnopolitics in Latvia: Ethnopolitical Activities of State Institutions and Non-governmental Organisations and their Influence on the Social Integration Process

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ABSTRACT. The article is based on data from the survey "The Ethnopolitical situation in Latvia and its influence on the social integration process in the year of 2000". Through the commentary, the general climate of civil activism and ethnic relationships is highlighted. The paper concludes that despite many organisations, there is little constructive interaction between them; therefore their input in promoting social integration has been *limited* so far – both from the governmental and the non-governmental sides.

There are many reasons that provoke ethnopolitical activities in Latvia. As we know, Latvia is a state with an ethnically divided society. There are more than 130 different nationalities in Latvia; however, 99 percent of the population belongs to the ten largest national groups. These are Latvians, Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, Roma/Gypsies, Germans, and Estonians.

The complicated ethnic structure is not stable and proportional to all aspects of ethnic relations. For example, the use of language and cultural affiliation does not correspond to the ethnic structure of society. Linguistic affiliation divides the society into two parts, because people usually use either Latvian or Russian in their families. However, cultural affiliation forms a different structure, which corresponds neither to ethnic nor linguistic structure. Moreover, many people in Latvia do not belong to any single culture, and sometimes they form culturally a marginalised part of society.

The real potential of national minorities does not appear in the official statistics of Latvia because the amount of people who are involved in national minority activities and who really belong to national minorities is considerably smaller than the formal size of any concrete ethnic group shown in the statistics. This is one of the reasons for political manipulation, and it is therefore too difficult to formulate a concrete definition of national minority in Latvia. In general, we may define this situation as an initial period in the process of national minority formation, where self-identification from ethnic groups to na-

tional minorities is characterised by many organisational and political cleavages. In this article, I prefer to use a term "ethnic integration" and understand it as a process in which national minorities get involved in all aspects of life but at the same time maintain their ethnic identity, language, traditions, and way of life that are different from the dominant ethnic group. The active search for ways to influence politics and at the same time to preserve the ethnic integrity of one's group is at the core of ethnopolitics.

For the purposes of my article, I would like to define ethnopolitics as a harmonisation of interests among the state, the dominant ethnic group (Latvians), and the subordinated ethnic groups (national minorities). In order to maintain national security and reduce the possibilities and threat of ethnic conflicts, the state should be responsible for the coordination of all of these interests. The lack of clearly defined ethnic policies does not stimulate social integration. The goal of ethnic policies is therefore to strengthen integrative groups and to discourage non-integrative groups. The basic problem of ethnic policies in Latvia is how to maintain Latvian national values and at the same time guarantee the rights and interests of national minorities.

The aim of the legislative process regarding issues of language and education, which is still going on and which affects the whole ethnopolitical situation, is to change the historically formed legacy of ethnic relations. The other aim of legislation is to ensure a stable normative basis to protect the ethnic identity of Latvians. Latvia's demographic situation at present is also becoming a problem of ethnopolitics. The legacy of the russification policy pursued during Soviet times still has a strong impact on the ethnopolitical situation both as a demographic fact and as an issue in public perceptions. For instance, a factor of its own that is a part of this legacy is the large share of recent post-war, non-Latvian, immigrants.

All the aforementioned reasons form the basis of activities with a political content and give possibilities to different political subjects to implicate ethnic relations. This means that ethnic processes and the interests of national minorities are sometimes placed under the purposes of political parties. Some political parties that have an active role in ethnopolitics try to ensure voter support in parliamentary or local elections. As a result we get a politicised climate of ethnic relations that makes the process of societal integration more complicated. Therefore a contradiction appears on one side between the interest of the national minorities to maintain their ethnic identity, which could be realised mostly by developing their own cultural activities, and political activities on the other side.

Taking into consideration all these aspects, I will review the relevant state institutions, political parties, NGOs, and mass media and their main characteristics. I will argue that a vast number of public actors are in fact unavoidably

involved in ethnic politics. The article is based on data from the survey "The Ethnopolitical situation in Latvia and its influence on the social integration process in the year of 2000"[1] .

Activities of state institutions

The Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and some institutions subordinated to these ministries have a significant role in the fields of ethnopolitics and social integration. According to the jurisdiction of these institutions, we may point out activities with ethnopolitical content. These are: the language policy implemented by the state, the education policy, the naturalisation policy, the human rights protection policy for national minorities, and the policy of social integration.

The fact that the Latvian language and cultural rights must be strengthened by the law shows that the situation of the dominant ethnic group is not seen as secure yet. In further legislative processes this fact will remain relevant as well. However, the attempts of the state institutions to protect the dominant ethnic group provoke an active reaction among the various national minority organisations.

The dialogue between the state and national minorities is not sufficient. For example, in the process of adopting the new State Language Law in 1999 and the Regulations on its implementation in 2000 (promulgated 1 September 2000) the government and responsible state institutions conferred with international organisations and experts from Europe but not with representatives from the national minority organisations. That can be seen as a political mistake. The Regulations on the State Language Law have a direct impact on the national minorities because they elaborate in detail the circumstances under which the government can regulate language use in society, thereby impinging on the rights of people belonging to minorities to use their own languages.

The Regulations cover issues such as the circumstances when translation into Latvian must be provided at conferences and public meetings and the Latvian language requirements for various professions in the public sector. In amendments to the Regulations passed by the government on 21 November 2000, the government listed those professions in the private sector subject to Latvian language regulation. The list contains 34 categories that can be termed as proportionate and falling within a legitimate public interest. The list includes various health care professionals and security-related professions, as well as advocates and taxi drivers. However, the most critical will be the process of the imple-

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[1] The survey was prepared by six researchers, including myself, from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Latvia. The official presentation of the survey took place on July 3, 2001.

mentation of these Regulations, not the content of them. For example, in the state sector problems have become apparent in implementing the provision that state and municipal institutions may receive documents only in Latvian. Earlier documents could be submitted in Russian, German, and English. But I must regret that in practice this provision is not observed in many state institutions, including Parliament.

In the state's administrative level, there is no institution with appropriate capacity that could be responsible for cooperation with national minority organisations. This means that the whole mechanism of cooperation with these organisations is unclear. The same could be said about the order and size of financial support for national minorities cultural associations from the state budget. The 1991 "Law on Unrestricted Development and Right to Cultural Autonomy of Latvia's Nationalities and Ethnic Groups" is inadequate for present demands, and therefore it is necessary to adopt a new law and regulations on its implementation.

Also unclear is the reorganisation process and prospects to resume the activity of the "Consultative Council on Minorities of the President of Latvia". The Consultative Council was established in 1996. Representatives of eleven different national minorities, as well as members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Rights, came together several times a year. The aim of the council was to exchange and regularly discuss information related to issues affecting national minorities in Latvia, with an aim to provide guidelines and recommendations for actions. Despite a promising beginning, the former President Guntis Ulmanis was not able to fully develop this opportunity to strengthen government-minority dialogue and minority participation in public life, and the new President V. Vike Freiberga thinks that the reorganisation of the council is not suitable at all. The Consultative Council has not been officially abolished, but it is not convened any more. The problem is that members of political parties deliberated with each other but not with the representatives from the national minorities.

Even though the ethnopolitical cleavages keep deepening the gap between citizens and non-citizens, between the Latvians and the Russian-speaking part of society, the implementation of the National Programme for the Integration of Society in 2000 has been delayed. On 14 November 2000, the government decided to allocate $ 26,500 from the 2001 budget to create a three-person Integration Department within the Ministry of Justice to prepare the implementation of the programme. On 14 November the government also referred to Parliament a draft law on the creation of a Social Integration Fund through which government and donor contributions are to be channelled to support integration-related projects. In November, the Minister of Justice also created an Advisory Council on social integration issues, which met several times to discuss the draft programme, the draft law on the Integration Fund, and the work of the new Integration Department.

A number of integration initiatives at the municipal level also deserve mention. In April, the city of Ventspils adopted its own integration programme and created a non-citizen's Advisory Council, whose members participated in the work of the City Council during the remainder of the year. The Liepaja city government established a working group for the promotion of integration in 2000 which prepared a draft city integration programme.

Activities of non-governmental organisations

The first national minority organisations began their formation process before the restoration of the independence of Latvia in 1991. Today more than 20 minority cultural societies are members of the Latvian Association of National Cultural Societies. However, not all national minority organisations belong to this association. The Russian minority organisations work independently from the association and they form other societies.

It is important to distinguish between ethnopolitical and ethnocultural tendencies in national minority organisations' activities:

- Ethnopolitical tendency is represented by a few politicised Russian organisations.
- Ethnocultural tendency is represented by various minority cultural organisations.

Speaking about activities of NGOs, I would like to put major attention exactly on the politicised Russian organisations and their activities, and therefore I will describe the main ones.

The Russian Community of Latvia was established in 1993. Compared to the other organisations, the Community is more active in political life; it has close ties with some politicians in Russia. The Russian Community stands for preserving the previous status of the Russian language and the status of schools with Russian as a language of training. Besides that the Community advocates the right of non-citizens to vote at local elections and the revision of the Citizenship Law. In spite of this, different sociological research data prove that after 1998, when Latvia's Parliament had accepted amendments to the Citizenship Law to cancel the age quotas of naturalisation and give Latvian citizenship to the children of non-citizens, who were born in Latvia after 21 August 1991, the question of citizenship had already lost its importance to non-citizens. According to the research "On the Way to a Civil Society" (2001), at the end of 2000 only 20 percent of non-citizens were planning to apply for citizenship.

The main activities of the Russian Community in 2000 were connected with a campaign against the State Language Law. The Russian Community was one of the organisers of the public meeting that was held on 3 March 2000 to pro-

test against the language policy in Latvia. The Russian Community took part in all of the activities from June till September 2000 that related to the discussions and adoption of the Regulations on the State Language Law by the government. The Russian Community has a negative attitude about the government's National Programme "Integration of Society in Latvia" because it thinks that the programme anticipates the "assimilation of non-Latvians under compulsion".

The Latvian Human Rights Committee is also a well known organisation thanks to its activities related to issues of citizenship, education, and language. The Human Rights Committee considers itself a defender of the human rights of all non-citizens and non-Latvians in Latvia. The Human Rights Committee opposes the ethnic policies implemented by state institutions in Latvia. The Committee is against the social integration policy and promotes the idea of Latvia as a two-community divided state. The Human Rights Committee also contested the so-called bans on professions for non-citizens. In 1999 the Committee considered that non-citizens were discriminated in 55 areas compared to citizens of Latvia. Among them were 19 bans on professions. But today the Committee has changed this opinion and has recognised that the main opportunity to overcome these limitations is naturalisation and the further activity of so-called new citizens in elections and the political process.

The Latvian Support Association for Schools with Russian as a Language of Training was established in 1996. The aim of this association is to defend the interests of schools with Russian as a language of training and to try to preserve the previous status of these schools. In April 2000 the association took the initiative to prepare an appeal in which it called for changes in the Latvian Law on Education to stop the transition to state-supported education only in the state language. Representatives from ten national minority organisations put their signatures on the appeal. I would like to note that the new Law on Education had been accepted in 1998, establishing that in all state and municipal educational institutions (starting from Grade 10 in secondary schools) "education is received in the state language" (Article 9). Shifting all education to the state language should be finished by 2004.

But Article 9 of the new Law on Education also states that education can be acquired in another language: (1) in private educational institutions; (2) in state and municipal educational institutions in which minority education programmes are implemented. However, the content of "minority educational programmes" is not specified in the law, but is "to be worked out by the educational institutions in accordance with state educational standards using the general educational sample programmes approved by the Ministry of Education and Science as a basis". Article 41, paragraph 3 of the new law states that "The Ministry of Education and Science determines the subjects within minority educational programmes that are to be acquired in the state language". Another questionable provision is contained in Article 59, paragraph 2, which says that "The state

and municipalities may participate in funding private educational institutions if they implement state accredited educational programmes in the state language". This means that the possibility for minority private schools to receive state subsidies has been restricted, if not eliminated.

The consolidation process of Russian national minority organisations

In order to achieve political aims, 15 Russian minority organisations established a **Coordination Council of Social Organisations** in 1999. In August 2000, the Council united 23 organisations. The basis of the Council is the politicised organisations such as the Russian Community of Latvia, the Russian Society in Latvia, the Latvian Human Rights Committee, and Russian National Cultural Autonomy in Latvia. From other national minority organisations, only one Belarusian and one Ukrainian organisation are involved in the activities of the Coordination Council. Some organisations, for example, the Russian Cultural Society of Latvia and the Union of Citizens and Non-citizens, support only some activities of the Council.

In 2000 the Coordination Council has organised some political activities such as initiating a collection of signatures for minorities and non-citizens rights and preparing an "Appeal to the UN, Council of Europe, European Commission, OSCE, and CBSS". The aim of this process was to ask the international community to influence Latvian authorities and state institutions. The appeal was handed to the Parliament of Latvia in June 2000. Till that time 57,000 mostly non-Latvian signatures were collected. The demands included in the appeal represented the main trends of ethnopolitical activities of Russian minority organisations in 2000. Those included the following aims:

1. To ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities signed by Latvia in May 1995.
2. To ensure the possibility of the official use of national minority languages in areas that have dense populations of national minorities.
3. To guarantee the further existence of the state-supported educational system in the languages of minorities along with effective teaching of the Latvian language.
4. To grant voting rights at municipal elections to the permanent residents of Latvia who do not have Latvian citizenship but have lived in Latvia for five years or more.

The Coordination Council has regular and close ties with the parliamentary fraction of Union of Political Organisations "For Human Rights in the United

Latvia". The cooperative mechanism between this parliamentary fraction and the Coordination Council is comprised of two social councils. One of them is the Social Council for Education and the other is the Social Council for Human Rights. These councils are led by deputies from the parliamentary faction "For Human Rights in the United Latvia," and representatives from the Coordination Council of Social Organisations are involved in the daily work of the councils. Russian national minority organisations which are united in the Coordination Council of Social Organisations do not appreciate the cooperation with the aforementioned parliamentary faction and see it as conformist with regard to the interests and policy of any political party.

Politicised Russian minority organisations have a critical attitude to the Latvian Law on Education and to the State Language Law, and in such a way they try to influence the whole ethnopolitical situation in Latvia. At the same time not all Russian minority organisations choose political activism as their main strategy. Several Russian minority organisations (for example: the Russian Cultural Society of Latvia, the Baltic Slav Society, and the Association of Russian Cultural Officials) consider the preservation of an infrastructure and environment of Russian culture as their most important duty. However, when the state does not offer possibilities for a dialogue with national minorities and the "Consultative Council on Minorities of the President of Latvia" is not convening, Russian cultural organisations are seeking ways to solve their problems through cooperation with politicised organisations. No matter whether the dialogue with the state is successful or not, all Russian organisations are united regarding the strengthening of the position of the Russian language and the further existence of schools with Russian as the main language of training. The other national minority organisations are basically oriented to cultural activities, and they refrain from participation in political actions and meetings.

To sum up, by the year 2000, ethnopolitical activities in Latvia had evolved to produce several tendencies:

1. A consolidation process among the politicised Russian minority organisations arose as a reaction against the language policy implemented by state institutions. The consolidation process is a good example of the politicisation of ethnic interaction. From a theoretical point of view, it means that national minorities are mobilised to use political resources in order to protect their ethnic interests.

2. Incapable of obtaining a dialogue with the state, Russian national minority organisations found themselves more effective in interaction with the parliamentary faction Union of Political Organisations "For Human Rights in the United Latvia." The tactics and goals of minority organisations have been adapted to the politics of the parliamentary faction.

3. To achieve their goals, politicised organisations chose confrontational tactics and opted for public meetings and street pickets.

4. The chosen tactics of these organisations did not achieve broad support among the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. This fact proves that for the present these organisations have weak links with state institutions and the majority of the Russian-speaking population.

Conclusion

The large number of different ethnopolitical subjects in Latvia means the whole intensity of ethnopolitical activities is rather high. The ethnopolitical subjects that inspire activities or initiatives in the fields of ethnic relations usually (with some exceptions) are not well educated in the questions of solving ethnic problems and conflicts. The term to characterise this problem could be "ethnopolitical amateurism," which is widespread among individuals as well as the authorities of state institutions and the deputies of Parliament. And this is one of the reasons why the Russian-speaking population has a deep-rooted opinion that state institutions and authorities provoke wounded feelings and indignant emotions among a certain part of the Russian-speaking society.

It is remarkable that Latvians, in comparison to Russians, do not have a significant non-governmental organisation that could be involved in the solution of ethnopolitical problems. In other words, Latvians rely on Latvian political parties and state institutions, which act in the name of the law for the protection of their interests. The important Latvian mass media (especially the main newspapers), in comparison to the Russian mass media, also stand aside from active and emotional reflection on the ethnopolitical problems in the country.

In the opposite situation are the Russians in Latvia, who do not expect that their ethnic interests will be protected by the law. Therefore the Russian-speaking part of society is an important resource for political actors where they can seek support. Their ethnic interests and any small-scale activities become inevitably politicised due to cooperation with such political actor as the Union of Political Organisations "For Human Rights in the United Latvia".

The "third force," Russian newspapers, joined the tandem of Russian minority politicised organisations and the Union of Political Organisations. This united force appeared long before the year 2000, but it was consolidated during the language policy crisis and then it became a significant ethnopolitical subject among non-Latvians in Latvia.

Considering all of the above, the widespread opinion that there are no possibilities for ethnic conflicts or confrontation in Latvia to appear is simply an ungrounded, but common, stereotype. I must conclude that the progress towards implementation of the social integration policy has been very slow. In spite of many attempts in 2000, the government adopted the National Programme for

the Integration of Society only on 6 February 2001. However, since the spring
of 1999 the government has engaged in a dialogue with national minorities after
it launched a draft programme on the Integration of Society. In the well organ-
ised dialogue in many places in Latvia, thousands of people got their first idea
about societal integration and its role in society. Unfortunately, the well initi-
ated dialogue was changed in 2000 into non-integrative public meetings and
street pickets with an ethnopolitical content. Besides passively reacting to the
dynamics from the NGO side, there are many tasks for the state to actively
shape coherent policies, create their implementation mechanisms, and involve
other public actors in the policy process. Latvia as a state and as a society could
achieve more:

- if the intensity of ethnopolitical activities were decreased;
- if all ethnopolitical subjects became better educated in the fields of social
  integration and ethnic relations as well as solving ethnic conflicts;
- if ethnopolitical subjects linked separate ethnopolitical actions with a
  prospects of the state's national interests, with the two declared priori-
  ties of foreign policy of Latvia – to join the EU and NATO - and with
  an idea of social integration;
- if state institutions and Latvian political parties overcame the opinion
  that ethnopolitics is just an unimportant component of public life in
  comparison to economic problems and the process of privatisation.

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Lithuanian National Minority in Poland: Self-organisation of a Minority Group

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ABSTRACT. This paper reviews the situation of the Lithuanian minority in Poland by describing the main organisational efforts and public activities of the minority. The issues of non-governmental and political participation, language use in education and media, and cultural activity are covered. Alongside, the relevant data on population are presented. The overall climate in which minority lives is highlighted by remarks on minority-related Polish legislation and attitudes of the general public. The conclusion is made that the Lithuanians' strong skills of self-organisation has helped to maintain a distinctive ethnic community in spite of its small size and an occasionally non-supportive environment.

Introduction

In this paper, I shall review how a minority group organises its social and public life. I shall discuss the main forms of the particular minority organisations and activities. Through the efforts to organise itself as a distinctive community, a minority is able to maintain and reproduce its identity as well as integrate into the larger society as a group. By self-organisation, a minority can more effectively resist cultural and structural assimilation into the majority.

Lithuanians in Poland live in a rather compact area. They belong to the so called "historical" or "frontier" minorities. They have a strong level of self identification that is related to their beliefs about the past, common history, and cultural affinity. A very strong factor of identification is the usage of their native language, a fact which is different from majority of Polish society. Lithuanians in Poland have a strong collective identity; they feel a "group soul" and they recognise themselves as group members.

After the Second World War, Poland largely became an ethnically homogeneous country. National homogeneity was considered one of the fundamental achievements of the new state, especially when contrasted with respective problems faced during the inter-war period.

The Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland, adopted in the 1950s, guaranteed equal rights to all citizens and forbade national, racial, or religious discrimination. This meant acceptance of a general principle of non-discrimi-

nation as a basis of the protection of citizens, including people belonging to national minorities. Actually, at the beginning of the 1950s, all of the important national minorities in Poland gained the opportunity to create their own organisations controlled and financed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The principle "one minority – one organisation" was adopted and all attempts of minorities to create their own independent organisations were discouraged. These organisations were officially supposed to aim at cultivating the cultural traditions of national minorities; however, in reality they were treated as an instrument of control of the minority societies by the state administration. Education in minority languages and cultural activities in local society helped minorities to preserve their national identity.

After 1990, national minorities became more active on the political stage. National minorities demanded wider rights for self-organisation. They demanded to have their representatives in district councils and in the state departments that dealt with minorities. As a result, the issue of national diversity received more public attention and had to be discussed by the state authorities. One of the greatest puzzles was the very definition of national minority.

The term "national minority" is included in certain bilateral treaties concluded by Poland. However, Polish domestic law has no precise definition of the term "national minority". It can only be said that the state policies towards members of national minorities in Poland is pursued in the respect to citizenship, i.e. only persons who are Polish citizens are subject to the protection of minority rights. The problem of national (ethnic) self-definition is the decision of each individual. *The draft Act on the Protection of National Minorities* contains a definition of national minority: "a group of distinct origin, traditionally residing on the territory of the Polish state and constituting a minority compared to the rest of the citizens and which is characterised by the objective to sustain its culture, traditions, language, national, or ethnic consciousness" (Article 2 of *The draft Act on the Protection of National Minorities*).

The criteria that determine to which nationality one belongs are very indefinite and the state has not so far found the ways to include the issue of ethnic diversity into its policies. A certain legacy is the lack of research: in Poland, after the World War II research about national minorities was basically neglected up till 1990. In the 1990s, it was difficult to estimate the number of members of national and ethnic minorities. The national censuses held in 1950, 1960, 1978, and 1988 did not contain any questions about either nationality or native language.[1] Therefore, we have to resort to estimates. The population of national minorities in Poland ranges between 1-1.2 million people, which means that

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[1] The general census in 2002.05-06 contained questions about national identity and language spoken at home, but the data was not available at the time this paper was written.

representatives of minorities do not constitute more than 2-3 percent of the total number of Polish citizens. Thus, Poland is largely an ethnically homogeneous country and in this respect differs substantially from other states of central and eastern Europe.

The living conditions, legislative regulations, and social status of the Lithuanian minority of 15-20 thousand are relatively satisfactory. However, certain problems persist and are embedded in the overall political framework, which is incapable of addressing the challenge of diversity. The main problem in the public life of the minority is education in the minority language and financing of the minority's cultural events. In order to safeguard the minority's rights, there has to be a clear government policy towards the national minority. In the autumn of 1993, the Sejm Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities initiated work on a Draft Minority Act. In its evolution, this document has been substantially changed and the foreseen rights for minorities have been pared down. However, the Draft Minority Act has not been adopted. There are several reasons to explain why the act has not passed and why work on it has been so slow. First of all the necessity of this kind of document is still being questioned. There is no clear position among officials on whether minorities should have such an act, or whether the Constitution and other legislative acts protect the rights of national minorities satisfactorily. The other reason for not passing this act is because other legislative work and reforms dominate the work of the Sejm, and the problem of minorities is not given high priority. A decision regarding the act has not been taken, and now it is up to the Sejm Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities whether to stop work on this policy document or resume further work on it. The national minorities themselves appeal for passing the act because they expect it to solve many of the problems of minorities.

Remigijus Motuzas, the former director of Lithuania's Department of National Minorities, stated that the "issues of national minorities should be solved on the basis of parity, but the problem is that the Poles seem to be more concerned about their nationals living outside the country than about the situation of national minorities inside Poland."[2] He added that no resolution was found to any of the contentious issues, including the spelling of names in official documents and the controversial border troop base in the Polish town of Punsk, inhabited by mostly Lithuanians. It is true that governmental policy towards national minorities would be more focused if an Act on the Protection of National and Ethnic Minorities would be accepted. More focused policy would likely enable the government to address the requests of minorities and solve them in a less complicated way.

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[2] *RFE/RL News line* Vol. 3, No. 129, Part II, 2 July 1999

Population and self-identification
of Lithuanians in Poland

The population of the Lithuanian national minority is 15-20 thousand people, members of which inhabit, in close concentrations, Suwalki voivodship in the northeast of Poland. They live mostly in Punsk commune, where they constitute 80 percent of the inhabitants. In the territories of Sejny and Szypliszki they comprise 30 percent and 10 percent of the inhabitants respectively. According to statistics, in 1993, Lithuanians numbered around 3,600 in Punsk, 3,100 in Sejny, and 400 in Szypliszki. All together there are around 7100 Lithuanians in this area (Rocznik statystyczny wojewodztwa suwalskiego 1994: 40-41). The autochtonous communities in the northeast of Poland are only part of the Lithuanians in the country. There are Lithuanian communities in various cities in Poland: Suwalki – 500 people, Warsaw – 400, Wroclaw – 250, and many others. Many who grew up in the border region have moved to the central part of Poland because of marriage, work, or education. We can affirm that there are around 25,000 Lithuanians in Poland who define themselves as Lithuanians (Tarka 1998: 194-195). Nevertheless we have to stress that the number of Lithuanians in Poland has decreased during the last few decades.

National identity is a part of an individual's concept of him-/herself. Via the perceptions and beliefs one holds about the unique past, common history, and culture, identity is closely linked with ethnicity. Most factors related to identity formation and personality development such as family role or values have a national or ethnic variability. Family is of the most significant factors in personality formation and in the transmission of ethnic culture. However, members of the Lithuanian minority are sometimes shy about their differences, and parents prefer not to teach their children about their ethnic background. This is displayed by such behaviour as talking in public places not in their native language but in the majority's language.[3]

We can notice that knowledge of language is the main element of national self-consciousness among Lithuanians. Although most of them are bilingual, the Lithuanian language is still their main language. It is their language of communication. According to the joint research from the Polish and Lithuanian Departments of Statistics, 97.9 percent of Lithuanians living in Poland declared that their knowledge of their native language was very good. 1.6 percent recognised their knowledge as poor, 0.1 percent only understood Lithuanian language, and 0.4 percent did not answer this question (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Departament Statystyki Litwy 1995: 66-67). The high level of knowledge of their

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[3] The incident about language discrimination in local society was described by students of Punsk secondary school in the letter „*Mes... lietuviškos kekšės?*" published in *Aušra* (2002/20).

native language command is result of education in the minority language, and is related to the fact that language is given great symbolic significance as an expression of identity.

Most Lithuanians who live in Poland identify themselves with the Lithuanian nation, but 9.9 percent associate themselves with the Polish nation (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Departament Statystyki Litwy 1995: 66-67). Given that ethnic understanding of a nation prevails in this region, we can suppose that associating oneself with the Polish nation is influenced by one's situation. In other words, this can be the consequence of mixed Lithuanian-Polish families, the influence of society, or assimilation. Ethnic intermarriage and the incidence of ethnically mixed families are used as indicators shedding light on involvement in structural assimilation. Mixed marriages tend to loosen the structural bonds to the group of origin and to intensify acculturation. Very possibly marital assimilation also contributes to assimilation (Berry 1997).

The authors of the aforementioned research state that the high level of national self-consciousness among Lithuanians is the consequence of good conditions for national minorities in Poland to enshrine their native language and culture. Nevertheless we cannot forget that this national minority sustained their identity thanks to strong self-organisation rather than to ill-defined state support. Education in the Lithuanian language and the work of non-governmental organisations helped to keep Lithuanian culture in Poland alive. Residing in a homogeneous territory is but a premise to develop community life, practice direct communication, and remain Lithuanian. Active cultural, social, and organisational skills are a crucial factor.

Non-governmental organisations

The democratisation process of Poland's political system since 1989 has changed the way that public life functions. The state withdrew from the function of organiser and "censor" of public life. The transformation of the legal system resulted in restrictions concerning the establishment of associations and the organisation of political activities being lifted. For national minorities, the abolishment of the principle "one minority – one organisation" was of great importance.

Under the Act On Associations (1987)[4], representatives of national minorities enjoy the freedom to establish associations and organisations. However, the

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[4] The 07.04.1989 act provides that a group of at least 15 persons may found an association, which is subject to registration in court in order to become legal entity. The activity of the association is supervised by the voivode where the seat of the association is located.

exact number of minority organisations is not known, as there is no central register of these organisations in Poland. The organisations of national minorities form a mosaic in terms of forms, sizes, and activities; however, a socio-cultural association is the basic form of their organisation. The national minority organisations are financed by state funds that are earmarked for performing a particular activity. These activities are mainly financed by state subsidies allocated by the Ministry of Culture and Arts. They cover almost 80 percent of expenses of minority organisations. The remaining funds are obtained from membership fees, economic activities, and foreign aid. State subsidies are of a subject nature, which means that they are earmarked for financing specific cultural events and not for covering permanent costs connected with the functioning of an organisation (like the salaries of full-time workers). Subsidies granted for financing the activities of minority organisations and cultural initiatives are the only resources available to these organisations from the state.

Although the first Lithuanian organisation was founded in 30-31 March 1957, the period after 1989 was a new era in cultural and social life for all of the ethnic communities. In 1995, the oldest Lithuanian organisation LVKD, Lithuanians' Cultural and Social Association, was replaced by the Association of Lithuanians in Poland. This entity still identifies its main goals as a typical ethnocultural organisation:

- Solving the problems of the Lithuanian minority,
- Taking care of cultural and amateur activity,
- Supervising education in the Lithuanian language,
- Guarding cultural monuments and places.

In 1990 part of the members of the Lithuanians' cultural and social association established the St. Kazimieras association, whose roots reach back to the pre-World War II period. This association was founded because there was a need for a legal entity that could co-ordinate the building of a cultural centre in the town of Sejny. The St. Kazimieras association emphasised its religious character and established a choir in the Sejny church. The main problem of this association is its low effectiveness (Tarka 1998: 198).

In 1993, the most active organisation, the Community of Lithuanians in Poland, was established. All people who identify themselves as Lithuanians are automatically considered members of this organisation. This organisation represents the interests of Lithuanians as a kind of representative government. The main purpose of this organisation is to retain national identity, to propagate Lithuanian culture, and to participate in political and social life.

Non-governmental organisations are the greatest contributors to the social life of Lithuanian communities. Their activities are aimed at organising artistic events, running amateur artistic groups, and publishing newspapers, magazines,

and books in the Lithuanian language. Since the majority of the members of the Lithuanian community live in the countryside, cultural activities usually have the character of local folklore events (galas, open-air events, and festivals). While most organisations are mainly oriented towards cultural life and education in the minority language, the main difference between the organisations is their effectiveness. Basically we can divide all of the Lithuanian organisations in Poland into those that have actual influence on the community and which are active and those that are of limited scope (Lithuanian Teachers' Association, Lithuanian Youth Association).

One can note several issues related to the functioning of Lithuanian non-governmental organisations. First, the organisational structure is weak. There is only one active and really effective organisation. Second, there is a lack of young and well-educated leaders. Third, there is low involvement of the Lithuanian community in the functioning and work of these organisations. This is slowly eroding the Lithuanian community's communal life. The functioning of non-governmental organisations is more effective in Punsk, where Lithuanians are the majority in the community and the community is more involved. In Sejny, where Lithuanians are a minority (30 percent of the population), assimilation is in progress and people are less interested in the minority's political and social affairs. Although non-governmental organisations have achieved much in the development of Lithuanian culture and language, in the district of Sejny, there are less people who care to express their loyalty to the Lithuanian community (Maksimavičius 2002).

All of these problems cause barriers for community development and realisation of the main goals of the ethnic NGOs. Therefore other means of expressing communal solidarity and the will for recognition, such as political activity, can become increasingly important.

## Political activities of the minority

The provisions of some legal acts in 1991 and 1993 concerning elections to the Sejm included special electoral preferences for minority organisations (election committees) that were not included in the act on elections to the Senate (upper chamber of the Polish parliament). The act of 28 June 1991 provided electoral committees of national minorities organisations certain procedural preferences in submitting constituency and national lists of candidates for deputies (article 70, 76 and 100; Paransevičius 1996: 31-67). Pursuant to the provisions of these acts minority election committees were allowed to present a lower number of signatures for votes supporting the committee constituencies (two instead of five). The committees were given the right to submit a national list regardless of the

number of constituency lists registered and were exempted from the requirement to obtain at least five percent of valid votes.

The Lithuanian minority participated in national elections in 1991, 1993, and 2001, but no Lithuanian ever entered the Sejm as an MP. The head of the district of Punsk participated in elections for the Sejm in 2001 and collected 1,649 votes, but he didn't get elected. Members of the Lithuanian community gave almost 90 percent of their votes to the left wing party (Bockowska 2002 : 21). The political activity of the Lithuanian community yields much more tangible results in the local government elections. Although the act on the election to the local authorities does not ensure any preferences for minorities, Lithuanian representatives are quite successful on this level.

In the Punsk district council elections of 1990, 16 of the 18 council members were Lithuanians. In 1994, 15 out of 18 were Lithuanian, and in 1998 there were 13 Lithuanians on the Punsk council. In the elections held in 2002, the community elected 14 Lithuanians out of 15 council members (Maksimavičius 2002, see Graph 1).

GRAPH 1. National structure of Punsk Council.

The fact that the representatives of the minority participate in the work of local authorities on a regular basis has resulted in them acquiring the status of 'master of the locality'. This is evidence that minorities are socially accepted at the local level. Lithuanians organise their community by themselves, and they seek to have as many Lithuanians as possible on the councils of Punsk and Sejny[5]. This allows them to better promote the community, to protect their rights effectively, and to continue their strategy of consolidating the group via public activities.

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[5] However, there is only one Lithuanian representative on the Sejny town council.

Language use in public education and media as the means of identity preservation

Education in the native languages of the national minorities is one of the most important instruments that allows people belonging to these minorities to preserve and develop their distinct identity and pass on knowledge about their mother tongue and culture to future generations. Recent legal regulations enable minorities residing in Poland to study their native languages and to be instructed in these languages. They are contained in the Act on the Educational System (7 September 1991; for larger coverage of legal aspects, see Paransevičius 1996). Article 13 of the act states that "public schools shall enable pupils to retain their sense of national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity, and in particular, shall make possible for them to learn their own language, history, and culture"[6]. The provisions of this article were followed by a resolution from the Minister of National Education (24th March 1992) that stated that education should be organised in such a way as to allow pupils belonging to national minorities to maintain a sense of national, ethnic, and language identity (*Dziennik Ustaw* of 1992. No. 34. Item 150).

The resolution permits instruction in the native language of a minority in kindergartens, primary and secondary schools (general and vocational), and vocational schools. Such instruction is provided in primary school (or in kindergarten) if the child's parents declare their interest in instruction in the minority language as the native language. The declaration must be submitted to the principal of the school that the child attends and is valid for the whole period of schooling. At the secondary school level, students have to make such declarations themselves. Three types of schools may be organised depending on the number of declarations made (Lodzinski 1999):

1) Schools with a *"non-Polish language of instruction"* offer extended hours of native language learning where subject instruction, with the exception of Polish language, literature, and history classes, is provided in the native language of a minority and information about the country and culture of the minority is added to the history and geography curricula. The number of hours devoted to teaching the native language should be equal to the number of hours devoted to teaching the Polish language.

2) *Bilingual* schools (or kindergartens) provide instructions in two equivalent languages, i.e. Polish language and the language of the national minority.

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[6] *Dziennik Ustaw* of 1991. No.95. Item 425. Ustawa z 7 września 1991 roku o systemie oświaty.

3) There are schools with "*additional study in the native language of a minority*," where that native language is obligatory for pupils who declared so and should be provided by the school. Geography and history classes include information regarding country and culture of a certain ethnic group; however, the board of education of the school takes decisions in this respect.

4) "*Inter-school groups*" are composed of pupils from different schools for whom additional native language study is organised.

The provisions of the resolution of 1992 specify the minimum number of pupils who may constitute classes with a minority language of instruction. These classes are composed of seven pupils in primary schools, fourteen in secondary schools, and at least three pupils in inter-school groups. The selection of additional topics to the curricula regarding the history, geography, and culture of a certain minority are left to the discretion of the board of education of the school. The resolution provides that those schools with "non-Polish language of instruction may issue bilingual certificates (in Polish and in the minority native language)".

In 2001 / 2002 education in the Lithuanian language included (Strategia rozwoju oswiaty 2001: 6-7):

1. Primary schools (four schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction, three schools in which Lithuanian is taught as a subject, four schools with additional study in the Lithuanian language, one interschool group),

2. Gymnasium (two schools with Lithuanian as the language of instruction, one inter-school group)

3. High school (one school with Lithuanian as the language of instruction)

Compared to previous regulations, the resolution substantially enlarged the scope of educational opportunities for minorities by extending to children in kindergartens and vocational schools; reducing the minimum number of pupils in classes, inter-classes, and inter-school groups; and introducing bilingual certificates.

Since 1 January 1996, financing of primary schools (i.e. primary schools for minorities) has been taken over by the units of local administration (communes). Funds earmarked for their financing are transferred from the central budget to the commune budgets in the form of subventions. Subventions for minority schools increased by 20 percent (per one primary school pupil) as operating costs also increased. Secondary schools are still centrally financed from the budget of the Ministry of National Education.

Besides the financial problems typical of all of Poland's educational system, the most significant difficulty minority education encounters is the lack of textbooks and teachers with appropriate pedagogical qualifications. Many textbooks,

mainly reading primers and textbooks for elementary classes in primary schools, are imported from the "native" countries of minorities and freely distributed. The remaining textbooks, as well as educational curricula, are prepared with the help of teachers and writers originating from minority circles.

On the community side, sometimes there is some lack of creative initiative from community members in supporting their own education. On one hand, there are people and organisations that seek to organise education in the Lithuanian language and provide high quality education. On the other hand, there are community members who are passive or indifferent concerning the preservation of educational and school system.

In 1999, the Polish educational system underwent certain reforms. What have the results of the national educational reform and its consequences for Lithuanian education in Poland been? The main issue for minorities was exam regulations. The reforms introduced examinations after each educational stage:

1. After completing six classes, there is an examination of pupils. A Lithuanian language examination is not provided. All examinations are held in the Polish language, even if pupils were learning in the Lithuanian language.

2. After completing gymnasium there are examinations, but there is no Lithuanian language exam and all exams are in Polish language. Pupils have no possibility to take examinations in their native language.

3. School leaving examinations can be taken in Polish or in a student's native language. Pupils can choose the language. There is also a Lithuanian language examination.

The examination procedures often raise confusion in the community and among the parents. Pupils get their education in their native language, but they take examinations in another language (Polish). Pupils cannot take examinations in the Lithuanian language (their native language), and this makes them more confused. Because there are no native language exams after the first two educational stages, it is very likely that students will not take school leaving examinations in their native language. The view with the minority itself is that when there is no examination in the native language, then the prestige of that language sharply decreases. Young people can be discouraged to use their native language and feel ashamed to use it among community members.

The members of Lithuanian community are also concerned about the financial problems that have a big influence on the quality of the minority's education; the community is often worried by uncertainty about the future of education in the minority language. In 1999, two schools in Wojtokiemie and Przystawance were reorganised and only a three-stage school has been left there. It is suspected that these schools will be closed because it is too expensive to support them (the groups are small and there are not enough pupils). In Punsk

there is only one school building in which there are 4 schools: primary, gymnasium, secondary, and music school. There is not enough room in classes and pupils are forced to learn in the corridors or halls. It should not be forgotten that schools of national minorities are much more than mere premises of education – they are a cultural centre for all of the region. Most cultural events take place at the school building; pupils have their dance and singing classes there. By closing such small community schools, the local population is deprived of the means to carry on its own cultural and social life.

Besides education, linguistic practice depends on access to radio and television programs in the minority language. The issues concerning minorities are present in public mass media under the existing legal guarantees of the Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting which state that "duties of public radio and television shall include in particular [...] consideration of the needs of national minorities and ethnic groups" (*Dziennik Ustaw* of 1993. No 7. Item 34). The access of national minorities to radio and television did improve in the 1990s, mainly at the region level. Once a week the local station in Bialystok broadcasts a program in Lithuanian and a 30-minute program in Ukrainian. However Lithuanians who live in other districts have no access to public television or radio programs in their language.

According to a statistical survey in 1994, over 94 percent of Lithuanians in Poland declared that they have the possibility to read magazines and newspapers in their native language (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Departament Statystyki Litwy 1995: 44-45, 58-59). The Lithuanian press in Poland basically consists of one magazine, *Aušra*. In 1991 the 100th issue of this magazine was published. Most of the magazine's themes apply to the social, cultural, and political life of the minority. There are articles about relations between Poland and Lithuania, foreign affairs reviews, and comments. The publisher *Aušra* also prints *Aušrelė*, a magazine for children and *Suvalkietis*, a magazine for Suwalki Lithuanians. In *Suvalkietis* there are articles about the historical background of the Lithuanian minority and news from Lithuanians activities in the town of Suwalki (Tarka 1998: 223-228). Given the relatively small target group, the activities of *Aušra* are quite successful; the magazine also has an Internet version.

National minorities in Polish society

Before concluding, I would like to highlight the broader context to which a minority has to adapt, and that sets up the framework in which an ethnic minority organises itself as a distinct group.

Polish society is convinced of its national homogeneity. Only one-fifth (19 percent) of Poles surveyed in 1994 estimated the population of national minorities in Poland in figures similar to the above-mentioned data (i.e. 1 million

persons). The majority of people (81 percent) estimated that the minority population was at a lower level than it is in reality (2 percent of people estimated that the population of minorities was around 100 thousand people, 17 percent believed that it was between 100-220 thousand persons, 11 percent guessed that it was between 200-300 thousand persons, and 21 percent thought that it was 300-700 thousand persons) (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 1994: 1-3). This is the result of both lack of information about national minorities living in Poland (at schools, in the mass media, etc.) and little interest in these problems.

After communism in Poland collapsed, Polish society faced the problem of working out a new formula of how citizens not of Polish origin could be represented. The revival of ethnic identities and the public activities of national minorities worried the Polish community ("the majority community"). Democratic changes in Poland's political system in 1989 gave national minorities the opportunity to get involved in social and political life, and national minorities became a subject of the government's national and local policy. The activity of national minorities increased rapidly and they began to postulate the protection of their rights. Legal authorities and society were surprised because they were used to minorities as a reminder of Poland's multinational history or as a sign of folklore. It is important to see the attitude of Poles towards national minorities. How do Poles see national minorities and how do they feel about them? Who do they like or whom they do not like? What kind of rights do they want to grant them?

A significant majority of Poles agree to grant the residing national minorities the rights to: worship their religions freely (93-96 percent), publish materials in their national languages (81-85 percent), use a native language as a language of instruction in public schools (72-75 percent), possess their own broadcasting stations (62-65 percent). However, the idea of granting political rights to national minorities, the right to hold posts in local authorities (64-68 percent), to participate in elections to the Sejm and Senate (48-51 percent), to perform managerial functions in the state administration and in the economy (58 percent), and to have double citizenship (39-42 percent), is less supported (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 1991).

In 1994, Poles expressed positive opinion of the members of the following national minorities living in Poland: Slovaks (42 percent) and Czechs (38 percent). Almost one-third of respondents also expressed that they like Lithuanians (32 percent) and Germans (28 percent); however, in the case of the latter balance between liking and disliking was equal (30 percent), while Lithuanians were disliked by 18 percent of Poles. The attitude towards certain minorities depends on the level of education of the respondents – the higher it is, the more likely they are to have positive feelings towards minorities (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 1994).

In the perceptions of Lithuanians by Polish society, further positive changes can be observed. This situation has also influenced the social attitudes of rep-

resentatives of national minorities whose activities and aspirations are better understood by the Poles. The Lithuanian minority is rather small in comparison with the German or Ukrainian minorities. This might affect the attitudes of Poles towards minorities. Historical background is also a significant component of prejudice as Poles and Lithuanians share a long and intertwined history, as well as certain national myths. Nevertheless, the systemic data about how representatives of minorities living in Poland estimate their situation is not available. It may be stated that the Lithuanians generally accept the status of a national minority within the Polish state and society despite the sense of a lack of equality with the Polish majority. Research about the Lithuanian minority in Poland did not show signs of its discrimination or polonisation. The majority of Lithuanians surveyed (88.1 percent) have not confirmed any signs of discrimination and only 4.4 percent of them perceived such signs. They positively estimate the issue of coexistence with the Poles in their places of permanent living (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Departament Statystyki Litwy 1995: 44-45, 58-59). Changes in the state policy towards minorities in the 1990s are accompanied by changes in the attitudes of these communities and in their relations with the majority of the society. It is important that nobody denies his or her national status. However, before the General Census (05.21-06.08.2002), some representatives of national minorities declared that they were afraid to declare their ethnicity. According to Myron Kertyczak of the Union of Ukrainians in Poland, Ukrainians prefer not to disclose their ethnic identity because they are afraid of the resulting consequences in the office or at school. According to Kertyczak, "minorities feel that they are treated unequally, therefore we have objections to the question about ethnicity". Senator Henryk Kroll, who represents the German minority in Poland's upper chamber, pointed to an example of inequality in the census itself: "The census is unequal in its foundation. When a Pole declares Polish ethnicity, he does not have to answer further questions. When a minority declares a different ethnicity, he has to answer additional questions; for example, about the language he uses at home" (*Minorities dislike questions*… 2002).

The attitudes of Poles towards minorities became more open, although their distance to certain groups is still significant. Minorities coexist well with Polish society, but still it is a lot to do to make Poles aware of the ethnic composition of society. Most Poles admit that minorities should sustain their ethnicity, but they don't wish them to be different. This applies to linguistic rights or election rights. More importantly, a reserved attitude remains in the circles of the policy planners. According to the provisions of the Decree of 1945 "Polish shall be the official language of the Republic of Poland. All government and self-government authorities and administrative bodies shall use Polish in performance of their official duties" (*Dekret o języku państwowym*…1945). The Decree of 1945 still applies.

Concluding remarks

Besides the internal activities of the Lithuanian minority that tell us about a strong collective identity, I would like to mention the importance of external stimuli. The wish to resist assimilation forces the minority to actively organise its public life, in which the orientation towards cultural events, organisation of education, and language predominate. However, minority self-organisation is stimulated not only by the usual cultural goals, but also by the changes in local life emerging from the apparently unrelated sources such as the army. An example of self-organisation and mobilisation stimulated from the outside was the establishment of an army frontier post in Punsk. This act of the Polish government was recognised by the local community as an attempt to assimilate Lithuanians. A protest committee was established and all the community acted in a very consolidated way (Jurkūnas 2001).

Although Poland has signed all of the main treaties that concern national minorities, they are rarely used in practice. Administrative officials and courts are often not familiar with international law and this causes many problems. At the local level, one may sometimes notice a tendency to be prejudiced on ethnic grounds; on a broader scale, one may notice a tendency to regard minorities as a kind of danger. A particular case can become a subject of interest to the central authorities and the mass media after conflict has emerged. Minority education problems or issues of funding are solved not in the corresponding ministries, but they are discussed during the meetings of Lithuania's and Poland's presidents or prime ministers. Minority problems are usually discussed or solved only after they appear at the highest level. Television or mass media involves all society, and often minorities are shown in a position of appealer and state authorities in a position of a donor. Issues about minorities in Poland always cause emotions inappropriate to their significance and the real size of minority population. However, rarely have those emotions been channelled into positive policy making. The review of a small minority group such as Lithuanians in Poland shows that national policy has its own dynamics barely related to actual minority life and that the self-organisation skills of the community are crucial for its identity in the changing environment.

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